The papers which JJ contributed to the SSISI in the 1930s were based on his own disastrous agricultural experience at the start of the economic war, and on his distillation of world experience which he was embedding both in his TCD lectures in the School of Commerce and in his Barrington outreach lectures in rural Ireland.

A Plea for Winter Dairying (JSSISI XV, 33, 1930-31)

In this seminal paper, which remains relevant to this day, JJ questioned the traditional view that winter dairying was not practical economics for the Irish farmer. It was said that the winter feed required would cost more than the price of the milk would justify. The question of winter production had come on to the agenda as a result of the imposition of a tariff on imported butter, due to the winter market being flooded with imports from the southern hemisphere.

Comparing the price obtained by Irish butter exports on the British market with that of Scandinavian competitors, JJ noted a substantial difference, to the advantage of the latter, due to lack of continuity of supply on the Irish side. The 1924 Dairy Produce Act had some effect on quality standards, but was insufficient to improve the price on the British market '...during the eight months of the year when we condescended to play a part in it....British buyers do not wish to be troubled with a butter which has the migratory instincts of the swallow..'.

There had been a proposal to set up 'Irish Associated Creameries' to make an organised approach to the market, but it had not received support from sufficient numbers. As regards those few creameries who did produce butter in the winter, their produce was now thanks to the tariff being absorbed by the home market, and their positive impact on the export market was being lost.

The proposal to cold store the summer peak production for release in the winter JJ dismissed, on the grounds that the market distinguished between fresh and cold-stored butter, and this depressed the New Zealand price substantially below the Danish. All indicators pointed to the need to develop winter-feeding practice, supported by increased autumn calving.

He then went on to outline a transitional procedure, initially prolonging the season to December. He urged an increase in the acreage under turnips and mangels; he considered it quite feasible for the Munster dairy areas to expand this to the Louth level. The increased number of autumn calves would be available for fattening the following spring for the 'baby beef' market. He concluded by making a plea for silage as an alternative to hay; this was then quite innovative, though currently the norm.

It is to be regretted that there is no record of the discussion following this paper, which while having been prompted as a tactical response the imposition of a butter tariff, had important and still unresolved strategic implications for Irish agriculture as a whole, where currently continuity of supply of quality value-added produce to the supermarkets of Europe is beginning to replace the initial post-1972 reliance on a disposal process via 'intervention'.

Aspects of the Agricultural Crisis at Home and Abroad (JSSISI XV, 79, 1934-5)

This paper was explicitly based on Barrington Lectures given previously in Cork, Enniscorthy, Limerick and Sligo. He regarded it as a sequel to the earlier Barrington lectures which had formed the basis of his Nemesis of Economic Nationalism, published in 1934. He also referenced material which he had used in a paper entitled 'The Purchasing Power of Irish Free State Farmers in 1933' which had appeared in the September 1933 issue of the Economic Journal.

He began, ironically, by thanking the politicians for giving the economists the opportunity of learning by dissecting the corpses of dead economies. If economic regimentation on Bolshevik lines was to be avoided, it would be necessary to get back to a regime where prices reflected not political ideals but economic realities, and profits depended on the success with which enterprise adjusted itself to hard economic facts.

Ireland resembled the USA in being a creditor country and an agricultural exporter. Rapid industrial expansion in the US behind tariffs from 1922 to 1929 had proved unsustainable because agricultural purchasing power did not expand concurrently. The fact that US tariffs kept out European goods meant that Europe could not buy US grain. Roosevelt was attempting to turn this round by bringing the farmer back to the market.

Agricultural incomes in real terms in Ireland were running at 50% of the pre-1914 level. Farmers were unable to buy in feed and were allowing their animals to starve in winter, an extravagant substitute. He produced some actual farm accounts, showing that this was totally unsustainable. He went on, with further US comparisons, to advocate a Rooseveltian Land bank approach to the re-financing of agricultural debt, and a co-ordinated attack allied, to the other Commonwealth countries, against the current British quota policy, which he compared to the Navigation Acts which had caused the breakaway of the American colonies to form the US in 1776.

This angry paper elicited some discussion; Professor George O'Brien proposing the vote of thanks had however little to add except compliments. Major Barrow, a substantial farmer from Castle Bellingham added his own experience, having farmed and kept accounts since 1921; he stressed the interdependence between livestock and tillage, condemning the current policy of attempting to become self-sufficient in wheat regarded as an alternative to livestock. There was a Mr AI Qureshi from India who had been studying the economic condition of the various Dominions, and who had become critical of all-round protectionism as a result. He came up with a set of conditions for enabling an industry to be considered a candidate for protection.

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Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999