I continue in this third part to intersperse such JJ stuff as remains. The mainstream of the RJ material is abstracted from the 'political' stream of the hypertext. I intersperse material from other streams chronologically where appropriate.

Pre-August Tensions

Meanwhile the Civil Rights movement in the North had got out an 'Ultimatum to Stormont' dated June 1969, in the form of a 4-page printed leaflet, listing the civil rights demand, and indicating the extent to which they had up to then in effect been blocked by Stormont. This was a well-reasoned and devastating indictment, and constituted a good basis for developing the campaign on a broad base, and was a powerful counter to all talk of 'civil rights splits', which probably originated from hostile sources.

The July United Irishman printed a letter from Betty Sinclair critical of the June 'Civil Rights' article, though on minor points, like the use of the word 'reformist'. The 'Belfast Letter' noted that an attempt to run a cross-community Connolly Commemoration was ghettoised. Farrell, McCann and Toman opposed the flying of the tricolour as being 'bourgeois'. Kelleher on ideology wrote about Teilhard de Chardin. O Caollai wrote about Connradh na Gaeilge. A fish-in article was headed 'Reconquest'. The Zambia situation was analysed. Mac Giolla's Bodenstown speech was given. We got the Barnes McCormack background story; this was part of the 1939 series. There was a call for the Orange parades to assume the status of folk festivals; it was noted that we too objected to Rome Rule and Article 44 of the Constitution.

There was no sense here of awareness of acute danger signals from Belfast. The present writer went to Belfast and observed the 1969 12th of July in Belfast at first hand; I enquired about the personalities depicted on the banners, and no-one knew who they were. I enquired 'why Finaghy' hoping to get some sense of history, but was told 'because the Orange Order owns the field'. I got talking afterwards to some who had walked, and they enthused about having gone to Dublin for the Horse Show, and met with Brendan Behan. There was no sense of impending pogrom, fuelled by any burning sense of political grievance at grass-roots. This reinforces my impression that the August pogrom was planned and engineered top-down by some ultra-'loyalist' core-group associated with the RUC and the B-Specials, continuing the momentum of the Silent Valley affair, with the objective of provoking the IRA into military confrontation.

At the Coiste Seasta on 07/07/69 there was a Cork letter (according to Mick Ryan from Jack Lynch, not the then Taoiseach, but the Cork republican old-timer) objecting to red flags at Bodenstown. It was agreed to promote the Plough and the Stars as the labour symbol. Cathal Goulding proposed that Jimmy Steele, who had given the Barnes and McCormack oration in Mullingar, be removed from the panel of republican speakers. MMcG reported policy of getting republican club people to steward Civil Rights marches, and prevent sectarian clashes developing.

Mick Ryan recollects (2001) attending an HQ meeting in or about July 1969, with Goulding, (Garland?, not acording to Mick Ryan), O Bradaigh, Mac Tomais; it was in Grogan's house. O Bradaigh asked Goulding had he a plan to defend the people in the event of a pogrom, of which he had picked up early warning signals. Goulding said 'yes' but not convincingly. Goulding's QM was one Pat Regan. On the day of the pogrom the latter was nowhere to be found, MR was appointed QM. Oliver McCaul was practically in tears for lack of weapons. Goulding had put total trust in the political process.

This poses important questions to historians. Who planned the pogrom, and at what level was it planned? It involved B-specials and armoured vehicles, and was implemented by agencies of the British state against defenceless people. O Bradaigh had advance warning of it. Was this a deliberate attempt on the part of the British State to provoke an armed response, so as to allow them use traditional repressive methods, internment etc? Was the leak to O Bradaigh and co deliberate? O Bradaigh in a recent (2001) conversation with the present writer insists that there was no leak, they were just reading the signs.

The political response to the pogrom would have been to let it run its course and turn all attention to getting the world media to report it, and thereby show up the nature of British rule; to get the democratic forces in Britain out on the streets; to get the Dublin government to get at the British and to complain to the UN, with US support. To go for guns was to do what the enemy wanted. We fell partially into the trap, falling between two stools; the Provisionals fell into it whole-heartedly, while we fell into it half-heartedly, but enough to divert our attention to issues like getting prisoners out, and rendering ourselves liable for internment when it came. Anthony Coughlan and I resolutely held out for a totally political response, but increasingly no-one was listening.

At the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle on 19/07/69 the first three recommendations of the Commission Report(1) were considered.

The first recommendation was passed for submission as an Ard Fheis resolution by 10 votes to 8; this projected the vision of a broad-based movement, involving many organisations, political, economic, social and cultural, with the politicised SF playing a leading role. It was agreed not to name names, simply to project the concept in principle. Amendments from the proto-Provisional people present, which projected 'loose associations' and the banning of association with any other political groups, were rejected.

This illustrates the difference between the proto-Provisional approach, which had more in common with Fianna Fail and, indeed, Stalinism, with their aspirations to a one-party State, and on the other hand the emergent democratic-Marxist approach of the Goulding vision, with its aspiration to a broad-based multi-party national movement.

It was agreed unanimously to drop recommendations 2 and 3. I don't as yet have on record what these were.

Recommendation 4 was considered subsequently on August 23; this contained the policy on parliamentary participation, and was passed by 11 votes to 8, the names being recorded. It was hoped to call an extraordinary Ard Fheis shortly, to which a motion would be put, enshrining the proposals of the report as amended at these meetings.

The August 1969 Crisis

There was no sense of giving a lead to people, what they should do in the event of a pogrom, though the Derry call was the beginnings of what might have been a good policy. Goulding had had warnings of an impending pogrom from O Bradaigh and Mac Stiofain. According to O Bradaigh he had told an all-Ireland meeting of OCs that it was up to the British to impose reforms on Stormont, including the disbanding of the Specials and the disarming of the RUC, which they would be forced to do if a pogrom was visibly started by the local Crown 'forces of law and order' and it was exposed and known to the world. Politically the Dublin Government should demand this, and call on the UN to intervene. This, if true, was an exact reflection of what Anthony Coughlan was saying at the time, as I recollect it. It was 'theoretically correct', but far from credible to the people on the ground who were at the receiving end of the pogrom, and needed guns to defend themselves and their houses.

Goulding had, apparently, bought (currently and in detail from Coughlan, and earlier in principle from the present writer and the Wolfe Tone Society) the essence of the Civil Rights political approach, but did not know how to motivate people to act upon it in the presence of a military-type threat from the 'loyalist' Establishment. It should have been possible to break through to the British Government, under Wilson who already was beginning to be aware of the RUC and B-Specials problem, in such a way as to pre-empt the pogrom. Why did this not happen? Anthony Coughlan agrees with this.

At the Coiste Seasta on 11/08/69 it emerged that Bernadette was proving elusive. More organisers were appointed (this was rubber-stamping an 'army' decision process). TMacG reported on the Maghera meeting at which 70 or 80 had attended, but no-one from Derry. It was agreed that if there was trouble on the 12th, then a meeting on the 13th should demand that the State move in to defend the people.

There is ambiguity here: did they mean the British State? Or the Irish State? I seem to recollect that the former was intended, in accordance with the policy of separating out the civil rights issues from the national unity question. Haughey, Blaney and Boland later emerged as proponents of the latter course, and it is probable that this would have been the thinking of most republicans on the ground.

The next AC was fixed for August 30, and Anthony Coughlan was to be invited to the next CS meeting to discuss the NI civil rights situation and also the looming EEC issue.

On August 16 1969 Greaves phoned Jack Bennett in Belfast to get a report on the situation: '..he expressed the opinion that the IRA was operating in such a way as to bring about a breakdown of "law and order" so that British troops would be brought in..'. He echoed Goulding as evidenced in the arguments of March 4 noted above. CDG went on: '..but you don't mean to say that they've risked raising this sectarian frenzy?..'. JB, somewhat irritated, supposed they had, but it would '..break the deadlock..'. CDG swore he would not go to see JB when next in Belfast.

JB's view seems to support Mac Stiofain's claim that the Northern IRA units were being re-organised as such, and were under his influence, in order to provoke a military response, and that the trend into politicising via the Clubs had gone into reverse. On the other hand, JB could have been absorbing disinformation spread by those planning the pogrom. The lack of arms in Belfast seems to support the latter hypothesis.

On August 22 1969 Greaves arrived in Belfast; despite his earlier resolve he rang Jack Bennett, who '...had his bellyful of "breaking the deadlock"..', but was helpful; they went to see Andy Barr: '..he was quite shaken..... I told him we intended to pursue the encouragement of reconciliation between the two religions. He said that perhaps he had gone too far in trying to keep open relations of co-operation with Protestants. The trouble was now that men he had known all his life would no longer talk politics with him. The events of the past few weeks had converted the moderates into bigots..'.

Later he saw Gerry Fitt, who described the desperation on the Falls Road and the demand for arms. He had rung Callaghan and got a secretary; finally he got through to the man himself, and soon afterwards the troops came in. Presumably Callaghan had consulted Wilson. Subsequently Callaghan promised to disarm the B-men, and assured Fitt that the reason he was not doing it at one blow was that the arms would then mysteriously disappear. Fitt was on top of the world, and quite convinced that what had happened was a result of a 'plan' that CDG and he had hatched in the car on the road between Liverpool and Manchester. The next step was to get the B-Specials to fire on the British troops. '...Between you and me that's being fixed up now..'.

I have looked back at this Greaves diary entry, which was on May 26 1968, and I can see no evidence of a 'plan' as such, but some evidence that Fitt was in a position to influence Wilson to be critical of the RUC and B-Special situation.

The same day he toured the Falls area with Jimmy Stewart, observing the barricades, and how they had defended themselves against the pogrom. There were 75,000 people behind the barricades. CDG concluded that '..this was no spontaneous pogrom, but a highly organised and well prepared attempt to drive the Catholics out of the city and set up a Paisleyite dictatorship to forestall the introduction of democratic rights..'. He went on down to Dublin and observed the 'Solidarity' movement beginning to emerge from the general confusion.

The SF Ard Comhairle on 23/08/69 was called early, due to pressure of events. There were only 13 people there; CG, SMacS and MR sent apologies; MMcG and DC were absent in jail. I don't seem to have been present either. EMacT wanted recorded the names of those who had voted on Section 4 of the Commission document recorded. The situation outside was in crisis and this was all the 'sea-green incorruptibles' could think of.

Those for recommending at the Ard Fheis the abandonment of the constitutional ban on electoral participation were: Tomas Mac Giolla, Kevin Agnew, Sean O Gormaile, Derry Kelleher, Mick Ryan, Seamus Rattigan, M Fogarty, Seamus Costello, Denis Cassin, Cathal Goulding and Liam Cummins. Those against were: C Campbell, S Mac Stiofain, Tony Ruane, Joe Clarke, Des Long, Oliver McCaul, Eamonn Mac Tomais and Mairin de Burca.

Those who rejected accessing the parliamentary process should be seen as unable in any parliamentary role to distinguish themselves from Fianna Fail. Those who accepted the parliamentary role were prepared to do so with a distinctive programme of legislation directed at democratising the ownership of productive property. The latter amounted to an emergent democratic-Marxist approach. The anomalous member of the second group is Mairin de Burca; she did not go 'Provisional', and is now a militant pacifist.

TMacG outlined the northern situation; we needed to maximise pressure on the Government; raise the issue at the UN; the Free State army was moving to the border. Our people were on the barricades, but we were not getting credit; we needed good TV and radio spokesmen. There had been no NICRA meetings since the 12th; conflicting statements were being issued.

In Dublin a 'Solidarity' committee had been set up, which included SF, LP, WTS, ITGWU, Dublin Trades Council and the GAA. It was important to keep the response political.

Yet in the background the response was being conceived in military terms; the old channels of influence and command structures were re-emerging.

The Sinn Fein Response to the August Crisis

The northern crisis was turning people's attention away from local political work all over. There was a civil administration emerging behind the barricades in Derry; this was real and effective; I had occasion to observe it in Derry the following weekend. I also met with Bernadette Devlin, and she had agreed to come to Dublin on September 13. The 'Federation' concept was beginning to be identified at this time, as a perceived 'political solution' by agreement between London and Dublin, in the context of both States joining the EEC.

In the September United Irishman the main headline was 'Blame Britain!' and the main political threat was seen as the Dublin government being maneuvered into a 'federal solution' in which in effect they whole of Ireland would come back into the UK. Dublin was called upon to take a hard line with Westminster. The need for leadership in the 'defence enclaves' was recognised, and the slogan was 'defend the enclaves until Civil Rights is imposed on Stormont'. The Civil Rights demands were given as: one man one vote, end discrimination in jobs and houses, disarm and disband the Specials and disarm the RUC, abolish Special Powers, introduce Proportional Representation, and grant the right to secede and join the Republic should the people so decide.

Note that this is more or less what currently exists under the Good Friday Agreement.

The overall strategy was 'no direct rule, impose Civil Rights on Stormont, PR elections under UN supervision' and it looked as if the Coughlan influence was continuing. There was however an IRA statement published, signed by Goulding: the IRA was said to have been mobilised and was at the service of the defence committees; the Dublin Government should be prepared to use the Free State Army, and should seek UN Security Council support; there should be 32-county elections under UN supervision.

Mac Stiofain attributed this statement to the influence of Coughlan, I think mistakenly, and certainly for the wrong reasons. More likely it was Goulding attempting to hold the 'army' together, and give it a political role, though it had the negative effect of apparently justifying the RUC's world-view in which the IRA existed as a military threat, which view they had been feeding the British, fortified by events like the Silent Valley deception. They could say to the British, 'now you see, I told you so'. The fact that Goulding signed the statement himself however suggested political motivation; he wanted to reassure the defence committees that their immediate needs had not been forgotten, while keeping the overall thrust political and UN-oriented.

At the Coiste Seasta on 1/09/69 TMcG, RJ, JC, SRR, MdeB, Tony Ruane were present. A Federation statement had been issued by the Republican Clubs. The Coughlan meeting was long-fingered. The weekly newsletter was initiated. Sean O Cionnaith reported from Connaught that the effect of the Northern crisis had been to cause all local work to be abandoned. Local meetings to explain the political position were needed. TMcG reported from Derry; civil administration existed; RJ was to go there the following weekend; feasibility of worker-co-op initiatives against unemployment would be examined.

During the next period the SF minutes become unreliable; most of what happened was as a result of ad-hoc decisions made in a confused situation. The Ard-Fheis date was repeatedly postponed. Nuacht Naisiunta(2) becomes a useful source. My wife Janice Williams, who returned from Wales in August, found that the whole structure of Sinn Fein had changed, and was working in quasi-military mode, with people being expected to obey top-down orders. An all-Dublin meeting took place which was chaired by Seamus Costello.

The initiation of Nuacht Naisiunta was an indication of a realisation on the part of the leadership that they had a long way to go before the membership, all over Ireland, could be got to understand the unfolding events in the North in its complex political context, rather than in a simplistic irredentist military mode. It was, viewed in retrospect, a rearguard action against the Fianna Fail supported 'provisionalisation' process, which was aimed primarily against the role of political republicanism in exposing of the dependence of Fianna Fail on shady property deals and political corruption.

The first issue of Nuacht Naisiunta (NN) is undated, but it was probably around September 1 1969, and its content was related to the Callaghan visit. It contains:

• a statement from Frank Gogarty, the NICRA Chairman, backtracking from the misunderstood demand for 'direct rule from Westminster'; they wanted Westminster to intervene to clear up the mess and to impose reforms on Stormont;
• an admonition to the Irish Labour party to drop the 'direct rule' demand;
• a call to the Trade Unions in the North to distance their members from what was identified explicitly as a genocidal attack;
• a call for support from the Arab nations;
• the text of a letter written to Home Secretary Callaghan which re-iterated the demands for the disarming and disbanding of the B-Specials and the disarming of the RUC, an amnesty for those who had defended their homes and manned the barricades, release of political prisoners, an end to the Special Powers Act, and the implementation of the basic demands of the NICRA: one man one vote, outlawing religious discrimination, impartial electoral boundaries, proportional representation etc. The letter was signed by James Gallagher, provisional secretary of the Republican Clubs Northern Executive; it also contained the demand that their existence should be legalised.

A Constitutional Convention?

The draft paper admitted our being unprepared, but stressed that this puts us in a good political position; we were not part of a plot preparing an armed insurrection. The mobilisation order went out only after the people had turned to us in despair seeking physical defence. There was a huge response, but most had to be sent home, as it was impossible for people unfamiliar with the terrain to be militarily effective at short notice. Support eventually being given was under the control of local defence committees.

The main priority at the time was political: we needed to make the case for an all-Ireland solution, not a Council of Ireland, nor a repeat of the 1st Dail, but some sort of peoples consultative convention on the Constitution, not yet practical politics, but we must make it so. '..It could be constructed from representatives of peoples' organisations; this would have the advantage that the 6-county Protestant workers would be represented through their trade unions, rather than through the MPs they elect, the latter having in the face of the world forfeited their right to rule..'.

Recommendations from such a Convention might include abolition of the special role of the Catholic Church, and concessions to regional interests by decentralising government (the 'Eire Nua' concept). To lay the basis for such a Convention required that all Cumainn develop local links with the people's organisations, initially via the organisation of a relief fund, setting up local Solidarity Committees. Demands on the Dublin Government should include getting the issue regarded internationally as all-Ireland and not internal UK, active support for local defence committees against B-Special-organised pogroms, no obstacles to be placed in the way of direct peoples' aid channels to defence committees. Demands to be pressed within the peoples' organisations should be to channel aid within their all-Ireland networks eg via the trade union movement, involving Protestant workers, and to seek north-south exploratory meetings to explore the constitutional needs.

'..The more joint all-Ireland meetings occur within the framework of the peoples' organisations, the more "direct rule from Westminster" will be seen for the retrograde step that it is, and the easier it will be to call an all-Ireland Convention..'.

At the SF Coiste Seasta on 8/09/69 TMcG, JC, MdeB, SR, RJ were present. There had been a statement issued on Article 44 of the Constitution; one was in preparation on the Federation proposals. RJ complained that Nuacht Naisiunta (NN) had no number, date or address on it. This would be remedied from now on. RJ and Seamus Rattigan were to attend the Connolly Youth conference as observers. A Clann na h-Eireann recruiting leaflet was rejected as unsuitable.

All-Ireland Solidarity

Bernadette Devlin was admonished for going to the US without consultation, and for coming out with the 'direct rule' demand. The strategic options were discussed, 'direct rule' from either Dublin or London being dismissed, in favour of an 'interim arrangement in the national interest'.

The 'all-out war' concept, with intervention by Jack Lynch's Army, was dismissed as being at best liable to give a 29-county Free State, labelled the 'Fennell/Bunting Solution'(3). It was regarded as preferable to hold out with the 'mini-republics' until substantial political reforms were granted along the lines of the Civil Rights demands.

"In order to make Irish-oriented politics practical in the 6 Counties we would need (1) PR at all elections (2) the right to secede the whole 6 Counties from the UK should a majority wish it, and (3) the right to make trade agreements. Under such a system the days of Unionism would be numbered. They know it; that is why they oppose even ordinary civil rights. If secession were constitutional the whole 'disloyalty' element would be removed..."

The foregoing situation approximates what currently exists under the Good Friday Agreement.

The sale of the United Irishman was urged; Liam McMillan had been released but Malachy McGurran was still held, on a charge of possession of illegal documents. Yet UVF men were out on bail on arms charges.

There was a Sinn Fein Coiste Seasta statement calling for the removal of the Rome Rule threat implied by Article 44 of the Constitution. It was noted that this call was beginning to be broad-based. They also opposed talks of 'federation' of Britain and Ireland which were beginning to be voiced by Dublin and London politicians, with in effect re-opening of the Treaty talks.

Condolences were sent to Vietnam on the death of Ho Chi Minh.

The closure of the Seafield Gentex factory in Athlone was noted, and trade union action was called for; issues like factory closures and housing for the people were not to be forgotten due to Northern pressures.

There was no reference to the IRA statement(4). signed by Goulding, which appeared in the September United Irishman, outlined above. The significance of this needed to be explained to the members, and it wasn't.

In the September 16 1969 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta there was a lengthy analysis of the 'Solidarity' ad-hoc group which originated from meetings at the GPO during the August crisis week. It was noted that the call for intervention by 'Jack's Army' has ceased to dominate. There was now an address, 94 St Stephen's Green, and a phone. There was a steering committee of republicans, trade unionists and other radical groups, with Anthony Coughlan as secretary. A meeting was held in Jury's on September 14, and a limited consensus was achieved, along the lines that:

(a) it is still strictly a civil rights issue, though Britain is responsible and the national question underlies it, and

(b) the religious-sectarian aspect of the 1937 Constitution should be amended.

People named as being present included Rev Terence McCaughey of Citizens for Civil Liberty, Barry Desmond and Justin Keating (Labour TDs), Ivan Cooper and Bernadette Devlin MP, Tomas Mac Giolla, Seamus Costello and Micheal O Riordain. This was a broad-based centre-left grouping.

This was a challenge to the 'Direct Rule' demand which was now associated primarily with Conor Cruise O'Brien and Noel Browne. The Labour Party was thus not monolithic in support of the latter position.

On the North it was urged that the barricades must stay; Chichester Clarke was resisting the 'political demands', though promising reforms such as a points system for housing. The key demands, eg reform of the RUC, remained. There was a guarded welcome given to the Cameron Report, which had actually commended the role of the republican clubs in the Civil Rights movement. They objected to smearing of the young left agitators as 'international conspirators', and to the 'puffing up' of John Hume.

The issue concluded with references to the Dublin Housing Action Committee, Citizens Advice Bureaux, and the Ground Rents issue.

Defence Committees and the NICRA; the 26-Co Response

The *proto-Provisionals were all there, making no contribution, but observing the scene and preparing behind the scenes for the walk-out, no doubt noting our total rejection of any military option.

It was noted that the citizens defence committee was no longer under republican control; this was due to co-options (by its proto-Provisional and Blaneyite leadership, Sean Keenan, Paddy Doherty etc); the barricades were coming down; the NICRA however was again emerging. Dalton Kelly was PRO and the AGM was planned for January. A meeting was planned for the 26th at which the Republican Clubs would organise activities relating to the CR issue, including a civil disobedience campaign. Paddy Callaghan reported that the Federation of Co-ops had met the Minister and the possibility existed that the Federation if developed could control the sea fishing industry. The Ard Fheis was again postponed sine die, due to the 'unsettled state' and a perceived threat of violence; it had been arranged for October 19. This was proposed by Sean Mac Stiofain (no doubt because he needed time to organise and schedule his walk-out for maximum impact and harm to the politicisation process).

There was a substantial change of emphasis in Issue #4 of NN dated September 23 1969, with topics like the Galway fish-in and a new Cumann in Sligo on the front page. Dublin homeless were jailed. On the North it was noted that the barricades had mostly come down, due to the combination of the British Army and the Catholic clergy. The Citizens Press, which the NICRA published, was commended and support urged for its Covenant campaign. Open UI sales and political activity were called for.

The Solidarity group was seen as presenting scope for doing spade work towards a constitutional referendum on Article 44, contacting Protestant communities tactfully, bearing in mind the negative effect of the Ne Temere decree in generating ghetto-consciousness.

The indication here however is that the Solidarity group was becoming evanescent; the foregoing looks somewhat aspirational.

The 'Federation' concept was decoupled from the 'British Isles' dimension and the concept floated at the level of devolution of Connaught away from total Dublin top-down control.

There were hints here at constitutional reforms of the 26 Counties such as to make a transition to an all-Ireland solution seem more acceptable and less threatening to Northern Protestants.

The Northern crisis took front-page priority again for issue #5 of Nuacht Naisiunta (NN) on September 30 1969: the Citizens Defence Committees had re-erected the barricades; the Republican Clubs were urged to meet and establish their own identities, and to help to make the Defence Committees truly representative of the community as a whole.

This good advice I suspect was largely ignored on the ground; Head Office was not enough in touch; republican activists tended to prefer their 'defence committee' type roles, and to ignore the need to stoke up their collective political consciousness. This led to the domination of the defence committees by the type of Fianna Fail-like people cultivated by Captain Kelly. Not enough social-republican spade-work had been done. I picked up this impression during the time on several occasions with trips North.

The remainder of the Nuacht was taken up with the Conradh, the Land League, Housing Action and fisheries; the Common Market began to make an appearance as an issue to think about.

I have on record a copy of a letter I wrote on 24/09/69 to Justin Keating, arising I think from a 'Solidarity' event at which he had spoken. I was attempting to develop a local basis in Rathmines for a 'Solidarity' event, on the neutral ground of the Connradh na Gaeilge hall in Observatory Lane. We had links with local Connradh and local tenants organisations, but no links with Labour. Anthony Coughlan was to address a meeting, which we wanted to be broad-based, and to accept a suitable message to try to convey to the Government indicating what they should be pressing on Westminster. The key demand was '..to implement rapidly and with no nonsense the CR Charter; also to press that there be no backing down by Lynch into any Commonwealth-type pseudo-unity deal..'. I went on to suggest that 'PR plus CR plus the right to secede' in the North would transform the situation, with the UI legalised etc. I had tried to get Noel Browne to accept this, but he had refused to listen. I have however no record of any reply from Keating. There was later some contact, on similar lines, with Brendan Halligan on the Solidarity network.

On the same day I wrote to Anthony Coughlan, stressing the importance of trying to develop local broad-based links around the 'solidarity' demands. I also declared the intention of pulling back from the 'front line' of the movement, in order to write stuff which might be useful in a broader-based 'liberation movement' context: '..Liberation Tracts that would give guidance to those people who were working in the mass-organisations... not specifically Sinn Fein policy... spell out the steps from here to national independence and socialism in the form of a sequence of concessions to fight for, such that the people can understand them..'.

I went on: '..I would like this to appear more or less as from your group (this was the Common Market Study Group), which seems to be the group which spans most effectively the radical spectrum. I would like on the whole to play down my identification with the republicans, except in the broadest sense. I feel there is now much work to be done in teaching the Left how to speak the language of national liberation (especially in the North), more than to teach the republicans the ideas and organisational principles of socialism. I am inclined to accept Desmond's criticism that the former should have come first, and I want to back-track (or advance) myself into that position over a period without rocking the boat of radical unity. A transition period like this, in an environment accepted by both sides, would I feel do the trick; also I want to hedge myself against the possibility that the work on the Commission may have been a waste of time, due to the danger of the movement reverting to type in the possibly coming military situation (of which don't underestimate the danger). In this case the movement will collapse and split and we must establish as many national links of a positive character under the Solidarity banner so as to be able to pick up the bits and weld them into a genuine national movement without the mythology.

I concluded by mentioning that '..from Jan 1.. I will be trying to earn a living without benefit of a job... I will need a period with as little public activity a possible, until I get my existing reasonable reputation for professional competence a bit better known... I'm not out to make a lot of money, just enough to keep me and the family going, and perhaps give Mairin a little less to crib about..'.

The foregoing, seen in retrospect, is a valid representation of my then thinking, under the pressures of the crisis and the impending split.

At the SF Coiste Seasta on 29/09/69 TMcG, TR, SmacS, SR, RJ, JC, MdeB were present. Dalton Kelly attended from the NICRA. It was reported that the meeting of Republican Clubs had been poorly supported; the plan to get active clubs in every county, with a 6-county executive to handle publicity remained unfulfilled. Dalton Kelly reported on the Citizens Press; it was hoped to get the Defence Committees to adopt it, while keeping policy under control of the movement.

I have a copy of a duplicated leaflet issued by the NICRA in September 1969, which calls for civil and political rights to be legislated by Westminster, as the alternative to Direct Rule and the abolition of Stormont. It is labelled 'draft' in m/s, so I don't know if this ever became the official policy. It was clearly an attempt to defeat the PD direct rule demand politically. It refers to a Covenant for people to sign. The political rights were '..explicit recognition... of the right of the people of Northern Ireland to political self-determination..', and the right of Stormont to negotiate trade agreements with other countries. The civil rights were votes for all at 18 in all election, a boundary commission to define local government areas, Proportional Representation, freedom of assembly and expression, anti-discrimination legislation, and an impartial police force.

The relationship between the Defence Committees, the Republican Clubs, the NICRA and the Citizens Press during this period needs to be analysed, perhaps with the NICRA records as additional source. What I suspect is that the first were increasingly under Blaneyite / proto-Provisional control, and were subverting the membership of the second, and keeping the third and fourth at bay. The foregoing SF minute is ambiguous.

The 'Federal Deal' Concept; the role of Fianna Fail

At the Sinn Fein Coiste Seasta on 6/10/69 Mac Stiofain was present, along with TMcG, SR, MdeB and JC, also RJ. RJ reported on Housing Action Movement feedback from the Left: it was rumoured that SF was withdrawing from active participation due to a secret agreement with the FF government, relating to the Northern question(5).

During the rest of October one gets the impression here that the lines of communication with the Northern leadership people, and their contacts on the ground, were becoming eroded through the Defence Committee system, under increasingly proto-Provisional and Blaneyite influence. Most of the Nuacht Naisiunta content was 26-county parochial.

I have a copy of the London 'Evening Standard' dated October 14 1969 which contains an article by Tom Pocock attempting to make sense of the Northern scene. I remember encountering him, and he did make an effort to report fairly the aspirations of the republican left, which he linked with my own name and those of Cathal Goulding, Sean Garland and Anthony Coughlan. '..Against the advice of the Left, the Right began a crash programme of re-armament and military training, with the active help, so I have been told, of three members of the Irish government and some factions within the Army... military-type camps... the Donegal Mafia... radio station beamed on Ulster... Indeed, my most alarming memory of this visit to Dublin is not of inflammatory talk over Guinness but of a charming member of the Irish Cabinet remarking over coffee in a luxurious restaurant that he has been in favour of ordering the Army to march into Ulster. Odd that the most rational and least bloodthirsty Irishman I met should have been a Marxist..'.

At the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle on 18/10/69 TMacG, CC, SC, EMacT, TR, LG, JC, SMacS, GMacL, DC, RJ, DK, SR, DL, KA, OMacC were present. Republican Clubs were to support Kevin McCorry or Dalton Kelly for the NICRA full-time organiser. Citizen Press was to remain under republican control, but with Belfast Central Citizens Defence Committee (CCDC) represented on the management committee. The Regional Executive of Republican Clubs had been set up, and clubs re-activated. The Clubs legality case had however been defeated in the Lords; people had been therefore convicted, but given conditional discharges. A campaign to release Malachi McGurran and Prionnsias Mac Airt (Frank Card) was initiated. Seamus Costello gave a list of current active regional organisers. Ard Fheis date was fixed for January 10-11. Mac Stiofain proposed that the 2 main resolutions be circulated in advance with information as to their timing on the agenda. This was accepted.

Mac Stiofain obviously had in mind the need to drum up maximal attendance at the crucial times. If his military plan was to be developed, the political plan needed to be stymied with maximal disruption.

Issue #8 of NN on October 21 1969 opened with the Hunt Report, using the text of a speech given by Tomas Mac Giolla in UCD. He was critical of the Report, which appeared to concede the NICRA demands, but in fact side-stepped them, with reforms which were nominal and cosmetic. McGurran and McAirt were still imprisoned, despite the Special Powers being supposedly abolished.

The ban on the Republican Clubs had been upheld on appeal to the Lords. The local courts however were not willing the sentence those accused of membership.

Pre-Split Intrigues

It seems I had been over in London on business, and had been staying with Sean Redmond. CDG recorded an encounter in the Lucas Arms on October 24. I was somewhat self-critical, but was inclined to be dismissive of the projected 1971 resumption of hostilities, though aware of the possibility that I might be kept in the dark. The Kerry republicans had broken with Dublin, and now there was a meeting in Belfast; Jimmy Steele was involved. I was in two minds about going forward for the Ard Comhairle. The question of 'petite-bourgeois organisational pre-suppositions' came up; I had earlier been aware of this as a problem and had wanted to discuss it with CDG, but he had been dismissive. We concluded, good-humouredly, that I was, like JJ, before my time, too impulsive, too talkative, and too keen on print.

At the Sinn Fein Coiste Seasta on 27/10/69 TMacG, JC, TR, RJ, GMacL, MdeB were present. Note that the CS meetings during this period were basically being carried by RJ and TMacG on behalf of the leading politicisers. The role of Joe Clarke was to put a glowering negative presence on the process, backed by Tony Ruane, and fortified by SMacS from time to time. TMacG reported on the 6-Co Regional Executive: five areas were represented; people had in most cases been absorbed into CRA work and club work had been dropped. Billy McMillan was elected Chair, Liam Cummins secretary, Kevin McCorry press officer and Oliver Frawley treasurer. The first meeting was fixed for Belfast on November 2 and there was to be a motion proposed by J White and seconded by R MacKnight 'that a revolutionary front of all radical groups be set up for the purpose of organising the youth into a revolutionary movement and to press the social objectives of the movement now'.

It is far from clear what the philosophy of, or strategic thinking behind, this motion was; it seems to have come bottom-up from the people concerned, and to have reflected ultra-left PD-type influence; it certainly was not a reflection of leadership thinking.

Thirteen regions were defined for elections to the incoming Ard Comhairle; these were realistically based on the known distribution of Cumainn and Clubs, and defined in terms of ease of access to a regional centre. It is not clear who drew up the list; it could have been from Goulding, who would have had a feel for the main foci of politicisation. They were 'all-Ireland' in structure, eg we had 'Donegal/Derry' and 'Fermanagh / West Cavan / Leitrim'.

Issue #9 of Nuacht Naisiunta on October 28 1969 opened with an accusation that the Fianna Fail leadership were actively engaged in colluding with the British in a scheme for a Federal Union of 'these islands'. The source of this was, it seems, statements by Terence O'Neill and Eddie McAteer, along the lines of 'a little United Nations in the British Isles'. There was an attempt to trace this back to the Lemass-O'Neill meeting. Fianna Fail were challenged to decouple themselves from this concept.

It was noted that the Northern Committee of the Irish TUC at its meeting on October 22 had demanded the reorganisation of the RUC and the abolition of the Special Powers Act. Republicans were urged to seek TU support for the release of McGurran and McArt.

The November United Irishman featured the exposure of the 'Haughey, Blaney and Boland' (HB&B) attempt to take over the Civil Rights movement. It was not clear whether it was Government or Fianna Fail; there was money involved. They plumped for FF; Brady and Corrigan were involved; what was the role of Lynch? O'Neill and McAteer had issued jointly a statement calling for a federation of these islands, a re-invention of the old 'Home Rule All Round' concept from the 1900s, though with Partition. The role of the Republican Clubs in support of the Civil Rights was highlighted, in defence of the political role, and in answer to those who were saying 'where were they?' when the people needed defence from pogroms.

At the SF Coiste Seasta on 3/11/69 TMacG, SR, TR, Mick Ryan, Seamus Costello were present; Sean Dunne and Andy Smith attended as from the Dublin CC, and Joe Nolan from Dun Laoire. It seems I was not present at this one, unusually. This was to resolve the Dun Laoire question. The Dublin CC position was that the Tracey Cumann promoted by Joe Nolan was 'paper', and a new active Cumann had been set up in Sallynoggin; Joe Nolan could join this if he liked. Joe Nolan was challenged to produce the minute book. Mick Ryan reported complaints that CS business had been discussed outside the CS; this was aimed at Joe Clarke but no names were mentioned.

I have among my papers a copy of 'Notes for Organisers Meeting' dated 3/11/69. This was aimed at organising the regional conferences, and ensuring that the Ard Fheis papers were distributed. Thirteen areas had been defined, each with some degree of geographical unity, each with 10-15 Cumainn. The 'report on the work of the movement' which they were urged to deliver was summarised; it covered the role of the Civil Rights movement, public opinion in the world, the Belfast and Derry situations, local work going on with housing and trade union groups, the Fianna Fail attempt to take over Civil Rights and to isolate radicals, while working a deal with Wilson on the EEC, Free Trade and NATO. The role of Nuacht Naisiunta, the weekly newsletter to Cumainn, was highlighted.

This political message was however not well adapted to the state of political development of the movement at the grass-roots, which was rapidly lapsing into a militarist mind-set. There is also a 'draft note on the job of organiser', defining weekly and monthly cycles, based on the United Irishman, and a suggested daily routine. There was, on some occasion about this time, a session with the regional organisers, and some of the regions were re-defined on the basis of their local knowledge.

There was a WTS meeting on November 4, at which Manus Durkan spoke on 'The Power of the Insurance Companies'. There was also a poetry reading in Jury's Hotel, with Sean O Tuama, on November 15.

Manus Durkan was a Fianna Fail trade union activist who had helped the IWP activist Noel Harris organise the ASTMS in the insurance business. The poetry reading was part of a series organised by Meryl Farrington to make cultural links with Irish, Scottish and Welsh poets.

One gains the impression that WTS momentum was declining, and that it was unable to respond to the Northern crisis, given the way it had developed.

During November 1969 a campaign developed for the release of McGurran and Mac Airt (Card), while the Fianna Fail takeover of the Civil Rights movement proceeded apace, funded by business supporters. There was a bomb provocation at Bodenstown. There was some proto-Provisional rumbling in a few Cumainn. There was increasing concern about Standing Committee business being openly circulated, aimed at Joe Clarke. The 'Voice of the North', edited by Seamus Brady, was acting for the Haughey Blaney Boland consortium. The perception was that £400 per week was being contributed by the HBB consortium '...to help in harnessing Civil Rights to the Fianna Fail star..'.

Republicans were urged to sell the United Irishman to counter this subversive ploy by the 26-county Establishment. There was some diversion of effort over a matter of a primary school closure at O'Brien's Bridge (Montpelier). There were indications that HQ was uneasy about the ability of local republicans to express national policies with any consistency, in a situation increasingly dominated by the Fianna Fail proto-Provisional position. Bernadette Devlin had approached the Movement to organise meetings for her in the 26 Cos. It was agreed to seek a meeting in advance to agree policy positions: UDR, British interference, sectarian strife etc.

Regional conferences to elect regional members for the incoming Ard Comhairle, under the revised regionalised constitution, were announced. The full Ard Comhairle would be elected at the coming '1969' Ard Fheis, planned for January 1970. The regional meetings would double as educational conferences, to update members on the developing Northern situation. The 6-co executive was now meeting regularly and club members were being encouraged to join the NICRA.

The Wolfe Tone commemoration oration was reported in Issue #13 of NN on November 24; the occasion was the 171st anniversary of his burial, and it was a response to the blowing up of the grave-stone, as reported earlier. Liam O Comain, secretary of the 6-county Republican Executive which united the Clubs, recalled the guiding principles of Presbyterianism, civil and religious liberty, the rights of the common man and true democracy. He reminded his audience of the simultaneous foundation of the Orange Order and Maynooth College, in response to the threat of non-sectarian democratic unity. There was however an explicit nod in the direction of the use of force to dislodge Britain, though in a projected context suggesting unity of Catholic and Protestant workers.

There was a Strabane demonstration for the release of Mac Airt (Card) and McGurran, and a defence of the RTE programme exposing money-lenders, which had been attacked by Minister for Justice Ó Moráin. It was suggested that the money-lending fraternity was extensive and influential in the local management of the Fianna Fail vote in working-class areas(7).

Thus not only was political left-republicanism exposing the top-level corruption fuelled by developers' land deals in local government, but also the mafia-type local control system for the urban Fianna Fail working-class vote. One can, in retrospect, understand the viciousness with which the Haughey group at the top moved to marginalise the influence of politicising republicans. Not only were they opening up the possibility of real reforms in the North such as to enable cross-community democratic politics to unite working people, but in the South they were exposing how democratic politics was being subverted by moneyed mafias. We had touched many raw Fianna Fail nerves.

The Connolly Association conference met on November 30 1969; Greaves characterised it in his diaries as a '..recall of the one wrecked by NICRA'. There were delegates from Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, Oxford and London; the Movement for Colonial Freedom was there, and a few Labour Party and Trade Union people. Hume it seemed was in favour of people joining the Ulster Defence Regiment. Greaves regarded the formation of latter as an 'astute move' on the part of the British, going on to remark that '..the absence of theoretical clarity in Belfast Left circles seems to prevent their extending influences on the nationalists, who are heavily divided... the IRA members of London NICRA were at the NICRA conference in Belfast..'(8).

In the December United Irishman the Special Powers was the target, the continued holding of McGurran and Card being the key issue. There was a review by the present writer of Bernadette Devlin's book; her policies were attributed to Farrell, McCann and Toman. The EEC threat was again mentioned, along with Building Societies and Land Leagues.

The year ends with a confused rearguard action on the part of the paper, to re-assert, somewhat half-heartedly, the political republican agenda, in the context of the impending Ard Fheis.

Bernadette Devlin

In retrospect, I must say I never fully understood how these meetings had come about, by whom or how they were initiated, what their objective was. I was inclined at the time to attribute them to the initiative of the Limerick politicisers, but from the Coiste Seasta record it seems the initiative came from Bernadette. Were they perhaps a diversion? Who was taking whom for a ride? It seems I did not voice my unease at the CS, though I remember distinctly being uneasy, and critical of their lack of political focus.

There were meetings at Ennis, Nenagh, Tipperary, Cashel and Thurles. She then flew back from Shannon to prepare questions for the next week's Westminster session, including the issue of the McGurran-McAirt imprisonment.

It is noteworthy that the only leading republicans to be imprisoned where those who were in the lead of the politicisation process; this supports the long-standing Greaves hypothesis that there was an influential back-room group in the Home Office which actively wanted to encourage the re-emergence of a sterile non-political military IRA. They arrest McGurran, but not Mac Stiofain.

Issue #14 of Nuacht Naisiunta: "It is evident that the Irish people have adopted Bernadette as a figurehead, whether they agree with her or not. In her speeches she stressed, correctly, the Lynch-Wilson machinations and the danger of a Federal fraud. She also stressed the need to build an all-Ireland movement with social-revolutionary objectives, so as to help persuade the Northern people that national unity under Fianna Fail was not the issue..".

She was '...complimented on doing a good job of combining agitational work with the occasional use of the parliamentary machine so as to express its inadequacy....' (and was) '...developing her ideas away from the rather arid doctrinaire student socialism and towards a more national-rooted revolutionary tradition...'.

I attended the Thurles meeting. She drew a crowd. I remember thinking at the time the meeting lacked political focus. She concentrated on the conditions of the working people in the North, and the need for social reform. These meetings were apparently a bottom-up Limerick initiative, part of the internal grass-roots Sinn Fein campaign against parliamentary abstention with a view to influencing the coming Ard Fheis. They had little relevance however to the actual Northern situation.

More 'Federal' Hints

(a) imposing a Bill of Rights on Stormont
(b) imposing PR in elections
(c) granting explicitly the right of democratic secession, so as to make all-Ireland politics non-subversive, and then withdraw completely from any further interference in Irish affairs...'.

This indicates that strategic Head Office thinking(9) was still in terms of the need to sustain the momentum of the NICRA, despite all the Fianna Fail machinations in the North and the increasing domination of local politics there by 'defence committees' and the like, and to oppose any steps towards an effective absorption into the UK via a 'federal' process, in the EEC context. The key intellectual influence remained Anthony Coughlan.

The Year 1970 and the Split

This would have been issued by Goulding subsequent to the 'Army' Convention which had taken place in December 1969. Mac Stiofain, O Bradaigh, Mac Thomais and a few others walked out, and continued to meet in another room. The Convention proper continued to consider the Garland Commission documents, and how to handle them at the Ard Fheis planned for January. The 'army' was thus acting as a political 'inner group'; there was no military dimension. The group who walked out then went on to plan the organised walk-out which crippled the subsequent Ard Fheis.

There is an agenda here for historians: to what extent were Tim Pat Coogan and the Irish Press directly involved, on behalf of Fianna Fail, with the process that led to the emergence of the Provisionals and the isolation of the politicising Left? It certainly was our perception at the time that this was their agenda.

There was also a review by RJ of Michael Farrell's 'Struggles in the North, along with George Gilmore's 'Republican Congress': Gilmore found the basic politics of FF and the IRA in the 1930s identical. In the Republican Congress the premature support for the 'workers' republic' vision led to leakage of support to FF. Farrell's chronology was accurate but the analysis faulty; he has a 'moderates' group with Hume et al wanting Catholic concessions within the UK, a 'militants' group with Blaney et al wanting a 32 county FF republic, and socialists attacking capitalism so as to win Protestant workers for a workers republic. There was no mention of the Republican Clubs and their mobilising support for the NICRA. I went on to suggest that the Congress error was being repeated: attacking capitalism before getting rid of the imperialist-imposed partitioned structure.

This issue of the United Irishman pre-dated the January 1970 (postponed 1969) Ard Fheis, where the split occurred publicly. This has been widely described. The proto-Provisionals remained in the hall long enough to vote against abandoning abstentionism, and then staged a walk-out, with various incidents guaranteed to attract journalistic attention. Among the visitors associated with the walk-out was Gerry Jones, a prominent Fianna Fail supporter on the Taca network. They had a hall booked ready to meet in for the purpose of founding the Provisionals.

According to Greaves the split occurred because of the outmanoeuvring of the Civil Rights movement in the North, and the consequent discredit of the republican policy of political action. He attributed it to the folly of the present writer, and undertook not to take sides. The London republicans were supporters of Mac Stiofain while Goulding's support was in Birmingham. The Huddersfield arms episode was 'official' and Goulding stood over Smullen and co.

In other words despite the best politicising efforts of the present writer and others, the movement on both sides of the split was reverting to traditional mode, under the pressure of the Northern events. Also it seems that Goulding had been keeping the present writer in the dark regarding the Smullen episode.

Greaves had hopes that Labour in Ireland might now take a strong national stand. In Dublin he picked up the impression that Meade and the present writer were happy with the situation, regarding the Provisionals as lacking in people of ability. I was, of course, thinking in terms of political ability, and had no feel for their military potential, which turned out, alas, to be considerable. I conveyed to Greaves the impression that the 'official' politicising structures were holding, and that the Northern Executive of the Republican Clubs had replaced the 'Northern Command' structure. CDG however picked up the impression that I was not told everything; I was not aware, for example, that Costello had been in London. I was, it seems, unable to give a satisfactory account of Belfast, and was under the impression that Jimmy Steele had no influence(10).

He was of course quite right. We had totally underestimated the extent to which Mac Stiofain had been actively building the Northern Command structure, outside of the political process.

The Ard Comhairle met on January 17, with Tomas MacGiolla, Malachi McGurran, Sean O Cionnaith, Cathal Goulding, Lian O Comain, Oliver Frawley, MJ Dunfy, Ivan Barr, Tom Mitchell, Frank Wogan, Frank Patterson, Oliver McCaul, Sean Dunne, Seamus Costello, Mick Ryan, Mairin de Burca. There were apologies from RJ, Paddy Kilcullen, Tom Kilroy, Sylvester Doolan. Eamonn Mac Tomais had been elected but had walked out. Regional representatives who had walked out were Peter Duffy, JJ McGirl, Ruairi O Bradaigh, Des Long, Ned Bailey. The position of George O'Mahony of Cork was not known.

The present writer had agreed to continue as Director of Education. MdeB and Sean O Cionnaith were secretaries. Seamus Rhatigan and Derry Kelleher were treasurers. The Coiste Seasta was to include as well as the officers MR, CG, TM and SD.

I did not want go forward, having just then left Aer Lingus(11). and being faced with survival in self-employed mode; I definitely felt I had to get more into a back-room situation, and out of the front line. But I was stuck with the education job and felt that somehow I had to continue with it. This meant that I continued on the CS.

It seems that one Jerry O'Keefe, who was a visitor representing the NAIJ, had assaulted Sean Mac Stiofain, so they agreed to complain to the NAIJ. The issue was raised by Tom Mitchell.

Why should a visitor take such an action? Could this be part of a prior arrangement to generate 'news'? The media would assume it was a delegate, and help to promulgate an aura of 'injured innocence' around Mac Stiofain.

Publication of the social and economic programme was to be prioritised. This appeared in the February United Irishman(12), under the title 'Freedom Manifesto'. Insofar as there was a focus for the 'National Liberation Front' concept, this was it.

Issue #16 of Nuacht Naisiunta on January 19 1970 contained a bare-bones account of the Ard Fheis; it was noted that the broad-based 'national liberation front' motion had been supported, but the electoral policy one had been defeated, not getting the required 2/3 majority. Both these motions had come out of the work of the 'Garland Commission'. There was no reference to the walk-out.

Other topics included the EEC (Coughlan's 'Case Against the Common Market' being promoted), the United Irishman (current sales were at 45,000 but there were problems in getting the money in from the Cumainn), the Springboks tour and the proposed Trade Union and Industrial Relations Bills. The issue of all-Ireland sporting organisation in the cycling context was treated, a matter dear to the heart of Seamus O Tuathail, the Editor of the United Irishman.

At the Coiste Seasta on 26/01/70 there were TMacG, Derry Kelleher, CG, RJ, TM, Sean Dunne, Sylvester Doolan; also Seamus O Tuathail. The Labour Party had invited TMacG to their Annual Conference; Sean Dunne was to go. The Connemara Cearta Sibhialta movement had written supporting the 'national liberation front' concept. No reply to the statement issued by the 'breakaway group' but errors of fact were to be corrected with the UI and NN. The Westminster election was discussed, and the coming NICRA AGM. Tom Mitchell was to meet with Bernadette. Malachi McGurran as a candidate for the NICRA Chair was considered but no decision was taken.

Issue #17 of Nuacht Naisiunta on January 26 1970 contained an overview of what happened as regards the walk-out. They had all stayed together until after the elections to the Ard Comhairle. While the votes were being counted, a delegate got up to propose the continuation of support for and co-operation with the IRA. At this point 'an altercation then arose' and a number of delegates and visitors walked out. The event had been pre-planned; they went off to the Kevin Barry Hall. Some of those who had opposed the electoral policy resolution remained behind.

The remaining body of Sinn Fein was thus in a constitutionally anomalous situation, lumbered with the electoral debris of those who had walked out.

The February 1970 issue of the United Irishman led with 'Hold Firm - No Civil War'; the British were standing aside and encouraging it, all-Ireland Federation with Britain being the perceived prize. The 'Freedom Manifesto' was published. This was our attempt to put some flesh on the bones of the 'national liberation front' concept which had crept into the discussions; this choice of labelling was elsewhere criticised as being derivative and misleading; it certainly gave rise to great confusion in the Ard Fheis debate. Mac Giolla in his speech at the Ard Fheis had accused Jack Lynch of promoting a new Act of Euro-Union.

The Coiste Seasta met on February 2; TMacG was to speak in Cork on March 6, and RJ was to go with him, to run an educational conference on that weekend. We had earlier had an encounter with Kiaran Kennedy, the Economic and Social Research Institute Director, who was systematically talking to all Parties. There was also reported a meeting representative of all Republican Clubs in the Brackareilly Hall, Maghera on February 1; it was addressed by Billy McMillan from Belfast and Anthony Coughlan from Dublin, with the latter stressing the need for the avoidance of sectarian clashes and the development of the role of the NICRA. Malachy McGurran presided, and Tomas Mac Giolla also spoke.

Issue #18 of Nuacht Naisiunta attempted to survey nationally the effect of the walk-out. Support for the leadership in the Six Counties was seen as solid, this comprising the republican club activists who had been supporting the Civil Rights approach. Others who subsequently emerged via the Provisional process would simply not have been on record with Head Office. Support for the 'breakaway group' was seen as emanating from Cavan and Monaghan. In Dublin six out of ten Cumainn, representing 80% of the membership, were seen as 'loyal'. The picture elsewhere however was confused, due to the conflation of two totally distinct issues: electoral tactics and support for trying to keep the Northern issue on a political road.

The unifying philosophy was seen as the need to develop a broad-based popular anti-imperialist movement for the re-conquest of Ireland, the 'national liberation front' concept.

A protest outside the British Embassy about the banning of the Republican Clubs and the sale of the United Irishman was reported as having taken place on February 2; there was music and songs.

The February 23 1970 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta reported a Liberty Hall conference which had been opened by Cathal Goulding. It was addressed by Kader Asmal on imperialism, Oliver Snoddy and Eoin O Murchu on the 'Cultural Revolution', Tom Kilroy and Seamus O Tuathail on farming and land issues, with Brian Heron (a Connolly grandson) giving the progressive US angle. Tomas Mac Giolla declared the intent of running similar conferences regionally.

The Ard Comhairle met on February 28 1970 with TMacG, Liam Cummins, M Dunphy, Mick Ryan, Oliver Frawley, Cathal Goulding, Seamus Rattigan, Ivan Barr, Tom Mitchell, Sean O Cionnaith, Paddy Kilcullen, RJ, Tom Kilroy, Derry Kelleher, Donnchadh MacRaignaill, Oliver MacCaul, Seamus Costello present.

This was the makings of an effective post-split national leadership, of what was the makings of an effective all-Ireland political republican movement. What went wrong? Were there avoidable blunders committed? Or was the initiative marginalised by external 'force majeure'? I hope to be able to tease this out in what follows, or or at least contribute to helping others to do so(13).

Sean Keenan in Derry 'did not want an enquiry into his dismissal'; ie he was registering his opting out in favour of the Provisionals. Local Derry activists threatened to withdraw support from NICRA street protests, seeing 'education in ideology of revolution' as an alternative. They were instructed to persist with public support for NICRA events. Church gate collections were called for the Bombay Street Housing Association.

On my various visits to Derry to interact with the activists, I had marginally encountered Sean Keenan, in a house where we met; he tended to be passively in the background, watching TV, while we tried to develop some degree of political understanding.

There was a discussion on whether a membership fee should be made a condition of membership; it was left that the Comhairle Ceanntar had the power to waive it. The prisoners release campaign was to be intensified. Frank Patterson was agreed as a unity candidate for South Down. Unity candidates to be discussed by the Clubs Executive. Tom Mitchell to go to Belfast to discuss current policy.

The March 1970 issue of the United Irishman continued on the 'No Civil War' theme, a divisive civil war still being perceived as what Britain wanted, with all-Ireland Federation with the UK as the strategic vision. The 'Abolish Stormont' demand was countered by 'only when the alternative is the Republic'. There was an NICRA group to go to the US: Denis Cassin, Malachi McGurran and Brigid Bond. The fisheries campaign continued. There was however an extended report on the 3rd AGM of the NICRA, which took place on February 14-15 in Belfast, attended by 500 people. The secretary Peter Morris reported the formation of 8 regional groups. Ivan Cooper promoted continuing extra-parliamentary action, around a demand for a Civil Rights Charter. Gerrymandering required re-drawing of boundaries. The report was proposed for acceptance by Daltun O Ceallaigh and passed unanimously.

The UI report of the AGM then went on to report on some emerging divisions: Con McCluskey it seems objected to the NAIJ in the USA being the contact-point; there was said to be a Black Panther connection, which Michael Farrell supported, leaving McCluskey isolated. Farrell went on to propose the development of a Civil Rights movement in the 26 Counties. There were attacks by PD people on 'Catholic bigots'. The Farrell motion was referred to the incoming executive, and it was recommended that the Citizens for Civil Liberties should be the contact-point, also the Article 44 campaign. The PD element in the conferences seems to have been a source of ultra-leftist disruption.

I feel I need to comment with hindsight on an aspect of the foregoing: I find it remarkable that we were dedicating so much energy to peripheral issues like ground rents and fisheries, relics of evanescent landlordism, at a time when the situation was so explosive. The explanation perhaps is that this was intended as a means of keeping activists in the 26 counties doing something of local interest, so as to divert them from madly rushing North and fuelling what was verging on a civil war situation. It probably had the opposite effect, however, as many were motivated to join the Provisionals by what they perceived as lack of leadership attention to the exploding Northern situation.

The IRA statements also perhaps were intended to serve the same purpose. The movement was imprisoned by its historical structures; the process of transforming it into a broad-based political movement of the democratic left was far from complete, so that in the end the Provisionals were clearly the winners in the competition to pick up the loyalties of the activists. Enough people remained with the 'officials' eventually to achieve some Dail representation, which however later split away from the Workers Party rump, forming the Democratic Left party, which eventually merged with Labour. The basis of the DL split was the perception of the residual existence of an 'inner group' having continuity of experience with the 'official IRA'. The Fenian-IRB tradition dies hard; it has been a powerful influence on the political culture.

In Belfast on March 15 1970 Greaves attended the conference which marked the unification of the CPNI and the IWP into the CPI. He was on the IWP invitation list but not on that of the CPNI. There were greetings from some 20 CPs in various countries. When it was over Sean Nolan asked him if he had any misgivings. He said he had: '..but it is done. The problems you haven't solved before reunification you will have to solve after it..'. Then he went down to Dublin, in the company of AC, who it seems had been present as an observer, presumably in his capacity as the Dublin correspondent of the Irish Democrat. The next day, March 16 1970, he spent some time with Cathal Goulding, who called in to MacLiam's house. '..Some of the bounce had gone out of him. He was more inclined to be self-critical... too busy in his business to get around to see people..'. The Belfast events did them terrible harm, specifically '..having no guns..'. CG tended to blame the lack of guns on the Belfast people themselves: '...the test of a man when the movement is broke is how deep he'll dig into his own pocket..'.

Note the apparent assumption that lack of Falls Road guns was the problem, rather than the existence of the armed Protestant B-Specials as a component of the Crown forces. Thus the pogrom succeeded in its objective, of making everyone think in terms of guns for 'defence'.

CDG went on to remark that the difference between the UI and the Poblacht did not warrant a major split. Goulding responded: '..Stephenson wanted the abstention issue discussed so as to kill it quickly. When we proposed delay as there was no election in sight, Costello challenged him "are you afraid to fight it out?" So it was discussed, and the result was the split..'.

The indications are however that Goulding wanted Belfast to be undefended, and to use the ensuing situation politically to get the B-Specials disarmed. This however gave the Provisionals the role of 'defenders of the people'.

CG went on to discuss Costello, the North, British policy, Federation etc. There was a mention of RHJ in this context. CDG concluded '..one gets the impression of a very imperfectly centralised organisation..'. CG had been invited as a 'fraternal delegate to the CPNI conference. He asked CDG had he misgivings about this CP reunification; he said he had, but asked CG for his: '..I saw the CPNI as a door to the Protestant workers, if they become anti-Partition they may close it..'. CDG replied that he thought that in that case they would have to make the trade union movement the door.

Then, on the question of the 'Irish Republic Now Virtually Established' CG was dismissive: '..revolutionaries must work from things as they are. For my part I cannot see any broad basis of politics being evolved from anybody but dedicated Marxists. They will show the way to the future...'. CDG goes on: '..it struck me that CG is now in a transitional phase. Joe O'Connor in London expressed the opinion that the Goulding IRA will go CPI and the other become the recognised IRA. It would be a pity in ways. But I think this might be true of Goulding. That he has enormously matured is certain...'.

Later: '..I saw RHJ again for a few minutes. It struck me that he was conscious of having lost influence. CG goes to MOR now not to him. As I left the house he said "I want to talk with you - about philosophy". It was because I had accused him of following Fanon...'. The next day he recorded that I had pointed him in the direction of Ned Byrne, Kevin O'Byrne's father, who knew Mellows. Then he went back to London to work on the Irish Democrat.

At the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society on March 24 1970 Joe Deasy spoke on 'The Independence of Small Nations'. There is on record a copy of the notice for this meeting, signed by Anthony Coughlan, secretary. "..The speaker will be examining, with particular reference to Ireland, the problems which a small nation has of maintaining its independence and identity under the political, economic and cultural pressures of imperialism. This has special relevance at a time when the twenty six county State is seeking to obtain membership of the Common Market under precisely such pressures..". He went on to give notice that "...the Society intends organising a Conference on the subject and related matters in the near future..". The circular also promoted a poetry reading on March 22 by Dic Jones the Welsh farmer-poet, in the series produced by Meryl Farrington.

In Nuacht Naisiunta on March 31 1970 Tomas Mac Giolla in the Derry Easter Commemoration responded to the presence of British troops; they were there to defend the RUC. He attempted to promote the vision of common interest between working people whether Protestant or Catholic, calling on the former to reject their propertied Unionist Establishment leadership.

Then on April 7 1970 Goulding, speaking at Glasnevin, began by taking up a basically Connolly position, but then in the latter part of his speech lapsed into a contradictory position in which he promoted the ('official') IRA as an essential factor in the revolution, while advocating the recognition of 'all forms of struggle and not confining ourselves to the form of struggle inherited..'. He was struggling with the transformation problem in the presence of pressure from the traditional 'physical force' cultural mind-set. He felt the need to raise the profile of the 'official IRA' enough to keep the waverers on the agreed political track.

On April 14 1970 an article on the North condemned sectarian attacks on Orange marches which had led to confrontations with British troops. Attention was drawn to the prospect of talks between Dublin, Stormont and London regarding possible new constitutional arrangements, with London seeking more control over Dublin (reinforcing the 'federalism' threat). Support was urged for the NICRA Bill of Rights Campaign.

At the Ard Comhairle on April 17 1970 TMacG, MdeB, DK, Padraig Maloney, DMacR, SC, MR, LOC, OF, MD, TM. A O hAnnrachain, Frank Wogan, SR, SOC, CG were present. Belfast affiliation fees were handed in. Bombay St collections were unsatisfactory. Educational conferences had taken place in Limerick and Cork and were planned for Tyrone and Waterford. A prisoners protest meeting had taken place in TCD (SOC). Eoin O Murchu was appointed Organiser for the Gaeltacht. A meeting fixed for Maghera on May 10 to organise a new 6-co Executive. Bill of Rights campaign support was to be urged on Clann na hEireann at their Birminghan AGM.

Arising from this meeting the Coiste Seasta issued a statement on 17th April 20 1970 which analysed the role of the Nationalist Party, Blaney and Fianna Fail in the engineering of an approach to local leaderships offering aid on condition that they break with Republican leadership in Dublin, perceived as a political threat from the left. A 'red scare' tactic was used. People were urged to forget about political issues and concentrate on military defence against organised pogroms. Military intelligence officers from the Free State were involved: Kelly, Drohan and Duggan. A 'Civil Rights Information Office' financed by the Dublin Government was set up in Monaghan, with Seamus Brady in it, producing the 'Voice of the North', defined as 'a Fianna Fail paper masquerading as Civil Rights'(14).

The April 20 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta contained in its education section a continuation of a paper on 'Imperialism and the Irish Nation'; I have located what I think is the earlier part published subsequently in Issue 31 on May 5. It was unsigned but clearly by Anthony Coughlan and represented the classical Connolly Association position, emphasising the need to develop support from the labour movement in Britain. It was also visibly a dry run for Coughlan's later contributions to the anti-EEC campaign.

The education section on May 5 contained the introductory section of the 'Imperialism and the Irish Nation' paper, of which what appeared to be a continuation had been published in issue 29. It outlined the classical Marxist analysis of what Imperialism is, in terms of the European imperialist States and their empires in Africa and Asia. It linked into Irish history via the setting up of the Free State as a pioneering 'neo-colonialist' venture, with the handing over of power in the ex-colony to a government favourable to the continuation of imperial economic domination.

The April 27 1970 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta(15) had a report of the sentencing in Mold of people, one a British Army sergeant, for causing explosions in Wales between 1966 and 69. The report appeared to indicate sympathy with them, without analysing the possible role of establishment agents provocateurs in attempting to discredit Plaid Cymru. This ill-advised report I suspect could have initiated the line of thought that led to the subsequent canard about the 'official IRA' having given away its guns to the 'Free Wales Army', which body, insofar as it existed, was most likely an invention of the British 'dirty tricks department'. There are perhaps issues here requiring further elucidation.

At the Coiste Seasta on May 11 1970, attended by TMacG, DK, SD, CG, TM, SR, MdeB, it was noted that meetings on the Westminster elections had taken place. CG reported on Belfast; 5 points were agreed:

1. FF agents to be opposed wherever identified.
2. 'Well-known people such as Gerry Fitt' should not be opposed, but movement should put forward its own policies.
3. Contest one trial seat on the abstentionist policy.
4. Circulate a questionnaire seeking views on abstentionism or attendance.
5. Attend 'unity conventions' in strength, get republican policies accepted, and our candidates where possible accepted as unity candidates.

South Tyrone urged getting NICRA policies agreed by the unity candidate. SR reported from Armagh; it had been a badly organised meeting, with small attendance, no unified decision were taken. There was however said to have been a 'successful educational conference' on the Sunday. In Derry they did not want a republican candidate, nor to attend any unity convention. They wanted to march on the American base protesting about Cambodia. There had been a complaint about picketing in connection with squatting families, without informing the action committee.

Here we again have evidence of a pincer movement on the exposed position of the Republican Clubs: ultra-leftism in Derry, and probably Provisional recruiting in Armagh. Electoral strategy was crippled by the residual abstentionism imposed by the January Ard Fheis.

TMacG reported from Mid-Ulster; they did not want an abstentionist candidate. They could select a republican abstentionist candidate and use this as a lever to get a preferred unity candidate.

At the Ard Comhairle on May 16 TMacG, RJ, SOC, SC, PK, IB, DK, DMacR, MMacG, SR, FP, FW, TM, OMcC were present. Kevin Agnew and Kevin Murphy were also present as visitors. There was a re-run of the Westminster election discussions as at the Coiste Seasta, dominated by the abstention incubus. It was agreed to try to recruit Labour Party drop-out dissidents. There were positive results from the organising effort, and UI sales were increasing. It was agreed to call a meeting of republican NICRA activists with a view to enhancing the Bill of Rights campaign. The Estate Agents conference was to be leafleted with housing action material.

On May 26 1970 Nuacht Naisiunta noted that the British Embassy had been peacefully occupied by members of the movement during the previous week. The politics of the occupation were related to what was going on in the North, but the precise nature of the demands were not made clear; it was assumed readers all knew. In fact this issue was a demand for the release of Eamonn Smullen and others who had been arrested seeking to obtain arms, in the August 1969 aftermath, in a 'sting' operation. Those concerned ion the occupation were arrested and remanded in custody. Janice Williams, who later became my legal wife after a lengthy period as 'common-law' wife, spent a week in Mountjoy over this episode, earning the credit of having 'gone to jail for Ireland', this being considered a political asset in some quarters. This episode perhaps also contributed to the growing unease of the Government regarding the role of the post-split IRA in the 26 Counties.

There was also a lengthy continuation of the 'Imperialism' paper, which set the stage for later arguments about the Common Market, confirming the authorship of Coughlan. It raised the following issues:

(a) Exploitation of Irish agriculture by the artificial rigging of the British market, favouring the store cattle trade and 'dog and stick' farming. The arguments presented here closely follow those of JJ in the 30s and 40s.
(b) Increasing domination of imperial capital over Irish capital in the Irish economy.
(c) Outflow of Irish capital abroad, mainly via banks and insurance companies but also privately.
(d) Political subservience to British imperialism in the field of foreign policy.
(e) Cultural domination by Britain.

Republican Clubs in the North (Newry and Coalisland) were reported as selling openly the United Irishman, and were campaigning for the release of Republican prisoners in Britain. Presumably what they were imprisoned for actions related to the August 1969 events, and it is assumed everyone knows what these were, as we are not told.

Coiste Seasta June 2 1970: TMacG, SR, SOC, Sean Dunne, TM, CG, SD, RJ, SC. There was a report of a very negative meeting in Derry by TMacG; it was badly organised, and indecisive regarding election policy. Coleraine Club was missing. Seamus Rattigan and RJ were to monitor the Common Market Study Group. RJ presented an agenda for an Organisers' Conference, planned for June 22/23. SOC to meet with LP dissidents. Seamus Costello and Jim McCabe to meet with Fermanagh South Tyrone republicans to discuss candidate selection.

Dublin Comhairle Ceanntar were to issue a statement on local democracy, in connection with the Commissioners meeting. This was to do with the then suspension of local democracy in Dublin; it sank without trace; there was no subsequent sign of it in Nuacht Naisiunta, that I have seen. This indicates that attention was on issues like prisoners and the key issue of local democracy had slipped down the agenda. According to Janice Williams they did try to organise a public protest event, and to get Labour supporters to speak, but were unsuccessful.

Greaves on June 2 recorded receiving from Anthony Coughlan a Hibernia article which contained '...the story of Fianna Fail's negotiations with the IRA, and the subsequent decision to split it. .... AC says the article is substantially accurate. He speaks of great political confusion in Ireland. He goes on to assign responsibility to the unprincipled intrigues the republicans themselves resorted to. It looks as if they are repeating 1948, a la Clann na Poblachta. The entire direction is to discredit Fianna Fail..'. Later on June 6: '..I think the split in the movement (product of Roy's nonsense) has deeply demoralised the Irish left..'.

The next day June 6 1970 he has the following to say: '..they never succeed in anything. They belong to a class that cannot win. And yet the glamour surrounds them. For all the talk of "socialism" they are clearly opposed to it. They make blunder after blunder... talking about a "National Liberation Front"(16). That is RHJ's invention. I am inclined to think the IWP are foolish to change their name to CPI and have this non-organic amalgamation, or shall we say, incompletely organic. Clearly the masses are miles away from them...'.

We were never very specific about the 'National Liberation Front' process, but the feeling I had was that the IWP-CPNI amalgamating into the CPI was politically a non-starter, and would be moribund due to the dead hand of Stalinism. People disillusioned with this might be able to think their way into joining an expanded, integrated and politicised republican movement which, as well as the primary objective of national unity through democratic reform in the North, had the core democratic Marxist objective of attaining democratic control over the capital investment process, and creating a friendly environment to co-operative enterprise. The 'NLF' was, for a time, a convenient in-house label for this concept, which we used during internal discussions. We never managed to think of a good name for the concept, although viewed retrospectively it was perfectly valid, taking on board as it did a recognition of the developing crisis in post-Stalinist Marxist orthodoxy, which came to a head subsequently in 1989.

There was a series of Coiste Seasta meetings in June"(17) which dealt with EEC controversies, Northern conventions, analysis of 'hawks and doves' in Fianna Fail: Lynch was regarded by Mac Giolla as leading a sell-out to Britain: '...the new constitutional arrangement which the British Government now has in mind for Ireland is a federal arrangement, which would end partition as such, but would keep all of Ireland firmly under the political and economic control of Westminster...'. The present writer tried unsuccessfully to make the case for a Special Convention in time for a possible Autumn election combined with a referendum.

There was a report of a resolution from the Whitehall-Santry branch of the Irish Labour Party in support of the release of the prisoners in Britain, suggesting that this campaign was broadening, as the reasons for the arrest were beginning to be understood.

Janice, who (as we saw above) herself was jailed in Dublin over this issue, recollects that it arose because some Irish activists, mostly of the political left, some with republican backgrounds (Eamonn Smullen being one), had been arrested in London and imprisoned on what was visibly a trumped-up conspiracy charge. This I must say I tend to interpret as another indication of the workings of the British 'dirty tricks' department: the intent was clearly to isolate political republicanism, encourage the movement to revert, both 'officially' and 'provisionally', to its traditional militarist mode, and draw attention away from the Civil Rights issue in the North.

The July 1 1970 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta featured the 'official' IRA again 'coming out of the closet' and issuing a further statement, attempting openly to play a political role, taking away from the leading status of the NICRA in the northern situation.

This I must say, with hindsight, counts as an appalling blunder. I personally had no role in it.

The statement condemned the sectarian fighting, and attributed it to British manipulation. Orange parades were forced through republican areas with the support of the British Army. Bernadette Devlin had been arrested. Northern units were encouraged to co-operate with defence committees, 'giving military aid.. for the adequate defence of peoples lives and homes..'. While doing this they were urged to 'contain sectarian strife'.

There was a final paragraph based on the perceived threat of the 'federal solution' based on the foregoing analysis of Lynch's dealings with the British. The thinking behind this must have seemed obscure to the activists in the North, some of whom still saw the NICRA and the Bill of Rights as the key issues.

This statement must have emanated from Goulding who was feeling the strength of the politicisation process wavering, with half-baked recruits wondering which way to turn; should they go 'provisional'? The political alternatives were looking increasingly obscure. He felt he had to issue what amounted to an 'official' call to arms, to keep them onside. But at the same time the 'call to arms' was fudged, with somewhat fuzzy politics, enough however to fuel Government paranoia about a threat from the left.

The political influence, such as it was, I am inclined to think was primarily from Anthony Coughlan. The present writer was increasingly taking a back seat, having taken on an innovative self-employed role, which included the Irish Times science and technology column, to which I was giving some priority.

Popularising Science

In the early 1980s, during the phase-out of my TCD consultancy work, I got the opportunity to edit the material of the column into a book(18). It is appropriate here to quote from my introduction, which outlines the philosophy:

This is a record of a personal crusade. The object was to try to bring about a situation in Ireland such that the best scientific brains would be permitted both to fulfil themselves scientifically and to earn a living in their native country, contributing to its technological and economic development. Prior to about 1970, the normal career-pattern for the young Irish scientist involved emigration, in many cases (most cases in some disciplines) permanent. The best-known Irish emigrant scientist was, perhaps, John Desmond Bernal, to whom can be attributed the identification and naming of the 'Brain-drain' process as a characteristic of the imperial-colonial relationship.

The raw material of this book appeared in the form of a 'Science and Technology' column in the Irish Times which ran from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1976, a period of seven years.

This was a time when the Irish State was beginning to recognise that science and technology were important factors in the national economic development process. The Lynch-Miller report 'Science and Irish Economic Development' had come out in 1964, recommending the setting up of a National Science Council to advise the Government. This took place, let it be said, as a result of the outside influence of the Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (OECD); there was no way whereby such an innovatory approach could have been developed within the impervious walls of the Civil Service without a strong external influence of some kind.

The Column, while it existed, had a philosophy which can perhaps be summarised by asking the question: 'How best can scientific discoveries be creditably transformed into useful and appropriate technology, in the context of a small developing nation attempting to assert its identity in the neo-colonial aftermath of a global imperial system?'

By a process of continuous critical chipping away at the pillars of the imperial legacy, a certain amount of consciousness was aroused in the Irish scientific community, to the extent that when the Column terminated in January 1977 its lack was noticed and commented upon. These comments continue to this day, in a high proportion of encounters by the writer with people whom he has not met before, in which his role in the Column period is looked back upon with nostalgia. This restructuring of the Column material is an offering to these sometime readers, in the hopes that they may find it useful or stimulating. It may also prove to be of interest to those concerned elsewhere than in Ireland with the initiation of creative State policies for science and technology in developing countries; where possible this has been borne in mind when selecting and structuring the material.

All I have done is picked out sequences of contributions to the contemporary discussions which took place within a set of themes or channels as suggested by the chapter headings. In some cases a coherent evolving picture emerges, in others a sequence of loosely-related snapshots..

In most cases the problems treated are still with us, so that I think I am safe in saying that the material has not become dated. Readers can amuse themselves by updating the record mentally in the fields that they know. Mostly they are likely to share my impression that the basic rate of change, in spite of activity which in some cases seems frenetic, is really rather slow.

I have tidied up the stylistic infelicities which resulted from the need to meet a weekly deadline and have corrected errors drawn to my attention at the time. I have not done any more research into the topics covered; to do so would have been prohibitive, as well as changing the whole character of the exercise. It does not claim to be a scholarly work and should not be regarded as such. If there are errors of fact which escaped the contemporary control-loop, I apologise for them. They can, if necessary, be cleaned up in a second edition, if such turns out to be merited.

Where I have amended substantively the text, it is in the light of information available to me at the original time of writing; I have avoided retrospective cheating. Where retrospective comment is called for, I have added it via the explanatory notes at the end of each chapter. I have also sometimes used the latter as an aid to generalising the experience outside the Irish context.

I must take the opportunity of thanking Mr Douglas Gageby, who as Editor of the Irish Times provided me with the chance to begin the regular column at the end of 1969. This, for him, was a 'shot in the dark'; there was no precedent in Irish newspaper tradition. The cross-channel precedent (Crowther and the Manchester Guardian in the 1930s) was unknown in Ireland.

I am also indebted to Trinity College for the period of funded research leave which made this possible.

Thanks to the foregoing, I got to review a book by Dr Michael Woods(19), then in charge of the Agricultural Institute horticulture unit at Kinsealy, and subsequently (2000) Minister for Education. I was somewhat critical, accusing him of being unduly influenced by the vision of the Harvard Business School, but supportive of his proposition that the researcher should have a hand in the dissemination of the results.

Also in 1970 I was invited to contribute a paper to Léargas(20), the journal of the Institute of Public Administration, in which I showed, using Aer Lingus experience, how in the economic planning and operations research domains the use of the computer in mathematical analytical mode was making the bridge between its scientific applications and its use in routine data-processing.

It is appropriate here also to mention the initiation in 1970 by Gordon Foster in the TCD Statistics Department of the MSc programme in Operations Research(21), with which I became associated after leaving Aer Lingus, as an extern supervisor, with academic 'Research Associate' status. This helped contribute to my economic survival in this difficult period, and I develop this in the next chapter.

The Political Mess Worsens

The Dublin Wolfe Tone Society record takes up again, after a gap, on July 7, when typed minutes of committee meetings begin; Uinsean Mac Eoin took over being secretary, with Anthony Coughlan bowing out with a view to concentrating on the Common Market Study Group.

The July 13 1970 Coiste Seasta noted that one Joe Sweeney in Clonmel had resigned; he was to be told that Anthony Coughlan was not a member of the movement.

It is not clear how this resignation was related to any act of Coughlan. It could be Sweeney reacting against the emphasis being given to the EEC campaign. The content of the letter illustrates the perceptions underlying the leakage of support to the Provisionals: SC, CG and TMacG were seen as apparently being led astray by the likes of the present writer and Coughlan.

On Belfast TMacG reported back; there were 6 active clubs; the Falls Citizen Defence Committee was unelected; they wanted to broaden its base and give it a local government function. 5000 copies of the UI had been seized; CG wanted to have it brought up at Westminster.

Michael O'Riordain (CPI) had tried to set up a unity meeting in Dublin and had asked the Provos to send a speaker, but they had refused, even for Eamonn Mac Tomais in his personal capacity. There was considered to be no point in TMacG going.

The hard-left, in well-meaning ignorance, wanted some sort of abstract 'unity' with people who even at that moment, it turned out later, were planning a campaign of divisive terror.

Greaves in Belfast on July 15 1970 observed the increasing militarisation of the scene. Betty Sinclair thought it would be better to have the 26 counties united with the six and federated with Britain than to have this go on. He encountered Madge Davidson and Dalton Kelly in the NICRA rooms, along with a Connolly Youth lad from Dublin; the latter became his '..guide around the ruins..'. The CY were meeting with the British YCL at the weekend; they were critical of the CPGB. CDG tried to explain some of the problems. They observed lads playing football, and soldiers looking on.

Back in the NICRA offices Jimmy Stewart arrived and took CDG up to the '...Defence Committee rooms. There were moves on foot to transform it into a Catholic Defence Committee. The priests were coming in, and NICRA is being denounced as "communist". I felt uneasy about the whole position...'. There was discussion about the Ardoyne proposal to re-route Orange processions; CDG's demand would have been to ban them.

The Wolfe Tone Society committee met on July 17 1970. It was agreed to try to organise a 'solidarity-type' conference in Dundalk in mid-September. UMacE announced that a WTS had been started in Newry. RJ and CMacL were to visit Limerick; poetry readings were to be abandoned. The AGM was fixed for November 7. UMacE read a paper giving his assessment of the North.

The Mac Eoin paper (1.5 pages) is in the WTS archive: he saw control as now being with the Army and Westminster; federal settlement with pretence of national unity were seen as a possibility. In this context Fianna Fail would move in on Nationalist ground; radicals like Bernadette would be isolated. NICRA was now outdated; a moderate nationalist umbrella group was required, to express minimum requirements for a federated republic, avoiding radical rhetoric such as to drive moderates into the arms of Fianna Fail. He calls for a new role for a Northern WTS (the old Belfast WTS being defunct) with the objective of trying to win the middle ground.

There is also in the WTS archive a copy of an interview by Jack Dowling with Cathal Goulding, done for This Week on July 31 1970. This was when Goulding was trying to hold the movement together after the split, and build up the 'officials', which later became the Workers Party. He outlined the then thinking of the leadership of the movement regarding how to achieve a socialist republic, and how the movement had attempted to go political, with parliamentary participation, to the extent that they were not in a position to supply 'defence' in August 1969, though they had put up armed resistance to the July 3 1970 re-occupation of the Falls by the British. He gave his views on the basis for the split. He defended the organisation from the charge of being anti-clerical and 'red'. He claimed to have persuaded US supporters that parliamentary participation would be useful if guided by revolutionary principle.

Coiste Seasta meetings in July covered regional reports, attitudes to provisional meetings, educational conferences (with the present writer participating as from the Common Market Study Group; I was consciously back-tracking, and the movement accepted it). I had however drafted a new members pamphlet, which was read and approved.

The Ard Comhairle on August 8 1970 was attended by Tomas MacGiolla, Frank Wogan, Mick Ryan, Ivan Barr, Tom Mitchell, RJ, Derry Kelleher, Liam O Comain, Donnacha Mac Raignaill, Seamus Ratigan, Malachi McGurran, Sean O Cionnaith, Oliver Frawley, Sean Dunne, AOhA(?), Seamus Costello, Oliver McCaul. Breasail O Caollai attended as visiting Connaught organiser. TMacG gave an overview report of the work of the movement in support of the NICRA. There were detailed regional reports, showing a consistent high level of activity by many Cumainn, all over, reflected in high UI sales. Thee were 10 active Clubs in the 6 Counties, taking up trade union and housing issues. A committee was set up to draft a short-term policy document for the movement, with a resolution, proposed by SC and seconded by MR: 'recognising that the ultimate objective of the Republican Movement is the establishment of a Democratic 32 county socialist republic.... taking into account the existing political, economic and military position in the 6 and 26 counties'.

A drafting committee was set up consisting of TMacG, SR, RJ, CG, MR, OF and OMcC; this was to meet local and middle leadership N and S, and to report back to an AC meeting on the 22nd.

This initiative seems to have sunk without trace; the next AC meeting was on November 7, and I can find no mention in Nuacht Naisiunta.

Coiste Seasta on August 17 1970: present TMacG, MR, DK, SOC, SR. The sub-committee was working and had reported; two drafts had emerged; both were to be presented on 22nd. AC members were to be contacted. The new 6-co regional executive was: Malachi McGurran Chair, Liam McMillan vice-chair, Liam O Comain Sec, Francie Donnelly Treasurer, Oliver Frawley PRO, with Peter Morris, Malachi McBirney and Tom French as publicity committee. There were 25 clubs represented at the Brackereilly meeting at which the new executive was set up.

There seems then to have been a long hiatus, and the August 22 event, for which the drafts noted above were to have been prepared, remains unrecorded. Politics however was still struggling to continue.

Some WTS correspondence from RJ dated August 21 1970 is on record; I can fill it in by recollection. Cathal Mac Liam and I went to Limerick; we met with Jim Kemmy, but the contact network was fouled by our encountering a hack journalist of the Fianna Fail persuasion, with whom Kemmy had had negative experience. The mission came to nothing; we had insufficient local knowledge to enable us to avoid the pitfalls.

It seems also we were supportive of the City Quay housing protest, which we attempted to link politically with the 'Battle of Hume St'(22); this also was unsuccessful, because the City Quay people, whose community was being demolished, could not identify with the Hume St issue, which was basically architecture and urban planning in the abstract, related to office environments. There was also currently a housing protest going in in Pembroke Road, with squatters in occupation.

It seems that about this time I had considered going for the Seanad, Owen Sheehy-Skeffington's seat being up for grabs, due to his illness. In the end I decided against it, and the seat went to Mary Robinson, who later became President. Greaves it seems would have regarded this as a positive move on my part. Skeffington had had a heart attack; I had been to see him, and there was some rapprochement; I might even have had his 'blessing', which would have picked up a few votes. I was however too concerned with the problem of how to make a living as an applied-scientific consultant, and this would have been a diversion(23).

There was a WTS committee meeting on September 15 1970. It was greed to co-operate with the Newry WTS in a 'concerned citizens' conference on October 3, on the North. It was urged that about 6 people should prepare papers, and that it should not be open to the press. It was agreed to try to re-activate Alec Foster with a view to trying to re-convene a Belfast WTS. A general meeting of Society fixed for October 6, to discuss the current position in the North.

In the WTS archive there is a copy of a letter dated September 17 which went out to selected people as from the Newry WTS, signed by Geraldine McGuigan, inviting them to '..a small conference sponsored by us, and supported by a countrywide group of concerned citizens who have been directly or indirectly involved in events... October 24.. Derryhale Hotel, Dundalk. She went on to list an initial group of invitees: Margo Collins, Madge Davison, Bernadette Devlin, James Donnelly, Jack Dowling, Sam Dowling, Mike Farrell, Frank Gogarty, Brandan Harken, Fred Heatley, Ciaran Mac an Aili, Oliver MacCaul, Terence McCaughey, Kevin Boyle, Eamonn McCann, Kevin McCorry, Uinsean Mac Eoin, Malachi McGurran, EK McGrady, Frank MacManus, Eamonn Melaugh, Terry O'Brien, Emmet O'Connell, Roy Johnston, Edwina Stewart.

There appears to be nothing on record to confirm that this actually happened; it is a group spanning officials, provisionals, communists, PDs, Trotskyists and various WTS contacts from the middle ground, from which an agreed position would be somewhat unlikely to be forthcoming. It looks like the Society was grasping at straws, in a rapidly worsening situation.

Nuacht Naisiunta on September 22 1970 with its Nixon statement placed the movement firmly among the international consensus of opposition to the Vietnam war, and urged local republicans to associate themselves with various demonstrations against it.

The NI Republican Clubs statement, issued from the Regional Executive, with Malachi McGurran in the lead, attacked the Public Order Act and the Criminal Justice (Temporary provisions) Act as being in effect the re-introduction of Special Powers. They were trying to resurrect the Civil Rights agenda, in the face of increasingly militarist oppression by the British Army.

At the Coiste Seasta on Sept 28 1970 a meeting to exchange ideas about anti-EEC actions was planned among representatives of 'radical groups'; this should not initiate actions 'as itself' but maybe a joint group could come later. A pamphlet on the EEC and Neutrality was in preparation, by Kader Asmal.

The 'radical groups' label is a euphemism for interaction with the Communist Party in the context of the emerging 'national liberation movement' concept. The barrier posed by the existence of the Stalin incubus was however palpable. While the movement valued and respected the ideas and actions of local CP activists, we were acutely aware of the Stalinist label as a political liability. Whence the perceived need for keeping such meetings discreet.

On October 5 1970 TMacG reported at the Coiste Seasta on a meeting with the Dublin Regional Council of the Labour Party, a radical focus, which was keen to get joint internal meetings going to co-ordinate anti-EEC actions, for example public meetings at factory level. SOC reported on anti-EEC meetings with the Connolly Youth, and with Sligo and Bray campaign committees. Meetings with broader representation were planned. The question of a Cumann commission on collections for the NICRA arose; it had been reported to the NICRA in Belfast by Eddie Glacken the CYM Secretary.

This was a cause of friction, representing as it did a basic difference in approach to money as between SF and CP activists, illustrating, perhaps, the 'petite-bourgeois' status of the former in the eyes of the latter, who were dominated by a sort of 'Stalinist puritanism!

On October 6 1970 a general meeting of the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society took place, which was minuted by Uinsean MacEoin(24). Cathal MacLiam was in the chair. RJ reported on the aborted Limerick project; Micheal O Loingsigh reported on plans for an anti-EEC meeting there. Anthony Coughlan traced the origins of the NICRA, and criticised the role of the 'Peoples Democracy'; he called for a Bill of Rights; direct rule was not a solution. RJ stressed that the Belfast WTS should have remained in existence and not allowed itself to be absorbed into the NICRA. Dick Roche called for the WTS to create a role for itself as a bridge between people of differing religions, and the reconcile the 'two wings of the republican movement'. Con Lehane stressed the deep fears of the Northern Protestants. Maire Comerford praised the way the NICRA had split the Orange movement. Other speakers included Alan Heussaff, Brendan O Cathaoir, Staf van Velthoven, Uinsean mac Eoin. The AGM was fixed for November 3 in 20 Marlborough Road; a weekend conference projected for later.

In Nuacht Naisiunta on October 7 1970 it was reported that the Nixon visit had been duly demonstrated against, and a large Dublin SF contingent had marched behind the Vietnam war protest banner (led incidentally by Peadar O'Donnell, with George Jeffares doing most of the organising). This had prompted Provisional elements to accuse them of 'being more interested in Vietnam than Derry', but the newsletter defended stoutly the internationalist tradition of small-nation solidarity.

There was an advance notice of a meeting to be held in Rathmines organised by the Pearse Cumann, which it seems I chaired. An attempt was made to have it broad-based, and the target was the EEC. I have no recollection of this meeting; perhaps it happened, but it probably was a damp squib. This again must have been Coughlan influence; he seems to have been attempting to find something for the Dublin movement to do, which would point in a good strategic direction, recognising that there was little they could do in Dublin to affect the deteriorating situation in the North. He had recently published his pamphlet 'Why Ireland Should Not Join', and Nuacht Naisiunta 52 promoted it with a review.

Meanwhile in the Falls Road the Ulster Defence Regiment had seized 7000 copies of the United Irishman and burned them in Ross St. The seizure was under Regulation 8 of the Special Powers Act. The UI was avowedly non-sectarian, while sectarian papers like Paisley's Protestant Telegraph and Seamus Brady's Voice of the North were free to circulate. In the UI statement the key quote was "..both the Unionist Party and the British authorities fear the acceptance by even some section of the Protestant community of the non-sectarian philosophy of Republicanism..'. A reprint was promised, in greater numbers, to profit from the publicity generated by the seizure.

The Coiste Seasta on October 12 1970 agreed a donation of £5 for the Irish Voice on Vietnam.

This again was an aspect of the 'NLF' concept. George Jeffares was the prime mover in the Vietnam context, fronted by Peadar O'Donnell. GJ subsequently became the prime mover in the Labour Party Dublin Regional Council, which he tried to develop as a left-political think-tank and ideas-forum. He had by then dropped out from the CPI over the question of Czechoslovakia, along with Sam Nolan, Joe Deasy and others who subsequently contributed to the 'Labour Left' tendency. It was natural for an emerging 'democratic left' tendency, wishing to escape from the dead hand of Moscow domination, to move closer to the politicising republicans. At the same time, it was natural for those among the politicising republicans who had residual military mindsets as baggage, to want to move closer to the 'official CPI', Moscow domination notwithstanding. There is an empathy between Stalinism and top-down military-type organisation. These were two contradictory aspects of the republican politicisation process, which ultimately destabilised it.

Then at the Coiste Seasta on October 26 1970 there was planned an anti-Mansholt week of lectures, being organised by an ad-hoc committee of CYM, CP and Labour Left. The Hilltown Co Down meeting planned for November 15, mentioned earlier by Ratigan, was to be focused on the EEC.

The underlying strategic thinking behind all this I attribute to the influence of Anthony Coughlan, who was promoting the 'Federation' model: ie the British were perceived as using the leverage of the Northern situation to influence the Irish government to come into the EEC along with them as some sort of federated close-knit unit. This concept surfaced repeatedly. The result was that the politics of Northern reform, as seen from the South, was half-hearted, although it was being pursued vigorously within the North by the NICRA, who were campaigning for a Bill of Rights. This positive political development was later to be undermined militarily by the Provisionals .

Then on October 26 1970 it was reported in Nuacht Naisiunta that a meeting was held in O'Connell St, organised by Dublin SF, to call for the release of the prisoners in Britain. This for the first time went into who they were and what they were in for. They had, it seems, in the emotional atmosphere of August 1969, attempted to get hold of arms for the people of Belfast. In some cases maybe only talked about it. This episode had provided a focus for the British militarising (trend? campaign? conspiracy? how does one label a situation where the British establishment reacts instinctively to Irish events?)

The episode had generated a number of occupations, stunts etc to draw attention to the prisoners, but these had been mostly unsuccessful in doing so. In contrast, '...we have now witnessed the spectacle of mass hysteria and hero worship of Mr Haughey and three others who have been found not guilty of failing to import a comparatively useless consignment of pistols... sheer incompetence... comparatively simple task... did they really want to import the arms, or only want to appear to... are they to be regarded as national heroes while six young men are ...forgotten in British prisons?'

It is remarkable how destructive the presence of the gun is to the development of sensible politics. The degeneration of the political situation must be attributed to the key mistake of allowing the August 1969 pogroms to trigger the militarisation process. It should have led politically to the disbandment of the Specials, and to sweeping reforms to Stormont, had the political path been followed consistently.

There was a call to develop a campaign for the restoration of local democracy in Dublin, with setting up a Citizens Committee, supported by representatives of tenants and residents associations, to monitor the decisions of the Commissioner and publicise them, particularly in relation to speculators and landlords.

Cathal Goulding's oration at Edentubber was given in full in Nuacht Naisiunta on November 3 1970. In it he attacked the 'five points of difference' promulgated by the 'loose association of individuals and splinter-groups which give its allegiance to what is generally styled the "provisional army council"..'. He turned round the question, to ask what were their points of difference with the 6 and 26 county establishments? He took his stand robustly on the left, 'placing the common people... as masters of their own destiny... making and maintaining contact with the disunited masses of the discontented... weak because they are disunited..'. He did however speak on behalf of the IRA, and predicted that before the 70s were out the British right to rule Ireland would again be challenged in arms.

He clearly felt that having adopted an IRA position he had to compete with the Provisionals in military mode, or at least to threaten to do so, verbally, to try to hold his own supporters, an inconsistent political position.

The AGM of the Wolfe Tone Society took place on November 3 1970. There is in the archive no record of this directly, but there exist what looks like notes for an annual report by RJ of 1971 activities, which commences with a note as follows: Chairman Cathal Mac Liam, Vice-Chairman Micheal O Loingsigh, Joint Secretaries Derry Kelleher and Dick Roche, committee Dermot O Doherty, Seamus Mac Gabhainn, RJ and Joy Rudd.

The Sinn Fein leadership continued to be distracted by the local O'Briens Bridge / Montpelier school issue; Eoin O Murchu was to get out from this and go back to trying to organise the Gaeltacht. The contact pattern with various support organisations remained fuzzy, and was tending to include the Peoples Democracy as well as 'English radical organisations'. Plans for the Sheelin Shamrock educational conference were firmed up. A 'Freedom Manifesto'(25) was to be prepared for the Ard Fheis (RJ's motion); regional meetings to take place beforehand.

The Sheelin conference took place towards the end of November 1970, and was memorable as a relatively high point in the political development of the post-split left-republicans. Topics for Sheelin were planned to include '19th century revolutions', 'significance of the TU movement', 'history of class struggles', 'decline of socialist movement after 1921', 'the Movement in the 40s and 50s', 'small farmers and the CR movement'. Speakers would, it was hoped, include de Courcy Ireland, Kader Asmal, Noel Harris, George Gilmore, Tom Kilroy, Dalton Kelly and various AC members. This plan was largely fulfilled, and some 50 people attended. Janice Williams, who participated, recollects that Ruth First of the ANC spoke, along with Asmal.

The event was however subject to stress from the military tradition, in that the selection of personnel to attend it was actually an 'army' function. Janice Williams shared a room with 2 other women, one of whom had a gun in her possession (she said she was 'minding it' for one of the lads), and the other of whom was subsequently convicted of a serious offence involving firearms. Despite Goulding's declared policy of avoiding recruiting people on the basis of the 'romantic appeal of the gun', this was apparently continuing to happen, and of course the August 1969 events reinforced the process, strengthening the mind-set of the middle leadership who would have been doing the recruiting. the event was organised militarily, and orders were expected to be obeyed. Those of us who were concerned with trying to fuel the political process at the top in fact had little control over what went on in the undergrowth. Much recent Army recruitment had inevitably been in response to August 1969.

In Nuacht Naisiunta on November 16 1970 Seamus O Tuathail, editor of the United Irishman, reminded the Queens students of the origins of 1790s republican philosophy in the continental Enlightenment, and went on to attribute the religious mania a partition-time to the industrialist of the North defending their access to the markets of the Empire. Carson sent 100,000 to defend the Empire and Redmond sent 170,000. He went on to draw a parallel with Chichester Clark and Jack Lynch, with Ireland being led back into the Empire via the Common Market. In passing he mentioned the 1932 'outdoor relief' riots when Catholic and Protestant workers united.

No clear currently relevant political message emerged from this, or from the Goulding oration at Edentubber. The militarisation of the situation had allowed the Bill of Rights and the NICRA objectives to sink without trace in the movement's perceptions. They clung to historical analogies, worthy but impractical.

Mac Giolla in Oxford had a better-constructed, though still historical and ideological, message, where he attempted to counter Jack Lynch's statement that the Northern trouble was an Irish problem: Britain saving Ireland from the Irish, like America saving Vietnam from the Vietnemese, and Russia saving Czechoslovakia from the Czechs. He went on to attack the sectarian barriers erected by the British ruling class. The barriers would crumble when the British rule was destroyed. Republicanism he defined as separatist, socialist and non-sectarian. The mantle of de Valera over which Lynch and Haughey were fighting was not, and never had been, a republican mantle. Socialism, in the Irish republican context, he claimed as the native growth through Connolly, repudiating current factions looking to Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and Mao.

A meeting, called at Swatragh co Derry by the Connolly Republican Club, included Kevin McCorry (NICRA organiser), Oliver Frawley (Belfast Republican Clubs), Mairin de Burca, Kevin Agnew (NICRA Chair at this time) and Sean O Cionnaigh as speakers as well as Bernadette Devlin.

The focus however had been displaced towards the issue of the republican prisoners in Britain (see above) and away from the potential for local community development offered by the existence of the Swatragh co-op.

On November 22 1970 Greaves noted in his diary that the Belfast NICRA had endorsed the McRory report, of which he did not approve, writing so to McCorry. Effective local government was gone. The next day he noted that the WTS and the CCL in Dublin had endorsed the draft Bill of Rights. Then on December 1 he learned from Sean Nolan in Dublin that Anthony Coughlan was coming to London to attend an EEC meeting; it turned out the next day that AC was to speak at the meeting, filling in for Justin Keating, who has cried off.

Anthony Coughlan was increasingly putting his efforts into the anti-EEC campaign, the Northern question having become intractable due to the developing Provisional militarism.

This anti-EEC campaign was increasingly being taken up the (official) Sinn Fein; they were to approach small-shopkeeper organisations urging measures such as co-operative purchasing, to enable them to compete with supermarkets, while pointing out the EEC threat. Eoin O Murchu was to speak on the EEC at Ennistymon Macra na Feirme. Tomas Mac Giolla was reported as speaking in Clontarf at a Dublin North-East Anti Common Market Committee, along with Dalton Kelly of the TCD Republican Club. There was much Northern Republican Club activity reported, including the first anti-EEC meeting in the North.

A letter by RJ on the question of the dissolved Dublin Corporation was accepted to be sent to the Dublin Comhairle Ceanntar and to the Dublin Trades Council.

This emphasis on the EEC at this time, and the attempt to develop the wider European view of the national question, undoubtedly was the continuing influence of Anthony Coughlan, responding to the new situation created by the demise of de Gaulle who had been blocking UK membership. Any analysis of the development of the the thinking of the left in Ireland during this period would be incomplete without input from the Irish Democrat, of which AC was the Dublin correspondent.

At the WTS on December 1 1970 Antonia Healy gave a Humanist view on Freedom of Conscience. There was another attempt to re-activate Belfast.

At the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle on December 5 1970 Malachi McGurran reported that CRA march in Enniskillen had gone off without incident, but they were expecting summonses. Regional meeting fixed for Dec 13 to discuss future march policy. Ard Fheis resolutions on electoral policy were agreed. Anti-internment meeting fixed for Dec 12, with broad platform including civil rights organisations, tenants, trade unions.

MMcG proposed 4 regional groupings of the 24 Clubs, for election of regional delegates to new Ard Comhairle. There was also proposed a 6-Cumainn regional grouping in North Leinster. All were agreed.

It was agreed that all speakers at educational conferences should be first approved by AC or CS. It is not clear if this was just precautionary, or if some specific speaker was being objected to. I don't recollect any tension on this issue; there was general agreement on the need to promote the intellectual unity of the broad left.

The December 8 1970 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta was dominated by a perception that internment was on the agenda in the 26 counties. A series of anti-internment meetings was projected. The Ard Fheis was projected for Liberty Hall on January 16-17. The Manifesto set the agenda for the regions: get to understand the specific needs of working owner-managers, self-employed and unorganised workers which were not catered for by the current Fianna Fail hegemony.

It is far from clear what was the trigger for the perception that internment was on the agenda in the 26 counties. It could have been that Lynch, having put Haughey Blaney and Boland in their places, was expected to turn on the Provisionals, and in doing so take up the 'officials' for good measure, as the Special Branch records would have difficulty in distinguishing. At national level 'repartition', the 'federal solution', and 're-opening the Treaty negotiations' seem to have been in the air. In this context the emphasis on the EEC threat reflected continuing Coughlan influence. The full analysis of the early post-split days must remain on the agenda.

An anti-internment march by Northern Clubs was planned. Derry Kelleher was to speak in Dublin at a Barney Casey commemoration, organised by left-wing groups. Barney Casey had been shot in 1940 when in internment, and the inquest had been adjourned sine die; Kelleher had witnessed the event. MdeB urged that the re-opening of the inquest be made an issue.

There is an extensive minute of this issue in Derry Kelleher's handwriting. The issue must have been raised at this time because internment was felt to be on the agenda, this being the way in which the Northern government was reacting to the NICRA campaign; they were trying to provoke an armed response to the 1969 pogroms and their aftermath; the Provisionals were in process of organising to oblige; the left-politicisers would of course also be interned; many of the latter were also beginning to react by reverting to their earlier military mind-set.

This concludes the year 1970; there were no more meetings until after the Ard Fheis. We take up the thread in 1971 in the 1970s context, the year 1970 being taken as being the last one of the 60s decade.

JJ and the EEC

Notes and References

2. I am indebted to the late Derry Kelleher for drawing my attention to a file of Nuacht Naisiunta, the internal Sinn Fein newsletter which commenced in September 1969 in response to the August events, and continued from some years. This remains accessible in the Workers party archive.

3. The writer Desmond Fennell and the Orange leader Major Ronald Bunting, who had led the violent ambush of the People's Democracy marchers at Burntollet. Both had in differing ways had argued in '2-nationist' mode for re-partition to concentrate the 'Ulster British' more compactly in the north-east.

4. In his memoirs Mac Stiofain took great exception to this statement. He was of course then preparing his own military campaign.

5. This would appear to be an echo of proto-Provisional intrigue, supporting the Justin O'Brien thesis in his Arms Trial.

6. This must be an indication of Mac Stiofain's followers already active, prior to the split. It is basically confirmed in Mac Stiofain's memoirs, in principle, though not in detail. He was engaged in active military planning from 1967, either under the false impression that this was what Goulding actually wanted, or, alternatively, with the intention of actively restoring the military agenda, despite the then Goulding Army Council policy.

7. This is referenced in the November 24 1969 issue of Nuacht Naisiunta in the hypertext.

8. The latter would not have been 'IRA' as such, but proto-Provisional or Blaneyite supporters of the attempt to take over the NICRA in the Fianna Fail interest. Greaves, at a distance, found it difficult to distinguish.

9. In the background there were moves afoot to amalgamate the Irish Workers Party and the CPNI, and this is treated in the Greaves diaries, who observed it in the context of the ongoing attempt of the left-republicans to find common ground with them. I have abstracted some of these insights in the integrated hypertext chronology; they suggest that the motivation was to think through the various national policy issues arising from the current crisis.

10. The foregoing is distilled from a more extensive series of abstracts from the Greaves diaries which feature in the hypertext 1970 integrated chronology during January.

11. I had resigned from Aer Lingus, and was beginning to work as a scientific consultant, in self-employed mode. To ease the transition I had done a deal with Douglas Gageby, the Irish Times editor, to provide him with a weekly 'Science and Technology' column, which was for him something of an innovation, though I had earlier, in 1967, provided some features on this theme. I have been able to edit much of the material of this column into a publication In Search of Techne which constitutes a critical view of 'science and society' issues in the first half of the 1970s. This is available in the hypertext. See also the 'Popularising Science' section of this chapter, below. It will also form an important source for the next chapter.

12. The essentials of the results of the Garland Commission were published in the February 1970 United Irishman, under the title 'Freedom Manifesto', and this is accessible in the hypertext, as is the Garland Commission Report in full.

13. The Ard Fheis resolution overflow was dealt with; I have recorded their fates by reference number in the integrated chronology, but lacking a copy of the agenda this is meaningless. It must await the sorting out of the Workers Party archive.

14. Most if not all of the foregoing, recognised at the time by the Movement, has been substantially confirmed by the analysis of Justin O'Brien in The Arms Trial, reviewed in the hypertext.

15. The Education section of the April 27 1970 Nuacht Naisiunta contains a short paper 'Socialism - a Definition' which we have encountered before (March 1968). I recognise this as having been my own production; it represents a good summary of my thinking at the time, and it is worth reproducing in full; see the 1970 integrated chronology on this date.

16. The 'National Liberation Front' canard had assumed, to my mind, an undue importance in people's minds. It was never intended as a slogan or a name of a confederating body, or a real movement involving any formal amalgamation. It was used by Mac Stiofain and others to imply the existence of a 'communist threat'. Insofar as I ever used it, it was to connote a process of expansion of the movement to soak up a broader range of progressive forces than Sinn Fein itself, and the embedded politicising IRA who were activating Sinn Fein. The 'Freedom Manifesto' as published in the February 1970 United Irishman was an outline of what we then had in mind for a broader movement. Anthony Coughlan is supportive of this analysis.

17. These meetings are reported in more detail in the 1970 integrated chronology in the hypertext.

18. In Search of Techne was the title; the publisher was to have been Tycooley, and I had in mind that it might be of interest in the context of the UN Development Programme. Unfortunately the publisher, who specialised in the UN market, went out of business, and I was left stranded. I have therefore added it in full to the hypertext backup of this book, and will find it useful to reference from time to time from now on.

19. The review was published in the Irish Journal of Agricultural Economics (July-August 1970); the book was Research in Ireland by Dr Michael Woods, Institute of Public Administration, 1969.

20.The Computer as an Analytical Management Tool, Léargas, the journal of the Institute of Public Administration, August 1970.

21. Some of the background to this initiative is given in the 1960s module of the Science and Society thread, which builds on the Bernal influence.

22. Plans to demolish most of Hume St and rebuild were being resisted by a group of young UCD architects: Duncan Stewart, Deirdre Kelly and others. Students were in occupation. This was based on support for the conservation of Dublin Georgian architecture, against the depredations of philistine property developers, who visibly had bought political influence in the planning process, mostly via the Fianna Fail party. We as the movement attempted, with only partial success, to relate this the the 'housing action' agenda. The Hume st battle was partially successful, in that in subsequent developments the facades were retained, but much sound Georgian property was needlessly gutted.

23. I am not going to pursue the analysis of the transition of Official Sinn Fein to its eventual Workers Party status; this is perhaps partially illuminated by Derry Kelleher in his memoirs. During 1970 I increasingly distanced myself from the process, under pressure of work. I did however contribute an article to the September 1970 United Irishman, on 'the Future of the Agricultural Subsidies', in which I reviewed a Government report. I made the case that subsidies should be social and not volume-dependent on commodities, and that co-operative groupings of farms could become large-scale commercial units.

24. There are some notes by the present writer in the WTS archive, also dated October 6 1970. They are worth reproducing, and they are accessible in the hypertext in the integrated chronology.

25. Nuacht Naisiunta at about this time was promoting the 'Freedom Manifesto', published in the February 1970 issue of the United Irishman, and subsequently reprinted as a broadsheet for wide circulation. It represented a reasonably definitive statement of the post-split 'official' republican position, developing somewhat the 'national liberation movement' concept, with separate demands relevant to the existing 6 and 26 county situations.

26. JJ's attitude to EEC accession was initially in favour of it, publishing a book Why Ireland Needs the Common Market (Mercier Press, Cork, 1962) and then later, in his final years, he was critical with articles and letters to the newspapers.

Some navigational notes:

Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999