In the relations of the small to the great and the weak to the strong there are some special features. The fable of the cock and the horse when they found themselves in the same stable is a case in point. "Let's all keep our feet quiet", said the cock. So, well might the Republic, or New Zealand, say to the British Minister of Agriculture, "Let each of us maintain an agricultural policy which won't strangle the development of a national agriculture to which a free and expanding export outlet is vital", etc. etc.

In general the weak stand to gain greater material advantages when their strong (economic) neighbours behave in a neighbourly fashion. The strong have a greater moral responsibility to behave in a neighbourly fashion, for even in their domestic economic policies their actions can have serious and even disastrous repercussions on the welfare of their weaker (economic neighbours. I made this point in my book about the Common Market(1).

The advantages to strong economies are moral, but they are not only moral. Great Britain can derive no long-term material advantage from the progressive distortion (or ruin) of the agricultural economy in the Republic or New Zealand. Perhaps I have said enough about that elsewhere.

There is a threefold aspect of the problem confronting us in this lecture:

(I) More neighbourliness in Northern Ireland.

(II) More neighbourliness as between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

(III) More neighbourliness as between all three political entities in these islands.

(I) As an ex-Tyrone man, now long domiciled in the South, I would say that, objectively regarded, both communities in NI have more human characteristics in common than either section has with its co-religionists in the South. Neither community in NI feels the need of being complemented. As readers of the "Northern Ireland Problem"(2) are aware its unique character is that two emotionally and culturally self contained communities live geographically all mixed up with one another without really getting to know each other, and appreciating the sterling qualities which an outsider like myself can admire, and appreciate in both.

However sectarian frictions are happily being oiled away in NI, and there has always been a substratum of real neighbourliness which is increasing. Lynn Doyle wrote a poem about 'our wee Michael Dan' of which I can remember a few lines:

"Forbye a while about the twelfth / When him and me's not friends / He's in and out about the house / He borrows and he lends etc."

and then I think he ends up:

"I'd swap a wheen of Protestants / For our wee Michael Dan".

If these two psychologically distinct, but geographically inseparable communities are to become fused it is essential that each should recognize the incompatibility of their present long term political ideals as one of the 'facts of life' but not as they now do allow that to prevent them from amalgamating and determining to make the best of their local political experiment.

Parnell said that you can set no limits to the onward march of a nation. Neither can anyone now living, North or South, tell what the majority and/or the minority in NI will think or feel in 20, 50, or 100 years from now. But if NI can solve its local problem of political and social integration I would set no limit to its progressive growth in prosperity and in the values that flourish in a democratic civilisation.

For the comfort of the Northern minority may I point out that there is a possible analogy between the present relations of NI with the Republic and those of Scotland with England prior to the l8th century? Highlanders and Lowlanders were not the best of friends and there were religious as well as racial conflicts and differences. The Union of 1704 gave political form to a single British Nation, but there remains a strong sense of national individuality in Scotland and England as well as Wales. The Northern minority should co-operate in developing a sense of a common Ulster nationality which already exists in more than germ.

(II) The second aspect of neighbourliness is as between NI and the Republic. There are two outstanding examples of this in the Foyle Fisheries Commission, and the Erne Power and Drainage Scheme. There are other directions in which fruitful co-operation at official level might well take place, and these will be indicated in later lectures. There was a notable occasion in the 40s when the Dublin Fire Brigade helped to put out fires in "blitzed" Belfast. They crossed the Border illegally, without a triptych. It is the spirit of this dramatic act of neighbourliness which needs to be generalized in our normal peace time relations.

(III) The third aspect of neighbourly relations concerns the relations between the Republic and the UK Government as well as that of NI. In this connection it will be suggested in a later lecture that we should aim to create a Common Market of the Republic and the UK. Here the matter can only be briefly adumbrated.

A few months ago both the UK and the Republic were eager to join the EEC, though the ultimate commitments of such an adventure were quite uncertain. It was a very big "camel" that we were prepared to swallow. I suggest that by way of getting ourselves into training we start by swallowing a very small "gnat". JF Deniat in his book "The Common Market"(3)makes it clear that in the EEC important aspects of national sovereignty are transferred irrevocably to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EEC Court of Justice.

A Common agricultural policy within the 'Six' has not yet been achieved, and may be only a hope.

Interstate tariffs on industrial products are to disappear by 1970.

The commercial relations between EEC and USA are becoming more and more acrimonious.

The EEC may be a step away from the "Kennedy round" and a genuine Atlantic community in which agricultural trade would at last receive a square deal and international trade in general might hope to expand.

A common market of the United Kingdom and the Republic would be a much less cast-iron commitment, and could be implemented by conference and consultation without the necessity for rigid international institutions.

May I point out that in spite of our constitutional facade of political separation, there is in fact a greater degree of real unity between the United Kingdom and the Republic now than there was 150 Years ago, greater also than the degree of real unity which now combines the 'Six' or is likely to for the next 20 years.

Besides our geographical propinquity and ease of reciprocal travel, we have (a)a common language, (b)a common currency and banking system (c)a common capital market, (d)a common labour market, and (e)close social intercourse.

We may as well admit that both islands have lost something by the political separation of 1922, as well as gained something, we hope a great deal. Ireland has a kind of Siamese twin, or triplet, relationship with the larger island, but the present political set-up does not always ensure that the larger twin, or triplet, will behave with consideration to one of the smaller. Our problem is to create, on EEC lines, a relationship between our three political entities which will be more advantageous all round, without prejudice to national and cultural values, and without impairing the present constitutional position.

Strangely enough the early history of the UK suggests at least part of the answer. The Act of Union in the first instance merely united the legislatures. The Irish exchequer and the Irish National Debt remained separate entities and the Irish economy was exclusively responsible for them. We even had a separate Irish currency, and varying rates of exchange, not only as between Dublin and London, but as between Dublin and Belfast. (Republican Belfast in those days did business in terms of golden guineas whereas in the South and Britain business was done in terms of a depreciated national paper money(4)).

It was provided in the Act of Union that the Irish economy should contribute two seventeenths of the annual expenditure of the U.K. In 1800 the Irish National Debt was much less than two seventeenths of the British National Debt, and each country remained responsible for its own national debt. The framers of the Act expected that in a few years the British National Debt would be reduced hence it was provided in clause 8 that "if at any future day --- the value of their respective debts --- shall be to each other in the same proportion with the respective contributions of each country --- it shall be competent to the Parliament of the UK to declare that all future expense shall be defrayed indiscriminately ---" etc. etc.

Unfortunately the framers of the Act did not foresee the enormous future expense of the Napoleonic Wars. The two seventeenths proportion was much too high for Ireland anyhow and for the next 17 Years Ireland had to borrow about half her annual expenditure, whereas in the British case the proportion borrowed was between a quarter and a third. Quoting Prof G O'Brien: "In the sixteen years which followed the Union, the debts of Ireland were quadrupled, her taxation was increased fourfold, and at the end of the period she was nearly bankrupt"(5).

By 1817 the two seventeenths proportion was achieved for the respective National Debts (by the opposite of the method expected in 1800) and in that year the Exchequers simply had to be amalgamated. The separate Irish currency continued till 1825.

More interesting from our present point of view is the fact that till 1826 Ireland had a separate customs tariff. A Protective 10% ad valorem duty continued to be levied on 18 articles imported into Ireland and these included cotton, glass and hardware. Some of these articles were subject to a countervailing duty if re-exported to Britain, in which case a drawback was given.

These protective duties were withdrawn in 1820 but the separate customs ring round Ireland continued until 1826 when British and Irish customs were amalgamated. According to Alice Murray(6) these protective duties did give some real advantage to Ireland. I quote: "Fortunately for the first twenty three years of the century we have official figures of Irish exports and imports, and these figures show that the trade of the country was on the whole progressing although the rate of progress was very much slower", so wrote Miss AE Murray some 50 years ago.

The point I really wish to make is that a separate customs ring round part of the United Kingdom is compatible with the letter and the spirit of the Act of Union.

A Common Market of the British Isles would imply agreement between the UK Government (in consultation with the Government of NI) and the Republic to make a rapid transition to a common tariff surrounding these islands. The proceeds of the tariff would have to be distributed on some statistical basis between the Exchequers concerned.

That by itself would imply free access for NI exports (as also for British exports) to the Republican market. To temper the wind to the shorn lamb of Irish industry a 10% customs ring might be maintained round all Ireland against British imports of goods competitive with Irish industrial products - this on the analogy of the 1800 - 1820 position. Southern industry would have enough to do in competing with exports from NI, and both areas might need a little protection from high-powered British salesmanship in their home market. The Border as a customs phenomenon would go and we would revert to the position that prevailed in 1922-23 before it was decided (to my horror) to turn the present Border into a customs frontier.

There are other implications of course. There could no longer be different prices for the same quality of the same agricultural product in a common market of the British Isles. If agricultural prices to the Republic farmers could be raised to the scale now enjoyed by farmers in GB and NI it would add about £60,000,000 per annum to the income of Republic agriculturalists or about £150 per person so occupied.

These are deep waters and will require further explanation in a subsequent lecture.

Assuming the various incidental problems solved, two main advantages would result for Northern Ireland and the Republic. The fringe areas of NI (notably Derry) would have their economic energies liberated and Northern trade and industry would acquire new markets in the Republic without losing any of their existing outlets.

The agriculture of the Republic would achieve its first post-war opportunity for all round expansion, and the recent industrial advance there, no longer precariously based on a stagnant agriculture, would be assured of a prosperous future.

September 1963; JOSEPH JOHNSTON.

References:

1. Why Ireland needs the Common Market, Professor J Johnston SFTCD, Mercier Press, Cork, 1962, p75.

2. The Northern Ireland Problem, by Charles F Carter and Denis P Barritt, Oxford University Press.

3. The Common Market by JF Deniat.

4. cf Andreades "History of the Bank of England" etc.

5. The Economic History of Ireland from the Union to the Famine, by Prof G O'Brien.

6. Commercial Relations between England and Ireland, by AE Murray.

Some navigational notes:

Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999