Century of EndeavourPolitics in the 1910s(c) Roy Johnston 2003(comments to rjtechne@iol.ie)There are indications of JJ's advanced political position in the records of the Oxford student debates in the period 1910-12, where he supported women's suffrage and other progressive issues. The key political statement in this period undoubtedly was Civil War in Ulster, published in 1913, in time for the Ballymoney rally of Protestant liberal support for Home Rule in November. There was a letter from his brother James in JJ's possession, dated February 5 1914, which relates to the aftermath of Civil War in Ulster. I tried unsuccessfully to scan it in, but the contrast is not great. I have filed it in folder 31, along with the rest of the papers relating to this book. James expresses surprise that the book which they had hoped would 'set the Thames on fire' has only 'set the town of Dungannon', which location he is glad to have left: '...such snobishness as is found there it would be hard to parallel in any part of the civilised world..'. He went on '..I am beginning to think that the Ulster question will not be solved without some shooting, and only hope that when it takes place, some of the bullets may reach at least a few of the selfish well-to-do people who are engineering the thing for their own dishonest purposes, and not the poor dupes whom they have got to pull their chestnuts out of the fire..'. He reported on a conversation with one D Brown about Home Rule: even if they succeeded in averting it there would always be 80 members in the Commons demanding it. But the priests were against it, according to Brown; the perception was that the Church wanted to maintain Catholic representation in Westminster. If this was the case, replied James, then we should be opposing the priests by supporting Home Rule. Brown then came back with a quote from TP O'Connor's speech about sweated workers in Belfast, Brown commenting '...if these fellows from the south begin interfering in labour questions which they do not understand, all business would become impossible. James then mentions Samuel's comment on this (the conversation must have taken place when James was in Ireland and in the company of his brother Sam): '...Brown was getting his workers to fight in order to prevent the Irish parliament from interfering for the purpose of raising their wages, which is the situation in a nutshell, and which if there is a second edition, I hope you will be able to bring into the book..'. He goes on to mention a cutting from the Referee, '..confirming our estimate of the three main props of the Unionist party...' and wants it worked in to the second edition; '...if you have not received it, it would be quite worth while looking up the files of the paper for the month of December... it was really too quaint for words.... You have also I hope got my cutting from the review in the mid-Ulster Mail, in which your main contentions ere unconsciously admitted.' It becomes evident from this letter that the book was a James-Joe collaboration; he has many more ideas for the projected second edition: response to Mahaffey and Stephen Gwynn, and expunging the section about the rifles. He has and will send the book of sermons, and he wants JJ to send him the one on military history. JJ can keep the one on land tenures. After a digression about the problems of buying a car in India, James concludes by urging JJ not to say any more than that he had frequently consulted him about it, and that he (James) had brought stuff in print to his (Joe's) notice. Then, finally, '..if ever you turn your studies to theology, your experience in this connection may enable you to invent some brilliant theories about the composition of the Bible, which will make you as renowned in that field as you have become in that of politics..'. The foregoing confirms what I had accepted as family lore, that James had a substantial role in the writing of Civil War in Ulster and that the sense of maturity of the arguments in the book must be attributed to this collaboration.
Encounter with Horace PlunkettI am indebted to the Plunkett Foundation, and to Kate Targett who was Librarian at the time I visited it, for the opportunity of discovering in the Plunkett diaries the following entry on 2 March 1914:"In evening Joseph Johnston FTCD age 23 who had been writing on the Ulster crisis from a Nationalist point of view (with great learning & no experience) dined & talked over the situation. He wanted me to join in a Conference but I argued doing nothing for a while." I interpret this as meaning that HP means 'doing nothing in terms of a convention right then', not that nothing should be done. Clearly JJ was attempting to mobilise Protestant opinion in favour of all-Ireland Home Rule and against the armed threat posed by Carson, and he regarded the IAOS and Plunkett's Department of Agriculture as important factors in the development of all-Ireland political and economic organisation. Plunkett however seems apparently not alive at this time to the seriousness of the threat, which manifested itself only weeks later with the Larne gun-running. There remains however work to be done on the Plunkett diaries, and there may be further insights.
The subsequent record however is sparse; he seems to have concentrated on his work with the DU Co-operative Society, and on relating his Albert Kahn and subsequent French experience to the economic development question. Although 1916 came as a shock, he seems to have appreciated its significance, and contributed to work in the background of the 1917 Convention; he is mentioned in James Douglas's memoirs in this context. There are references in the Garnier correspondence to Manchester Guardian articles, in which a Canadian-type solution is advocated, not unlike what subsequently emerged with the Treaty, though of course without Partition, to which surgical process JJ remained resolutely opposed throughout his life. This was almost certainly spin-off from his attempts to influence the Convention, with James Douglas and others.
Before the Easter RisingThe position of JJ with regard to the war seems to have been supportive, on the principle of defence of French republican democracy, which he had come to admire thanks to his Albert Kahn experience, against Prussian militarism. He remained critical of the British regarding the way in which they had allowed the Home Rule process to be subverted by the Tory gun-runners. He outlined his position in a letter to a newspaper which was published in January 1916, the date Jan 15 being associated with the signature. I found a galley-proof ( not a cutting) of the letter among his papers, alas without attribution, but the column is headed 'First Letter Wednesday', and the heading is 'Compulsion vs Voluntarism'.In this letter, which runs to about 30 column inches (ie not a typical letter to the editor), JJ introduces himself as the author of Civil War in Ulster, and as sharing the Editor's aspiration for the success of the national cause. The main thrust of the letter is to try to persuade the Nationalists to do a conscription deal with the British such as to undermine the Unionist position on the Amending Bill which introduced Partition. JJ's own position was ambivalent. He had considered volunteering during his Albert Kahn world tour, and then rejected the idea. Later he referred to having written the first draft of his Albert Kahn Report while sitting around in TCD waiting to be conscripted. He was resigned to conscription coming, but wanted to ensure that when it was applied to Ireland it should not only be seen to be fair (as regards exempted categories etc) but should be used as a political lever to keep all-Ireland Home Rule intact. Partition for JJ was the greatest of evils, to be avoided at all costs. Opposition to conscription was seen as playing into the hands of the Ulster partitionists. He was critical of the 'voluntary system' because he regarded it as being unfair in the way that vulnerable, and often quite unsuitable, people were pressurised into 'volunteering'. In the letter he made the case that there were many who had been pressurised onto volunteering who would be better serving the war effort by using their skills in production at home. So he wrote this letter, perhaps to the Freemans Journal or the Independent, making the case that Nationalists should campaign for a fair conscription procedure to dedicated national service (the result in each case not necessarily being actual military service), in return for the re-reinstatement of Home Rule on a all-Ireland basis, without Partition.
I have scanned the Times for September, and I found an article ('from a correspondent') on September 8 1916, headed Ireland Today / Spread of Sinn Fein / Political Cross-Currents. It begins with a scholarly reference to the fatalism expressed in the writings of Edmund Spenser: '...they say it is the fatal destiny of that land that no purposes whatsoever which are meant for her good will prosper and take good effect'. The author reports on '...a journey...undertaken with the object of making an independent study of the condition of the country without the pilotage of leaders of political parties, though their opinions where sought received the great attention they deserve.' (The opening quote supports the hypothesis that this was JJ; also travel during the TCD long vacation would have been feasible.) He noted that Sinn Fein had gained support from the Nationalists, the reasons given being (a) that the Nationalists participated in the Coalition, (b) that they agreed to the 'mutilation' of Ireland, and (c) that they omitted to procure for the Dublin rebels that measure of clemency with which rebellion in another part of the Empire was treated. He goes on to describe the wide variety of types of people who are in Sinn Fein: '..men whose influence on the masses of the people might be made productive of good...', '...professions which ordinarily moderate political enthusiasms..', '..well-read, well-travelled and earnest...students of political history and political economy..'. '...The masses certainly contain combustible material - youths with wild notions of heroism and misdirected military ardour, and women and girls and mere children who have been worked up to something like a revivalist ecstasy...', '..the poor have been given ideals which they never before associated with politics, for the Sinn Fein programme is still sentimentally 'patriotic', literary and industrial...'. '..Thus a great movement has developed...its strength and dimensions are visible everywhere...portraits of the rebels exhibited in the shop windows..', '..The Easter Rising has however not been without its lessons. It is recognised that the Party ran amok through seeking strength in a wrong direction. It alienated the shopkeeping classes without whose assistance its industrial aims could never be attained. It enlisted the support of a part of the labouring classes and then devoted itself to an object which could avail them nothing. That was probably a condition of its receipt of certain funds...'. He goes on to contrast the violent denunciations of Redmond with the profession of admiration for Carson, regarded as strong, honest and just. '..who might well receive a cordial greeting in unexpected quarters..'. (This complete misunderstanding of the role of Carson and the Larne guns is at the root of most subsequent disasters! RJ Sept 2000) '...it is thought likely that many who have given their sympathies to Sinn Feiners as a protest against recent events might support the Nationalists if a test were made with "exclusion" out of the way...'. (The author, perhaps JJ, is here clinging tenaciously to his vision of all-Ireland Home Rule. RJ Sept 2000) 'The Nationalists...are confident of the unwavering support of such followers of substance as the shopkeepers and farmers. Among the latter however there is a growing disinclination to mingle ... in the tumult of politics. They are more prosperous than they ever have been. The co-operative movement has helped them towards that prosperity, and the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society has taught them to reap the great advantages which now come within their reach. Yet it is manifest that they are much less popular with the labourers than the "ould gintry" used to be... through settled ownership of land they are drifting from nationalism into a political category that has now no representation...'. The author concludes by indicating as a possibility that Redmond may regain some of the ground lost by his support for the 'exclusion scheme', given that he retains the support of the business community.
The scrap-book continues with material relating to the 1926 Seanad elections, and I treat this elsewhere (in the 1920s module of the 'public service' stream).
JJ had kept a copy of the June 1916 issue of TCD the student humorous magazine, which was packed with reminiscences of College during the Rising, and contained a historic editorial recalling the earlier military occupation in the time of James II. There was an assessment of the medical unit of the DUOTC, and an overview of the OTC itself by 'Captain Alton' (later Provost). There is an article by one 'El Jadir' on how the DU Co-op fared; this includes a reference to an expedition to the Manager's house, to get him to come back and take charge. This is the explanation of the military pass mentioned above, and leads me to suspect that El Jadir was in fact JJ. There is a mass of further anecdotal stuff, much of it humorous.
I have looked this up, and it contains several items of interest and relevance, including the following articles, which almost certainly were by JJ, based on his Albert Kahn Foundation period in France:
(There are three essays in this series, of which the first and the third are in JJ's 1916-17 scrapbook in the TCD library. The second alas is missing. I went looking for it in the Irish Times microfilm for September 1916, and I was unable to find any of them. Either they were published in some other Irish paper (there is alas no indication of origin in the scrap-book, though the dateline is given as Sept 18, France) or else they were published in the Irish Times with some delay. The quality of the microfilm is very poor. This I am afraid remains unfinished business. I give an outline of the contents of the first and the third; this certainly is enough to give the flavour of JJ's then political vision. RJ Sept 2000) This is an exercise in 'what if' contrafactual history. JJ begins by waking up from the nightmare of the actual post-Parnell Home Rule history, and picks up on the new reality of what happened when the British, finally deciding that Ireland was ungovernable, handed it over to the French, as a sort of Atlantic Corsica. This happened in the 1890s. The Irish sent representatives to the Chamber of Deputies, and soon discovered that French law suited them rather well, so that the demand for Home Rule (and indeed the opposition to it) subsided. 'The French had... as in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, shown their capacity for making people of a different race and language loyal citizens of a united France.' 'The Vice-Regal Lodge is inhabited by a Deputy President or Governor, appointed by the President of the Franco-Irish Republic... the administration is organised in seven Departments, each in charge of a delegate of the corresponding Ministry in Paris... these Deputy Ministers are men of long administrative experience, and politicians are ineligible... many Irishmen had already risen to these positions... the class of Irishmen who were formerly attracted to the Indian Civil Service now found in the public service of their own country a career worthy of their talents..'. (JJ was obviously thinking of his 3 elder brothers.) 'The seven branches... are as follows: Interior, Justice, Finance, Public Works, Commerce and Industry (including Posts and Telegraphs), Public Instruction, and Agriculture. Apparently all the activities of the different offices, which in my nightmare I thought numbered 20 or 30, are provided for by one of these seven Deputy Ministries..... a Municipal Council representing the whole of Dublin and suburbs had been set up. A Prefect of the Liffey, appointed by the Deputy Minister of the Interior, is solely responsible for municipal administration... all houses that fall below a certain standard must have placarded...the names... and addresses of all who have any financial interest in them... The new regime... had fostered the national industry and encouraged the growth of a rural civilisation..'. In the third essay of the series, JJ took the train from Broadstone to Mullingar, where he met MacMahon the Prefect of the Province of Meath. The Royal Canal no longer grew weeds, but carried heavily laden boats. The Meath graziers had been persuaded to expand their tillage of fodder crops and to go into winter feeding. MacMahon explained, between phone-calls, how at the outbreak of the war he had organised the mobilisation, and at the same time made use of the military machine to complete the harvest. JJ contrasted the French system of central Ministries co-ordinated locally by Prefects with the British system of having a multiplicity of central departments working against each other. He met with one Grogan, who was the Director of Agricultural Services for the province. Though of military age, he was in a civil job serving the State in organising the production of food, successfully applying the principles of strategy to the problems of agriculture... (There are signs here that JJ was conscious of a personal moral dilemma; he supported the war, but looked to the French Republic rather than to the British Empire; he rallied to the cause of the French who needed to defend themselves against the German attack. He used his French experience to discredit British rule in Ireland. In the divisive UK environment, with all-Ireland Home Rule shelved, he had not himself volunteered, though he had considered it, according to my mother's Australian diary. He was promoting all-Ireland conscription, on the French model, in such a way as to conserve Irish unity. In such a situation, perhaps he envisaged a Grogan-like role for himself?)
The author analyses how the French State had gone about reorganising agricultural production despite the absence of so many farm workers at the front. He identifies the co-operative use of machinery, and the abandonment of regard for boundaries marking private ownership of plots of land: '..each one came to the aid of his neighbour; gangs of labourers proceeded to the cutting and binding of the harvest without troubling themselves about the boundary marks of the little pieces of land belonging to different persons..'. The Ministry of Agriculture gave subventions to co-operatives to encourage the purchase of machinery, and the railways gave free transport to exhibitors at machinery demonstration events: '..needless to say these railway companies are not without expectation of increased traffic receipts for the transport of food later on, but theirs is an enlightened self-interest which the railway companies of the United Kingdom would do well to imitate.' November 22, 1916, The Times: 'A Mainstay of France / The Peasantry and the War / Agricultural Outlook The author reported on visits he had made in Anjou, Touraine and Normandy, where he had attempted to demonstrate how agricultural production had been maintained at full volume despite the absence of 90% of the working population of military age. The wives, children and aged fathers were carrying on, with the aid of good organisation and mechanisation. The Ministry was encouraging co-operative machinery ownership. Work was being done also by prisoners of war. Committees of Agricultural Action have been set up in every commune, and the municipality has the right to requisition uncultivated land. The French are self-sufficient in wheat, at a price cheaper than in Britain. The yield per acre in Ireland and Britain however is about twice that of France, suggesting that in the UK the business of handling agricultural output is less well organised than in France.
He concludes by suggesting that '...the only policy worthy of a statesman is one which will be daring to the point of recklessness. Announce that the Act suspending Home Rule Act will be made inoperative from the 1st of February 1917. Invite a conference of all Irishmen representative of all sections of the country to meet together in the knowledge that, if they fail to agree about some better scheme of Irish government, the existing Act, with all its faults, will be in operation on February 1st. If a substantial majority of the different sections represented agree about anything they like more of dislike less, let it be understood that that will go through as an agreed measure... In any case, let the Government make it clear that it will enforce both conscription and Home Rule with equal impartiality in all parts of Ireland, and it will have no trouble in enforcing either..'. The editorial comment attacked the 'unofficial nationalist policy' as expressed by JJ as 'criminal folly' and accused JJ of implying that the (unofficial) Irish Nationalist '...must either be purchased as an ally or accepted on his own terms..'. Two letters were sent in on the 21st, and published on the 22nd of November. The first was by one Harold Cross, supporting the Editorial and calling for immediate conscription, and the second a robust rejoinder by JJ, citing the precedents of Canada and the Transvaal, and accusing the Editor of describing '...as 'gross tyranny' the process of inducing Ulster to obey what would have been the law of the land if she had not successfully appealed to force...'. He went on to suggest that '..if the combined policy of real Home Rule and conscription is put through simultaneously, Ulster cannot resist Home Rule (by force), while nationalist Ireland is accepting conscription. Nationalist Ireland cannot, and will not, seek to resist conscription by force while she is getting real Home Rule. He concludes with '...one of the facts I have endeavoured to face is that there is such a thing as a strongly nationalist point of view, and lately I have taken some trouble to estimate its force and understand its nature. Another ... is that at least three fourths of Nationalist Ireland do not read your able editorials on Ireland's duty in the war...'. The foregoing, which suggests a period of travelling and soundings of opinion, supports the hypothesis that the Times article of September 8 referenced above was in fact from JJ; he had certainly by late September established himself as a Times correspondent in the context of the 'food production in France' episode. RJ Sept 2000) On the following day there was a letter signed 'Fiat Justitia' from a Unionist in Dublin, basically agreeing with aspects of JJ's position, and urging the British to grant a Canadian-type constitution, in return for the disarmament of all parties and a recruiting campaign by nationalist and unionist leaders jointly, leading to a 'friendly and allied Colonial Ireland, ready and anxious to help (Britain) in her need. The other road (ie imposing conscription) spells ruin. The controversy simmered on into January 1917, with JJ persisting in his defence of all-Ireland Home Rule against various shades of Unionist attacks. On January 2 1917 he wrote in attacking the Unionist candidate for TCD in Westminster, Arthur Samuels, as a partitionist, and in support of Sir Robert Woods the surgeon, as someone open towards all-Ireland Home Rule. Woods also had the support of Maurice Dockrell. Samuels had the College authorities and the Church on his side. According to JJ, '..Samuels... will hand over a majority of his constituents, including the College itself, to the jurisdiction of a Parliament from which the bulk of his fellow-Unionists in the North... will be excluded.' A further letter on January 6 1917 goes into the question of how many recruits from the various parts of Ireland, making out that 'the difference is not so very great in view of the monopoly of loyalty in Ireland which "Ulster" has been endeavouring to persuade the world that she possesses. If this is the criterion... will any responsible Unionist kindly say what number of Nationalists must voluntarily join the Army before he will withdraw his opposition to Home Rule?' He went on to remind readers of the '...promise given by the leaders of English Unionism, including Bonar Law, that, if necessary in defiance of the opinions of the electors, in the event of an attempt to force Home Rule on Ulster the whole resources of British Unionism would be placed at their disposal, even to the extent of joining them in a civil war..'. He concluded, invoking comparison with Machiavelli: '...Ulstermen were induced to fight..on the understanding that their valour would stand to the political credit of the Union.... Nationalists were asked to volunteer... to the political credit of Home Rule.
May 14 1917 p6 Decisive Week for Ireland / Fate of Constitutional Movement There is nothing more to be said on the outlook in Ireland, except that this will be a decisive week on the course of our future history. The fate of the constitutional movement is now in the hands of his Majesty's Ministers. Unless they are prepared consistently with the principles of nationality and democracy to settle the Irish question out of hand there is an end to the movement in any effective or controlling shape. Whether the Irish party will remain to undergo a slow extinction or put its fortunes to the hazard at once is a point for the party to decide. Many of its supporters here desire that if it has to quit the field it should quit it with honour, and leave the fate of Ireland to be evolved by the Sinn Feiners, the curates, the covenanters, and the wise men of Whitehall, into whose hands the lack of grip and vision in British statesmanship will have thrown it. It surely is an irony that while John Mitchel's grandson, as Mayor of New York, was receiving the British Foreign Minister in that city and proclaiming a common fealty to the cause of liberty, the forces that made such an incident possible should be in process of dissipation by British politicians at home. Yesterday was James Connolly's anniversary. The little children of the slums who were making their first parochial communion reserved themselves for the day that they might pray for the soul of Larkin's lieutenant. Force is no remedy. May 18 1917 p5 For an Undivided Ireland / Sinn Fein and the Convention (This being much longer I reproduces some key extracts; the quality is such that it impossible to scan in. RJ October 2000) ...the Irish people...have no use for the Government scheme of a truncated nationality....the existence or the pressure of .. Sinn Fein... does not affect the matter.... Partition is bad, partition without the vote of the counties affected is worse, but a partition scheme which, while refusing a referendum before dissection, insists on a referendum before the wound can be repaired, making reunion as difficult as possible, and subjecting it to the veto of the most inveterate of prejudices, is the worst of all forms of partition.... ...The Ulster democracy has never voted for Partition... The interest and sentiment of commercial Ulster are against Partition, the interest of Protestant episcopalian Ulster are against it... Interest attaches to the Prime Minister's desire that all parties should be represented at the Convention. Does he include the Sinn Fein party? If he does, the proposal should cut the ground from under any element of the party that is of hostile association. By all its principles the party would be bound to accept the judgment of such a Convention. It would, in fact, be their ideal assembly realised in an unexpected fashion, and unless they are false to their own principles it should be accepted. But if Sinn Fein is to be represented, it should be genuinely represented. There are good grounds for belief that the men in prison do not all approve the wrecking tactics of the Easter-week pacifists who are now in control of the movement. It should be remembered in this connection that the Irish Volunteers came into being originally to resist the military cabal and the Ulster aggression upon Home Rule. The more responsible leaders, it is said, have not abandoned that position. General Smuts might be asked to advise on this point. Both the foregoing were 'from our Correspondent'. This next one was from 'our Special Correspondent' May 19 1917 p5 The Proposed All-Ireland Convention / Representative Irish Views / Sinn Fein Leaders' Emphatic Declaration. The Special Correspondent had the company on the Holyhead boat of an Irish Nationalist MP who indicated total rejection of the 'partition scheme' and total support for the Convention. He went on to interview William Martin Murphy, who objected to the Convention, comparing it with South Africa, where the delegates had representative status. Count Plunkett and Arthur Griffith rejected the Convention, calling it a 'put-up job' between Lloyd George, Redmond and Carson. They predicted a 75% Sinn Fein majority in the next election. They were organising so as to send delegates to the Peace Conference. The 'Special Correspondent' followed on May 28 with a survey article which was supportive of JJ's position regarding Protestant support for all-Ireland Home Rule. I give some extracts from this. I also give extracts from 'Our Correspondent' on the same day; perhaps it was JJ. May 28 1917 p4 Irish Parties and the Convention / A General Survey ...one of my Belfast friends: "...some people always talk of the Protestants of Ulster as if they were invariably Unionists. How, then do you account for this?" he... called my attention to the figures of the last election in North Antrim... the Unionist got 3557 votes and the Liberal 2874... 45.5% for Home Rule.. only 24% are Catholics... almost half the Home Rule votes are Protestant votes... sturdy Presbyterian farmers who are Home Rulers to a man. They inherit their tradition from their grandfathers and great-grandfathers who were 'United Irishmen' of the 18th century and who wrote the record of of the Ulster Liberalism of that day in their blood. It is from this race that so many of the chief statesmen of America, including President Wilson, have sprung... As to Labour, if once a Home Rule settlement were effected, it would probably sweep all four Belfast seats... ...During the Dublin outbreak of last year many of these Socialist Orangemen freely expressed sympathy with the 'rebels'. The reason was that they fully appreciated the fact that the backbone of the outbreak was the labour element in Dublin, and they looked on the rising as a revolt against intolerable wages and housing conditions in Ireland's chief city... Then, on the same day, from 'Our Correspondent': The popular expectations from the proposed Convention have been not a little clouded by the Prime Minister's speech, which indicates a difficulty in arriving at an agreement as to the proper basis of representation.... the principle of representing interests apart from opinion.. might.. lead to.. an assembly.. separated in political sympathy from the Irish masses... ...a Convention that was... a gathering of persons of business and professional experience... might make an excellent jury, while failing in the ability to work out a working constitutional compromise. ...It is universally felt in Ireland that the present situation is a result of departing from the spirit and practice of the Constitution, a departure for which not only is Ireland not responsible, but which has proceeded against her will and against her interests. The less the Coalition endeavours to shelve its own responsibilities in the matter, the more confidence and good will accompany its endeavours to find a way out of the impasse. This last paragraph is palpably an echo of 'Civil War in Ulster' and the Tory conspiracy that led to the Larne gun-running, overturning the constitutional Home Rule procedure, by a process of armed coup d'etat. JJ, if this was he, was by now fighting a rearguard action against the disastrous consequences of the 1914 events, which set the stage for the inexorable drift into Partition. The first extract from the May 18 report above also reflects the concern of the writer with the acute pathological nature of the partition process.
The Sinn Fein 'unofficial observer' Edward McLysaght was in and out of the Coffey residence in Harcourt Terrace with considerable regularity, and interacted strongly with Childers, outside the formal structure of the Convention. Boyle gives Childers' view of McLysaght as follows: "a very interesting young man - landlord - Sinn Feiner though not official enough of one to prevent him coming under the Sinn Fein boycott of the Convention. Much depends on him, for he is practically their unofficial spokesman. He thinks Dominion Home Rule will satisfy them and all other information is to that effect, but this assumes an absence of trouble and the good sense of the Castle."
It is noteworthy that Coffey, McLysaght and JJ were all members of AE's 'Irish Constitutional Association' which had been the pressure-group behind the setting up of the Convention, lobbying Lloyd George. This appears to have functioned as a sort of inner circle, with a direct line to Childers the Convention secretary via Coffey's house.
The foregoing is the background to the Childers letters in JJ's possession. The first is dated April 10 1917, and is on Convention paper. It reads as follows: "Dear Johnston, I had hoped to see you to lunch but you may have been away. I wanted to return your book with many thanks. I fear your proposals had no fair chance under the Conditions of the Convention, but their time will come later, I believe. This is not final in my belief. Remember me please to Mrs Johnston. Yours ever, E Childers."
There is an undated letter from Provost Mahaffy around this time, as follows: "Dear Johnston, I sent you back your paper of suggestions, which I think excellent, but it is longer than it should be, and not put as attractively as it might be, but it is hardly to be improved by small corrections. But I should have ...(?)... in the opening sentence something like this 'to provide for the competent verdict of experts on all public functions... and to bring it home to every citizen that the non-political aspects of most functions.... are more important than the political'.
Then later, on October 20 1917, when the Convention was undergoing increasingly heavy weather, Childers wrote to JJ, from home (ie Coffey's), a substantive critical letter, as follows: "Dear Johnston, forgive the informal paper etc, I am writing at home. Re your memo. In its present form I think it is unsuitable for Convention purposes. The concrete proposal resolve themselves into the following:
1. A radical change in the position of public officials in the direction of giving them personal responsibility and freeing them from 'legal formalism'; a special tribunal to be set up to deal with administrative cases, tribunal to be elected by Civil Service officials. A considerable part of the Memo supports these changes but I do not think they can be considered in framing the Constitution - too theoretical and strange to Irish minds and too remote from burning practical issues. The whole English-speaking Empire is, I think, run on this existing system. I think you underrate the difficulties and objections to a change especially when supported by the German analogy - German officialism being one of the bugbears of English-speaking peoples. The severe criticisms you make of Irish local government are really common ground and do not need insistence upon.
2. A change in the form of Acts, so that they shall only lay down general principles, leaving Departments (checked of course by the Conseil d'Etat) to enact actual regulations. Admirable perhaps, but impossible to put into the Constitution. Again too theoretical and unfamiliar. Tendency is in fact, I think, in your direction and it is often complained that too much is left to Orders in Council, bye-laws etc though of course there is no check from any body like the Conseil d'Etat.
3. Codification of administrative law: a matter for post-Home Rule decision.
4. Open competitive examination for all local government officials; University Diplomas to be exacted for some of these; ditto for servants of central authorities.
5. An independent Civil Service Commission containing University representatives.
These two latter proposals (4 and 5) appear to me to be the really practical part of the Memo. (5) of course is not novel and is pretty sure to be part of the Constitution, as it is of many others. The [principle of competitive exams may very well be insisted on also but the application to local authorities, State medical service etc, and the Diploma, are parts which deserve special consideration. The evils of the existing system do not need much stressing: hardly anybody denies them but of course local vested interests and power of patronage are a great obstacle.
I think you prejudice the more practical points by overloading them with too theoretical issues. You will understand of course that this is only personal opinion and advice. I would suggest a short succinct memo on (4) and (5) with definite concrete proposals under heads designed to meet an admitted evil which does not need enlarging on.
Yours sincerely E Childers."
(One can see the influence of the Indian and French experience. Perhaps the book referred to in the first letter was his report on French local government and agriculture, based on his 1916 Albert Kahn visit to study wartime food production. It is probably the same document which he had discussed with Garnier, meeting with the latter's approval. RJ Sept 2000.)
I am indebted to Kate Targett, currently (October 2004) working on the Plunkett papers in the Plunkett Institute, for supplying a note by AE that mentions JJ in The Irish Home Rule Convention by G. Russell, H. Plunkett and John Quinn (Macmillan, New York, 1917). Page 156 reads:
NOTE / I was asked to put into shape for publication ideas and suggestions for an Irish settlement which had been discussed among a group whose members represented all extremes in Irish opinion. The compromise arrived at was embodied in documents written by members of the group privately circulated,
criticized and again amended. I make special acknowledgments to Colonel Maurice Moore, Mr James G. Douglas, Mr Edward E. Lysaght, Mr Joseph Johnston, FTCD, Mr Alec Wilson and Mr Diarmid Coffey. For the spirit, method of presentation and general arguments used, I alone am responsible. And if any are offended at what I have said, I am to be blamed, not my fellow-workers. / AE
Dear Sir -- The following letter was sent to a Unionist contemporary last Friday and has not yet been published:-
He followed this with a further letter on 16/05/18, to the Editor of the Daily Chronicle, headed 'A Question for Sir Edward Carson':
There is in the TCD collection also a cutting, not clear where it is from, but dated 19/07/18, perhaps the Times, headed 'The Marquis MacSweeney', which reports a House of Commons question by Ronald McNeill, relating to the credentials of the former, stated to have German connection, and for his house to be a rendezvous for Sinn Feiners. It was suggested also that he had to do with the Vatican secret service.
There is subsequent correspondence between JJ and the Marquis, in the Albert Kahn context. He seems then to have had a diplomatic role on behalf of the Irish Government in Rome. This episode may be to do with the 'German Plot' episode, and the fact that the cutting is in JJ's collection indicates that he was aware of what was going on.
There is also in JJ's TCD collection a cutting dated 30/10/18, ie just before the war ended, probably from the Irish Times, reporting an event in Trinity College presided over by Mahaffy, and at which Dr Coffey, President of UCD also spoke; the Chief Secretary was present; there was a toast to General Biddle, of the US Army, who was the guest of honour. A key quote is, perhaps, as follows: "If Mr Shortt would not allow them to have self-determination in Ireland it was a dangerous thing to try it in other countries which were only held together by the bond of their Empires..'.
This would appear to be a belated attempt to wake the moribund politics of the Convention, and promote, even at this late hour, the politics of conscription. It is not clear if JJ still supported the all-Ireland Home Rule in return for conscription argument.
According to Padraic O'Farrell's Who's Who in the Irish War of Independence and Civil War (Lilliput, Dublin 1997), MacManus "..was in early actions at Templemore and against the Four Courts, being one of the first to penetrate the building... involved in negotiations and operations in Athlone, Clare and particularly Limerick. Commanded two vessels for a successful sea-borne landing at Kenmare 11 August 1922. Later Provost Marshall, Southern Command, and Deputy Governor of Mountjoy."
I reproduce the key arguments in the Plunkett letter; after an introduction thanking Monteagle for the hospitality expressed in the Gresham Hotel event which welcomed him back from America, he went on:
"On three matters we are, I think, all agreed. In the first place, there can be no doubt as to the urgency of a settlement - we are approaching anarchy. In the second, it is equally clear that such a settlement must be one that can obtain the acceptance of a majority of the Irish people; and, in the third, it is not less evident that the settlement must be a compromise and as such the concessions must naturally be more extensive on the side that is less representative than vice versa.
"The Coalition Government, in their Bill, do not even pretend to fulfil any of these conditions. For them the end in view has been not to solve an Imperial problem, but to extricate themselves from the pledges to which their Ulster and English Tory supporters had committed them. No doubt they are anxious for peace in Ireland, but only insofar as it subserves peace in Downing Street.
"In face of such contemptuous disregard of the whole of the country outside the northeast corner, Sinn Fein will naturally adhere to its extreme demand. Yet, in spite of the apparent deadlock, a middle way of advance there must be, and it is my considered opinion that in the Dominion plan, adjusted to Irish conditions as in the programme of the Irish Dominion League, the happy mean has been discovered.
"It is my earnest hope that all whom I am addressing through you in this letter, will give their support to the League, and help to make it a means of political co-operation in the true spirit of Irish Unity.
"Since the publication of the League's original manifesto an important advance has been made towards the practical realisation of its aim. This is the proposal that the details of the settlement should be worked out by a democratically elected assembly of Irishmen, empowered by the Imperial Parliament to draft a constitution for Ireland within the Empire. To-day British politicians delight to tell each other that the Irish question is no longer a dispute between England and Ireland, but between Irishmen themselves. If the first part of their contention is just, if no party in England any longer wishes to gain advantage from Irish difficulties, the procedure we advocate will receive their full assistance, for it is the obvious and only way to reconcile the differences that exist between the north-east corner and the remainder of the country.
"One word more. I gave my reasons on Thursday night why, if American and British opinion must not be ignored, the Government must be compelled to attend to moderate opinion here. In Britain particularly the tremendous force of Labour is on our side and the Independent Liberals - with the inestimable advantage of Mr. Asquith's Parliamentary leadership - are in substantial agreement with the fine Report of Labour's Irish delegation. But what support have they in Ireland ? The support is there, but to make it effective it is essential to employ the ordinary instruments of political action. We have in the Irish Dominion League and in the Irish Statesman both an organisation and an organ which will have to. be enlarged and improved. The only real needs are men and money. Both should be immediately forthcoming to the amount required for effective action, even if the now latent forces of moderate opinion have no more, and I am sure they have far more, than the mere instinct for self-preservation....".
Monteagle sent this to JJ with a covering letter dated 12 March 1920 drawing attention to the positive support from the British Labour delegation for the Dominion League all-Ireland position. There is a further letter from Monteagle dated 28 March thanking JJ for his subscription and sympathy, while recognising that he was not in a position to take an active part politically. He went on to express interest in the forthcoming Barrington Lectures, and suggested an invitation from the Foynes Co-operative Society, inviting JJ to send a prospectus.
(JJ seems by this time to have been putting his main efforts into the co-operative movement, and into Sinn Fein via the Thomas Davis Society and Dermot MacManus, but he clearly wanted to keep the Dominion League onside as his fall-back option. The confluence of the British Labour Party with the Plunkett co-operative movement under the Dominion League banner is significant. Note also the Barrington intent; this however was nipped in the bud by the War of Independence and the Civil War, though JJ did get to give lectures to trade unionists in Dublin under the Barrington auspices. RJ October 2000.)
Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999
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