As in the previous modules, retrospective comment, or additions from other sources contacted retrospectively, are in italics; declarations of intent are in [square brackets].

We take up the record with the Coiste Seasta (CS) meeting on 11/11/1968, which was attended by Tomas MacGiolla, Sean Garland, Tom Mitchell, Tony Ruane, Wally Lynch, Cathal Goulding and Mairin de Burca. There was a complaint from Donegal that they had had no contact with the Ulster organiser. This was an indication of residual grassroots opposition to the leadership's de facto recognition of the anomalous political position in the 6 Counties. The Ulster organiser was concentrating on Northern Ireland where the problem was.

Tom Mitchell reported that he had been unable to contact Kevin Agnew about the McEldowney case. There was a decision to issue a statement on Civil Rights in response to the remarks of Neil Blaney, the Donegal Fianna Fail TD. It will be recalled that the first explicit linking of Civil Rights to the national question came from Blaney, and this was rightly regarded as counter-productive, an assertion of Catholic-nationalist irredentism.

The Dublin Housing Action Committee was seeking for SF to affiliate and it was agreed to do so. The DHAC was a broad-based group. Earlier references seemed to indicate that SF members outside Dublin thought it was a SF-owned body. Sinn Fein was going through a process of learning how to deal with bodies which it did not own, the NICRA being a key contributor to this learning process.

Mick Ryan was at this time Chairman of the Dublin Comhairle Ceanntair, of which Sean O Cionnaith was the Secretary.

CS 18/11/68 TMacG, Sean O Bradaigh, CG, WL, MdeB; the idea of civil disobedience in the North was discussed. It was agreed to urge the Wolfe Tone Society to look into how best to set up some sort of civil rights movement in the 26 Counties. This in the end happened; there emerged Citizens for Civil Liberties; we treat this in the Wolfe Tone Society thread.

Ard Comhairle 23/11/68: TMacG*, Frank McGlade*, SO'B, CG*, RJ*, TR, Paddy Kilcullen* came in from Mayo, Monica Ryan*, Joe Clarke, WL, SG*, Seamus Costello*, Mick Ryan*, Bartley Madden*, Malachi McGurran* and MdeB*. The names marked with * were supportive of the Goulding politicisation trend. On the face of it, the leadership group seemed strong enough to have recommended constitutional change to the Ard Fheis, but for some over-cautious reason on October 26 they had hesitated.

Costello, on the Minutes, objected to the record of the final resolution on October 26, claiming it had been put to the meeting and passed. He was over-ruled, and Costello wanted his objection recorded. The resolution had been passed for submission to the Ard Fheis, but not with the AC recommending it, which Costello had wanted.

MR: another example of Costello's impatience.

Malachi McGurran, reporting from the North, was critical of the proposed O'Neill reforms; one man one vote and repeal of Special Powers not yet in sight. The central NICRA body was regarded as lacking in initiative. It would be necessary for the Republican Clubs to get PROs and make contact with local press, radio and TV. A march was planned for Armagh on November 30, and this was on Republican Clubs' initiative. It would be necessary to get the clubs to set up local broad-based CR committees.

Costello wanted the Wolfe Tone Society to press for a Civil Right conference in the 26 Counties, to focus on the Offences against the State Act, and the Criminal Justice Bill.

* The perception here, from the 'militarist wing' as embodied in Costello, is of the WTS as a tool, to be told what to do. In fact it was not like this; the WTS took its own initiatives, but tended to defer to Goulding's suggestions when these occurred. Costello, in fact, was a contradictory character, who wanted to get rapidly into front-line politics, from his local power-base in Bray, and was prepared to use the military command-structure to help him do so. This became evident at the next Ard Fheis. MR is supportive of this assessment.

There were organisers' reports from Mick Ryan (Leinster) and Bartley Madden (Munster), no details given. Paddy Kilcullen reported that there were now 5 cumainn in Mayo and 4 in Sligo. The Ard Fheis was confirmed for December 8; the Workers Party, Connolly Youth, Gaelic League and Misneach were to be invited to send observers. Misneach was a radical language movement, associated with Mairtin O Cadhain. There was a clear perception of an emerging broad left, with a cultural dimension.

The 1968 Ard Fheis (O Liathain Hall)

The voting analysis sheet for the 1968 Ard Fheis, and most of the relevant records, have become available, and my name is not on it. Yet I am on record as having attended subsequent meetings. So I must have been, in effect, co-opted. There were press reports to the effect that I had been 'defeated', and I have a copy of a letter I wrote dated 9/12/68 to the effect that for personal reasons I did not stand for elections, despite considerable pressure. I was consciously trying to pull back from a leading position, although in the event, in effect, I was not allowed to do so. The results in order of preference were Goulding 109, Costello 94, Sean Garland 78, Mairin de Burca 70, Sean Mac Stiofain 67, Larry Grogan 61, Derry Kelleher 61, Eamonn Mac Tomáis 60, Tony Ruane 58, Joe Clarke 58, Sean O Bradaigh 55, Frank McGlade 53, Parry Kilcullen 53, Mick Ryan 49, Sean White 49, Des Cox 46, Malachy McGurran 45, Marcus Fogarty 45... etc. This gives a good measure of how a vote on a serious constitutional amendment would have gone. They would have been just short of their 2/3 majority. Someone must have done a head-count, and the Garland Commission fall-back procedure was adopted.

In the 1968 Ard Fheis the general political flavour was positive and forward-looking; most if not all of the politically progressive motions were carried, and the 'sea-green incorruptible' ones rejected. Tomas Mac Giolla's presidential speech exuded optimism as a result of the Civil Rights events at Derry and Armagh which had exposed the ugly face of Orange hegemony embedded in the State machine; he went on to refer to the east-west economic partition of the country, and to invoke James Connolly, drawing attention to the fact that the year was the centenary of his birth.

The Constitutional motions were however referred to the Commission. The key one which they had hoped to pass was No 17: '...to contest all elections, and allow its elected members to take their seats in Leinster House...'. This was proposed jointly by 5 cumainn, including Pearse (Rathmines), Connolly (Arklow), and the Belfast and Donegal Comhairle Ceanntair. Similar motions were tabled from Galway, Limerick and Glencolumcille. None however addressed the question of Westminster, despite the looming by-election in Mid-Ulster.

* However Costello fouled things up by trying too hard. He issued voting instructions on bits of paper to the Army people who were present. This was picked up and queried, poisoning the atmosphere. In the end the motion was not put, due to fear of it being defeated in the aftermath of the Costello attempt to rig it.

MR is uncertain whether this episode happened twice, or just once, with him wrongly attributing it to an earlier Ard Fheis.

Instead Sean Garland proposed an amendment that a Commission be set up to go into the question in detail, holding meetings all over the country, and report to a special Ard Fheis. This was the origin of the 'Garland Commission'; it was an attempt to rescue the movement from the day's failed attempt to legalise political participation.

The failure to reform Sinn Fein in the direction of acceptance of political participation at the 1968 Ard Fheis had disastrous consequences. The incoming Ard Comhairle had a substantial majority of politicisers, on my reckoning 16 to 7. It was immediately faced with the mid-Ulster by-election, which was winnable, and had in the past been won by Tom Mitchell. However its hands were tied, and it had to resort to all sorts of devices and intrigues to find an 'agreed candidate' who could pull Republican support.

In the end Bernadette Devlin won the seat, enhancing the adventurous and inexperienced ultra-leftist trend which had emerged via the Peoples Democracy (PD) movement among the Queens students. This tended to look to Paris; they thought the socialist revolution was round the corner. They did not defer to the broad-based NICRA, which in December 1968 called off all marches, to allow time for O'Neill to deliver, and a breathing-space to organise properly on a regional basis, preserving the cross-community focus on civil rights issues, with trade union, tenant association and other community group links where feasible.

Instead the PD marched from Belfast to Derry, through a series of small Protestant Antrim towns, leading eventually to the ambush at Burntollet, where they were clobbered by the Orange heavies. This coat-trailing exercise was disastrously counter-productive. It certainly exposed the true face of Orange thuggery, but were we not already well aware of this? It helped reduce Civil Rights to a Catholic ghetto movement, and made it difficult for Protestant trade-unionists to rally in support of local government electoral rights ('one man one vote'). After Burntollet, Civil Rights became a crypto-Nationalist issue.

Let me return now to the first post-AF AC which took place on December 22 1968. It analyses into the following composition:

Left-republican politicising core: Cathal Goulding, Tomas Mac Giolla, the present writer, Sean Garland, Seamus Costello, Tom Mitchell...

[In what capacity was I there?!]

Active followers of this trend, who had been engaging in socio-political actions in various parts of the country: Seamus Rhatigan, Mairin de Burca and Gabriel McLoughlin in Dublin; Paddy Callaghan in Kerry, Derry Kelleher in Wicklow...

A strong Northern contingent associated with the emerging Civil Rights politicisation: Tom O'Connor, Dennis Cassin, Liam Cummins, Des Long, Malachi McGurran, Kevin Agnew..

Marcus Fogarty: [at present I can't place him; MR identifies him tentatively as right-wing from Cashel.]

A group who subsequently supported the provisional split: Tony Ruane, Sean Mac Stiofain, Joe Clarke, Sean O Bradaigh, Larry Grogan and Eamonn Mac Tomais.

Joe Clarke, the old-timer who had defended Mount St Bridge in 1916, from this time on felt he had to use his Vice-President status to attend not only the Ard Comhairle meeting but also the Coiste Seasta meetings. He was resolutely opposed to any practical politics and a dedicated worshipper of the Holy Grail of the abstract Republic 'as by law established'. His role was an additional and unwelcome brake on the politicisation process.

Kevin Agnew was a solicitor in Maghera; many of the key meetings had taken place in his house. He had been Tom Mitchell's election agent.

Larry Grogan was another old-timer, who had been active in the 30s; also judged by MR to be very conservative. Mac Stiofain was primarily a military man; he had been invoked in the Sinn Fein context earlier by Gerry McCarthy, as a conscious right-wing militarist counter to the Goulding left-wing political trend. He subsequently became Chief of Staff of the Provisionals. His English accent and background was rendered acceptable in some quarters by doctrinaire insistence on the use of Irish on all possible occasions.

This was the AC which had to steer the Movement through its most difficult period. The minority which subsequently became the core of the Provisionals was vocal and influential. Its first task was to address the Mid-Ulster election question. There had been planned a Convention in Cookstown on the next day (Dec 23) to select a candidate. The northern consensus was that if an abstentionist candidate was selected, there would be no Movement within a month. Names of possible 'agreed candidates' came up: Fred Heatley and Frank Gogarty, both of whom had NICRA public standing.

Eamonn Mac Tomais, true to form, wanted Tom Mitchell to stand as an abstentionist candidate. The Dublin 'sea-green incorruptible' had learned nothing from the NICRA and Republican Club experience.

Seamus Costello proposed a special Ard Fheis to decide on abstention, thus pre-empting the Garland Commission. Derry Kelleher and Paddy Callaghan supported this. Both were active in local politics, the former in Greystones and the latter involved in Killorglin where he had pioneered a shell-fish production and marketing co-operative.

After a long discussion, it was proposed by Sean Garland and seconded by the present writer that 'after the Convention in Cookstown we issue a press statement to the effect that Convention had been held and election machinery set up, but that we were anxious to preserve the unity of anti-Unionist forces which had been demonstrated in the Civil Rights Campaign, and that we were prepared to meet other interested parties before announcing the name of the candidate and policy..'. A sub-committee was set up to negotiate an agreed candidate with other groups. This consisted of Tom Mitchell, Cathal Goulding, Malachi McGurran, Liam McMillan, Tomas Mac Giolla, Francie Donnelly (South Derry) and Pat Coyle, plus the right to elect two others at Cookstown.

This was basically a Goulding IRA politicising group, with a nod in the direction of the Cookstown meeting. Billy McMillan was O/C Belfast.

This was put to the meeting. EMacT's amendment was defeated 5 to 13. The original proposal was carried 12 to 5. Costello then had another go at undoing his recent Ard Fheis blunder that had lost him his anti-abstentionist motion and led to the Garland Commission; seconded by Paddy Callaghan he proposed that if the Cookstown meeting asked for an extraordinary Ard Fheis to disown abstentionism, that this be done as soon as possible. This was lost by 7 to 12.

There were then steps taken to set up the 'Commission of 16', whose task it was to deal with the Garland amendment. The following names are on record as having been proposed for it: Tomas Mac Giolla, Sean O Bradaigh, Eamonn Mac Tomais, Derry Kelleher, Paddy Callaghan, Dennis Cassin (identified by MR as 'ultra-left', now in the US), Tom O'Connor, Gabriel McLoughlin, Liam Cummins, Kevin Agnew, Seamus Costello, Brian Quinn, Malachy McGurran, Marcus Fogarty and Seamus Rhatigan. Here some uncertainty develops. There are only 15 on this list. The minutes go on to say the 'eight were to be elected and the following were successful'. What I suspect this means is that this was an Ard Comhairle panel, with the other 8 being nominated by the Army Council. An election took place, by secret ballot, and the following emerged as the Sinn Fein component: Tomas Mac Giolla, Seamus Costello, Sean O Bradaigh, Derry Kelleher, Liam Cummins, Paddy Callaghan, Dennis Cassin, Malachy McGurran. Of these all but 2 were IRA politicising activists, Goulding followers. Of the other two, one was a left-republican of long standing. The other was Sean O Bradaigh, and he resigned at the next meeting, being replaced by Seamus Rhatigan.

[I have not yet tracked down who were the other 8 to make the 16; perhaps this will emerge in due course.] The present writer must have been among them, as he undertook to prepare an agenda for the first meeting of the Commission scheduled for 05/01/69. It is appalling to contemplate in retrospect how the movement had 'shot itself in the foot' with Costello trying to railroad the December 1968 Ard Fheis.

* Here we had the Northern scene exploding politically, with a chance of an early election win, and an emerging Republican Club political machine, supportive of a mass civil rights movement which crossed sectarian barriers, involving Belfast trade unionist support. In this context we had had to dedicate our leading people to a laborious internal reform of the Sinn Fein Constitution, when they should have been steering the movement to hold the NICRA middle ground and prevent it being hijacked by ultra-leftist adventurism and Catholic ghetto-nationalism. The 1968 Ard Fheis was indeed the key turning-point where things began to go wrong.

The Ard Comhairle met again on January 4 1969, primarily to elect officers. Vice-Presidents were Joe Clarke and Cathal Goulding. Secretaries were Mick Ryan and Mairin de Burca. Treasurers were Tony Ruane and Eamonn Mac Tomais. Organiser was Sean Garland. Publicity was offered to Sean O Bradaigh but he declined. Finance was with Sean Mac Stiofain. Education remained with the present writer. Local Government (linked with the labels 'agitation and economic resistance') was with Seamus Costello. Mick Ryan had to be co-opted, and this was done on the proposal of Joe Clarke seconded by Tony Ruane.

It is evident that the latter two perceived MR as being 'hard-core militarist', despite his energetic espousal of the politicisation process.

On the Commission it was noted that Sean O Bradaigh had declined to act, and he was replaced by Seamus Rhatigan, so that the Ard Comhairle component of the Commission was totally composed Goulding-supporters. It is perhaps worth noting that those who subsequently were associated with the Provisional split had homed in on the financial roles. Sean O Bradaigh was clearly distancing himself from the politicising process.

MR: 'Rhatigan would be an articulate and honest interviewee'.

On Mid-Ulster it was reported that the Cookstown meeting had decided to contest with Kevin Agnew as abstentionist candidate, with a view to using him as a lever to get the type of agreed candidate they wanted; he would resign in favour of a suitable person. Austin Currie had been seeking the nomination, and he was regarded as unacceptable. The SDLP was not yet in existence.

Currie's credentials were based on his role in the Dungannon local authority housing scandal. The hostility of the Republican Clubs to his candidature was based on what to my mind was a mistaken identification of Currie with traditional sectarian Nationalist politics. He subsequently was an effective SDLP politician for many years, but in the end came south, and became a Fine Gael TD. He would have been a more effective and principled MP for Mid-Ulster than was Bernadette Devlin. So this rejection of Currie must be seen, in retrospect, as a key political blunder.

Eamonn Mac Tomais reported on a series of events (lectures, parades etc) planned for the commemoration of the First Dail in 1919.

There had been a Coiste Seasta meeting on Jan 12 but the minutes were reported lost at the Jan 19 one, which was fully attended; Tomas Mac Giolla presided, supported by both Vice-Presidents Cathal Goulding and Joe Clarke. The core-group of Tony Ruane, Sean Garland, Seamus Costello, the present writer, Sean Mac Stiofain and Mairin de Burca were there. A strong group had come down from the North which included Malachi McGurran, Liam Cummins (Derry), Oliver McCaul (Newry), Liam McMillan, Malachi McBirney (Belfast), Dennis Cassin: all the Civil Rights movement activists.

Joe Clarke, with some relish, as I recollect,agreed to participate in a 'Republic as the Holy Grail' stunt at the official commemoration of the First Dail to take place in the Mansion House.

It was agreed to work for a full attendance at the AGM of the NICRA on February 15, and to get good radical people elected to the Executive. Issues left for further discussion included the attitude to the new Derry Action Committee, Peoples Democracy and such; there was a perceived threat from the emerging student left, which was seen as being inexperienced and undisciplined; the general Civil Rights development strategy needed to be worked out; we needed more marches, and to keep them peaceful. In the background to all this we needed to establish a distinct Republican Club identity. (MR: 'Yes, but we didn't!)

Kevin Agnew had complained about 'being kept in the dark'; this was regretted and it was agreed to take steps to keep him informed.

CS 27/01/69: Attendance TMacG, SG, MR, CG, SMacS, JC, TR, RJ, SC, MdeB. The resignation of Mrs McGlynn, as Trustee and as a member of SF, was noted. She was another old-timer, who was out of tune with the developing politicising trend.

A proposal for a march from Dundalk to Belfast was rejected, as being not in accordance with NICRA policy, this being to keep the issues related to civil rights in the North and to keep clear of any all-Ireland nationalist-looking dimension.

This tactically impeccable policy was viewed with total incomprehension by the 'sea-green incorruptibles', who felt themselves increasingly isolated, in a process with which they were politically at total variance. Catholic-nationalist irredentism, of the type pioneered in the current context by Blaney from Donegal, was closer to their way of thinking than was that of the current Ard Comhairle majority. The possibility of winning some middle-ground Protestant support for democratic reforms within Stormont, such as have now at last begun to be achieved under the Good Friday Agreement, and which were within reach in 1969 thanks to the NICRA, never occurred to them.

There was a letter from Limerick looking for a speaker from the Dublin Housing Action Committee to help set up a similar body in Limerick. No action was taken.

This again shows the then local 26-county republican grass-roots mind-set: the perception of the DHAC, and other such broad-based bodies, as being somehow Sinn Fein property, had continually to be countered. (MR attributes this view to Sean O Cionnaith.) This was one of the roles of the 'educational conferences' which we organised from time to time; these promoted a vision of a bottom-up association of peoples' organisations, for which the Movement would help focus a political lead, helping them to formulate demands on Government for legislative change.

On Mid-Ulster: one Frank Morris (MR: Convoy, Donegal; an ultra-right nationalist) was seeking the nomination as the 'agreed candidate'; this did not meet with support. Seamus Costello and Malachi McGurran were to meet a potential 'agreed candidate', who was not named, but referred to as 'she'. Kevin Agnew was to hold an initial meeting. This was the first time Bernadette Devlin entered the arena. She was perceived, correctly, as being associated with the Peoples Democracy group, and therefore somewhat unpredictable.

The target was to ensure that the NICRA after its AGM would remain under republican 'control' (this word was used, and it reflected the perceived need) and would take initiatives.

Sean O Cionnaith, who now was organiser for Connaught, was to call a meeting to explain the meaning of the developing process of 'co-operation with radicals'. Mairin de Burca had urged the need for a 'labour-republican alliance' in a public statement and this had cause unease among some purists.

There was a full meeting of the new Ard Comhairle, with its regional representatives under the revised Constitution, on Feb 10. Tomas Mac Giolla presided and the attendance included the present writer, MMcG, Dennis Cassin, Mick Ryan, Caoimhin Campbell* (from Mayo), Larry Grogan*, SMacS*, Derry Kelleher, Joe Clarke*, Seamus Rhatigan, Paddy Callaghan, Tony Ruane*, Eamonn Mac Tomais*, Sean O Bradaigh*, MdeB, Sean Gormley, Des Long*, Marcus Fogarty, CG, Gabriel McLoughlin, SG and SC. Of this group of 28 the 8 marked with * subsequently 'went Provisional'.

It is necessary to comment here that the 'Holy Grail' purist attitude to the abstract Republic could sometimes be combined with a progressive attitude to local community development work, on co-operative principles. Caoimhin Campbell was representative of this trend; he and the Mayo republicans in the 1950s had helped re-develop the co-operative movement among the farmers, in association with Seamus O Mongain, Cathal Quinn and Ethna MacManus (who later married Michael Viney). I had used the experience of this group, with their philosophy which they had developed under the name 'Comhar na gGomharsan' (community of neighbours), in spreading the social-republican message elsewhere, in 'educational conference' mode. It came as a surprise to me that, despite their grass-roots practicality, the Mayo social-republican activists mostly supported the Provisionals. [This basically contradictory position to my mind needs analysis and explanation.]

This meeting dealt with the Ard Fheis resolutions, which in the minutes are referenced by number. We must await the archive access process before analysing this, but for the record I note that numbers 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 35, 36, 37, 73 were referred to the 'Commission of 16'. Although I am on record as having attended, I have no recollection of this meeting. [When I see the texts of the resolutions perhaps my memory will be stimulated.]

At the CS meeting on 10/02/69 TMacG as usual presided; SMacS, TR, CG, MR, SC, SG and MdeB were there, as well as the present writer; Joe Clarke glowered at the proceedings, exuding disapproval, having painfully come up the stairs on his crutches.

* I am reminded of a parallel. Joe Clarke as a living link with 1916 could do no wrong. In the European Left, to have been in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War was a similar qualification. Micheal O Riordain, who led the Irish Communist Party into the political wilderness as a narrow sectarian Stalinist cult, was in the latter category. There is perhaps a 'law' which says that those who participate heroically in a good military cause in their youth tend to remain as a 'dead hand' on the development of the necessary politics which follows. (MR: 'very true, even with accidental heroes'.)

They agreed to ask Mrs Dempsey to be Trustee. The editor of the United Irishman should sit in on meetings. SC and MMcG were still on the trail of the elusive Bernadette Devlin. A Tyrone meeting had shown little support for Tom O'Connor and some support for Austin Currie.

Regarding the Peoples Democracy programme it was agreed to issue a statement of support '...with qualification on their outlook on Partition..'.

[It remains on the agenda to go into this, to find out what it was.]

The United Irishman was urged to take up the question of the ESB maintenance strike, and TMacG agreed to put to the Wolfe Tone Society the idea of a 'joint committee'. This latter point was a reflection of an acceptance that Anthony Coughlan and the WTS were a key source of insight into the Civil Rights situation in the North.

CS 17/02/69: TMacG, TR, SMacS, SC, JC, MdeB. Costello was unhappy about the stated support for the PD policy document; AC decisions were being ignored by members in the North. Organisers reports were requested. A CS meeting in the North was projected for Feb 28. [where?]. TMacG reported that the WTS was circulating a critique of the Criminal Justice Bill and would call a meeting of interested groups.

CS 03/03/69: TMacG, TR, MR, MMcG, LC, SGm SC, SMacS, MdeB; JC glowering.

It is a not unreasonable conjecture that because of the JC and SMacS presence, CG tended to absent himself, and take key decisions elsewhere, reviving the old 'HQ staff' procedure. This if true reflected another negative consequence of the 1968 Ard Fheis indecision, and the 'Garland Commission' fudge. If the constitutional amendment had gone through, and the core Provisional group had walked out in December 1968, they would not have had the August 1969 events initially to fuel their renascent militarism. With a unified political-republican leadership, the NICRA would have held the middle ground, and perhaps August 1969 would have passed off without an armed Orange pogrom. Mid-Ulster could have been won by a politicising left-republican, holding out a hand of friendship to the Protestant working-class, in the Wolfe Tone tradition, and the anarchist ultra-left would have been contained. This was the vision we had been playing for, and we were close to achieving it.

The perpetrator of the debacle, Seamus Costello, in a subsequent split founded the 'Irish Republican Socialist Party' (IRSP) and the 'Irish National Liberation Army' (INLA) which had a destructive record of splinter-group activity over the years, including the Airy Neave assassination in the House of Commons. Bernadette Devlin was associated with the IRSP. Costello himself was assassinated, under circumstances as yet unexplained. The 'INLA' has since descended into drug-dealing and criminal-fringe activities.

On the whole the 1969 leadership of the movement was not in a healthy state, and our failure was inevitable. I hope this record will help people to learn something of the futility of military structures in politics, and of the difficulty of getting rid of them once they become embedded in the culture. I must admit that at the time I had totally underestimated the cultural strength of the IRB military conspiratorial tradition, though open democratic-Marxist politicisation was top of the agenda.

The political response to the pogrom would have been let it run its course and turn all attention to getting the world media to report it, and thereby show up the nature of British rule; to get the democratic forces in Britain out on the streets; to get the Dublin government to get at the British and to complain to the UN, with US support. To go for guns was to do what the enemy wanted. We fell partially into the trap, falling between two stools; the Provisionals fell into it whole-heartedly, while we fell into it half-heartedly, but enough to divert our attention to issues like getting prisoners out, and rendering ourselves liable for internment when it came. Coughlan and I resolutely held out for a totally political response, but no-one listened.

Now to the CS meeting: there was trouble at the Dun Laoire Cumann (Joe Nolan); this was proto-Provisional rumblings. The meeting planned for Feb 28 was postponed perhaps to Derry on March 16, or (preferably) in Monaghan on 23rd. Breasail O Caollai was appointed organiser for West Ulster (to keep the Donegal activists happy and in the picture; BOC was the brother of Maolseachlainn O Caollai who headed the Gaelic League; BOC subsequently became an influential journalist and magazine entrepreneur).

TMacG reported that the first meeting of 'Citizens for Civil Liberty' had taken place, consequent on the WTS initiative.

CS 11/03/69: TMacG, JC, CG, RJ, SMacS, SG, TR, MdeB. The Pearse Cumann (of which the present writer was a member) was calling for the Dublin Comhairle Ceanntar to meet monthly instead of quarterly, thus increasing the political awareness of the Dublin movement as such. A national consultation conference on Civil Rights in Northern Ireland pas called for London on March 23. This was the Connolly Association taking the initiative in support of the developing situation. Mick Ryan and the present writer were to go, and Clann na h-Eireann in London were to send 2 delegates. The barriers between the left labour movement activists in Britain and Sinn Fein were by now nearly completely broken down.

On Mid-Ulster: TMacG reported that Bernadette Devlin had again declined to stand as a 'republican agreed candidate'; a meeting was planned for Carrickmore. Republican Club members were to attend in their personal capacities, and a statement was to be issued to the effect that 'we had not been invited and were not taking part'.

Thus BD got nominated, basically with PD activist support, filling the vacuum left by persistent Republican abstentionism; her subsequent success pumped up the anarchist ultra-left beyond their capacity to deliver.

* CS 24/03/69: TMacG, RJ, CG, SG. For once we did not have the glowering presence of Joe Clarke, who no doubt reported every move to the proto-Provisional core-group waiting in the wings. A meeting was planned for March 14 for the organisers, to deal with the expanding of the United Irishman circulation; this, under O Tuathail's brilliant editorship and later under MR's management, was becoming a significant success-story, and the movement needed to adapt to the increased demand for its ideas as expressed in the paper.

Regarding the NICRA: a meeting was planned with 'interested parties' to discuss the resignations from the NICRA Executive. The AGM had taken place, and it looks like a railroading job had been done, somewhat heavy-handedly, with the result that some middle-ground, and perhaps Protestant, leading members had felt squeezed out.

[It is on the research agenda, for myself or others, to see if this can be confirmed from the NICRA record; I have made preliminary enquiries. See however the overview Greaves Diaries for this period.]

The 'interested parties' would undoubtedly have been the Communist Party trade union activists, on whom we depended for the preservation of the fragile cross-community composition of the NICRA executive.

On Mid-Ulster: it was agreed to withdraw from the election and say nothing. Republican activists on the ground would have supported BD with heavy heart and a sense of frustration; a classic opportunity missed.

I am on record as having attended the London meeting; there had been 130 present, from 61 organisations, and a committee was to be formed. The Clann people attended, and I had attended a Clann meeting afterwards; there had been about 15 present; organisation was poor, and they had a lack of sense of direction.

[I have no current recollection of these meetings; maybe I will find something in my papers from the period; this remains on the agenda.]

CS 31/03/69: TMacG, CG, SC, TR, RJ, MdeB. Costello wanted the AC to discuss the coming 26 County general election. It was agreed not to participate in the coming PD march on Dublin. TMacG had met with Bernadette Devlin who had '...explained her remarks about republicans at election conventions..'. The final selection was to take place on April 2; Agnew was to withdraw; TMacG and SG to attend. A Derry statement attacking BD was discussed, without decision.

AC 12/04/69: TMacG, RJ, DK, GMacL, SR, SC, DL, EMacT, LC, DC, TR, JC, CG, CC, SmacS, LG, MdeB. Finbar Doherty in Derry sought re-admission; it seem I supported him; I had recently been to Derry. The Connolly Association wanted a speaker at a London conference; Tom Mitchell was to go.

Mid-Ulster: I am on record as having proposed, and SMacS seconded, that we take no action in the Bernadette Devlin campaign. Our motivations were from opposite ends of the spectrum. Costello dissented, but the motion was carried. People on the ground however would have given individual support.

NICRA: Costello proposed, and I seconded, that we co-operate with Belfast Trades Council in getting agreed nominations for the vacant seats on the executive, arising from the resignations.

The Sligo Cumann was disbanded and Norbert Ferguson, who had been Mayor, was called on to resign from the UDC.

[We need to get some insight into this episode; was it simply the shedding of the old guard? I seem to remember him as Mayor however, presenting quite a positive image.]

Costello wanted to stand in the election in Wicklow, and to bring forward the Commission and special Ard Fheis in order to be able to do so. CG and SMacS proposed that the Commission schedule stand, and that no elections be fought until it had reported.

I have notes at the above level of detail on CS and AC meetings up to 20/09/69, and then brief summary notes up to 1972, as indicated in the concluding section. These I have subsequently expanded from the Minutes of the AC and the CS. In what follows I summarise what I see as the key episodes between April and September.

* With hindsight, and in overview, I am inclined to think that the Commission episode was a disastrous diversion, which prevented the attention of the politicising leadership from concentrating on the developing Northern situation, where it belonged. I recollect Anthony Coughlan remarking to this effect at the time, and being unable to escape from what was a procedural straitjacket. MR is supportive of this assessment.

CS 05/05/69: a sub-committee was to meet in my house at 10pm that night to issue a statement on O'Neill's resignation.

AC 24/05/69: mass UI sales in the North were planned for June.

CS 16-23-30/06/69: there were increasing echoes of the Barnes McCormack funeral, which was emerging as a source of tension. There was on 30th talk of a 'civil rights split' emerging, in speeches in Strabane; sales of UI at CR events were taking place, strengthening the irrelevant and unwanted link between CR and the national question.

* CS 07/07/69 There was a Cork letter (according to MR from Jack Lynch, not the Taoiseach, but a Cork old-timer) objecting to red flags at Bodenstown. It was agreed to promote the Plough and the Stars as the labour symbol. Cathal Goulding proposed that Jimmy Steele, who had given the Barnes and McCormack oration in Mullingar, be removed from the panel of republican speakers. MMcG reported policy of getting republican club people to steward Civil Rights marches, and prevent sectarian clashes developing.

At this point I feel I should perhaps reiterate and expand on some earlier comments I have made on several funerals which took place during the 60s. The first was that of Roger Casement, which took place in 1966, as part of the 50th anniversary celebrations, with official State support. This had been a major national event.

* Then, some time later, in Dean's Grange, there took place that of Dunne and O'Sullivan, who in 1922 had assassinated Sir Henry Wilson, in London, at the prior instigation of Michael Collins, though the Treaty was already in place and being implemented. This could arguably have been stood over by the State, given the role of Wilson in instigating the 'ethnic cleansing' then going on in Belfast, which stopped after his death. But they chose not to. The IRA handled the re-burial, and Sean Mac Stiofain gave the oration; there were shots fired over the grave, and all military ritual.

* Then in June 1969 we had Barnes and McCormack, who had been executed for their part in Sean Russell's 1939 bombing campaign in Britain. Jimmy Steele gave the oration, and it was a rallying-point for all who had resisted the social-republican politicisation process of the 60s, and who were to go on the form the Provisionals. In fact, the framework of the Provisional organisation were set up via the Barnes McCormack Committees, and the politics was implicitly linked to the right-wing philosophy of the 40s. MR is supportive of the foregoing assessments.

I feel I should set an agenda for historians: it would be interesting to find out exactly how these events were organised, and how the timing was decided. The timing, and indeed the decision to release the bones, was clearly under the control of the British. Did the British have a strategic need actually to help the Provisionals come into existence, by giving them organisational foci? And what in this context was the role of Sean Mac Stiofain?

I have on several occasions conjectured, publicly, that there exists somewhere in the Home Office a strategic unit, with long continuity of experience, the objective of which is to maintain the historic policy of 'divide and rule' with regard to Ireland.

Such a unit would view with concern the emergence of cross-community politics in Northern Ireland, based on the common interests of working people. Political republicanism supportive of a broad-based Civil Rights movement constituted a real threat. What better way of dealing with this than by supporting the re-invention of the IRA in its reactionary militarist mode? What better way of doing this than timing the release of suitable 'martyred dead' remains, guaranteed to bring together people motivated by militaristic nostalgia?

On a couple of occasions, prior to the first cease-fire, I have made the case to Gerry Adams that the British need the IRA to fuel their live training-ground, and that they delight in it. Top Brass is firmly of the opinion that 'the war in the Falklands was won on the streets of Belfast', and has said so publicly on television.

The first attempt (Hume-Adams) to produce a cease-fire generated a neo-Provisional process, which initially surfaced under the name 'CAC', for 'Continuity Army Council'. Who first invented this and named it? Because CAC in Irish means 'shit'. No-one with Irish roots would think of a name with such initials. It must have been a British invention. I wrote a letter to the Irish Times, pointing this out, which they printed. Soon it became 'Continuity IRA'. Is the re-invention process still going on, at British instigation? And are the unfortunate Irish who aspire to the Holy Grail of the Republic too dumb to see that they are being used simply to keep the Irish people divided by religion, to prevent the Irish nation from emerging, and to keep Northern Ireland in existence as a British Army live training-ground?

All the foregoing arose as an aside from the CS meeting on July 7 1969. MR regards some of it as being 'far-fetched', but I suggest it is worth looking into. There are other equally 'far-fetched' hypotheses, like that surrounding the Mountbatten episode. Leading CND people in Britain told me they were convinced that the nuclear weapons lobby wanted Mountbatten out of the way, as he was resolutely anti-nuclear at the highest military level. The 'dirty tricks gang' in the Home Office would perhaps be quite capable, at the request of the military nuclear lobby, of leaking his movements to the IRA. The statement issued by the latter showed lack of research and exuded opportunism, for was Mountbatten not the architect of the partition of India? Yet they failed to pick this up.

I return now to the highlights of the 1969 record.

Mick Ryan recollects (2001) attending an HQ meeting in or about July 1969, with Goulding, Garland, O Bradaigh, Mac Tomais; it was in Grogan's house. O Bradaigh asked Goulding had he a plan to defend the people in the event of a pogrom, of which he had picked up early warning signals. Goulding said 'yes' but not convincingly. Goulding's QM was one Pat Regan. On the day of the pogrom the latter was nowhere to be found, Mick Ryan was appointed QM. Oliver McCaul was practically in tears for lack of weapons. Goulding had put total trust in the political process.

This poses important questions to historians. Who planned the pogrom, and at what level was it planned? It involved B-specials and armoured vehicles, and was implemented by agencies of the British State against defenceless people. O Bradaigh had advance warning of it. Was this a deliberate attempt on the part of the British State to provoke an armed response, so as to allow them use traditional repressive methods, internment etc? Was the leak to O Bradaigh and co deliberate?

CS 14/07/69: an educational conference was planned for September to which Bernadette Devlin and Eamonn McCann would be invited.

I was not at this meeting. I think I would have agreed with making this effort to pull the forces together, but in the event I think this event fell victim to the post-August confusion.

AC 19/07/69: the first three recommendations of the Commission Report were considered. I have a copy of these minutes in full, and I will expand on them if and when I can resurrect the internal draft version of the Report; the version which is here accessible would have edited in the results of these discussions(1). The first recommendation was passed for submission as an Ard Fheis resolution by 10 votes to 8; this projected the vision of a broad-based movement, involving many organisations, political, economic, social and cultural, with the politicised SF playing a leading role. It was agreed not to name names, simply to project the concept in principle. Amendments from the proto-Provisional people present, which projected 'loose associations' and the banning of association with any other political groups, were rejected.

This illustrates the difference between the proto-Provisional approach, which had more in common with Fianna Fail and, indeed, Stalinism, with their aspirations to a one-party State, and on the other hand the emergent democratic-Marxist approach of the Goulding vision, with its aspiration to a broad-based multi-party national movement.

It was agreed unanimously to drop recommendations 2 and 3. [I don't as yet have on record what these were. RJ June 2001.]

Recommendation 4 was considered subsequently on August 23; this contained the policy on parliamentary participation, and was passed by 11 votes to 8, the names being recorded. It was hoped to call an extraordinary Ard Fheis shortly, to which a motion would be put, enshrining the proposals of the report as amended at these meetings.

CS 11/08/69: Bernadette was proving elusive; more organisers were appointed (this was rubber-stamping an Army decision process). TMacG reported on a Maghera meeting at which 70 or 80 had attended, but no-one from Derry. It was agreed that if there was trouble on the 12th, then hold a meeting on the 13th and demand that the State move in to defend the people.

There is ambiguity here: did they mean the British State? Or the Irish State? I seem to recollect that the former was intended, in accordance with the policy of separating out the civil rights issues from the national unity question. Haughey, Blaney and Boland later emerged as proponents of the latter course, and it is probable that this would have been the thinking of most republicans on the ground.

The next AC was fixed for August 30, and Anthony Coughlan was to be invited to the next CS meeting to discuss the NI civil rights situation and also the looming EEC issue.

AC 23/08/69: this meeting was called early, due to pressure of events. There were only 13 people there; CG, SMacS and MR sent apologies; MMcG and DC were absent in jail. I don't seem to have been present either. EMacT wanted recorded the names of those who had voted on Section 4 of the Commission document recorded. The situation outside was in crisis and this was all the 'sea-green incorruptibles' could think of.

Those for recommending at the Ard Fheis the abandonment of the constitutional ban on electoral participation were: Tomas Mac Giolla, Kevin Agnew, Sean O Gormaile, Derry Kelleher, Mick Ryan, Seamus Rattigan, M Fogarty, Seamus Costello, Denis Cassin, Cathal Goulding and Liam Cummins. Those against were: C Campbell, S Mac Stiofain, Tony Ruane, Joe Clarke, Des Long, Oliver McCaul, Eamonn Mac Tomais and Mairin de Burca.

Those who rejected accessing the parliamentary process should be seen as unable in any parliamentary role to distinguish themselves from Fianna Fail. Those who accepted the parliamentary role were prepared to do so with a distinctive programme of legislation directed at democratising the ownership of productive property. The latter amounted to an emergent democratic-Marxist approach. The anomalous member of the second group is Mairin de Burca; she did not go 'Provisional'.

TMacG outlined the northern situation; we needed to maximise pressure on the Government; raise the issue at the UN; the Free State army was moving to the border. Our people were on the barricades, but we were not getting credit; we needed good TV and radio spokesmen. There had been no NICRA meetings since the 12th; conflicting statements were being issued.

In Dublin a 'solidarity' committee had been set up, which included SF, LP, WTS, ITGWU, Dublin Trades Council and the GAA. It was important to keep the response political.

Yet in the background the response was being conceived in military terms; the old channels of influence and command structures were re-emerging.

CS 25/08/69: Present were TMacG, Seamus Rattigan, Seamus Costello, Joe Clarke and Mairin de Burca. Arrangements were made for full-time office presence, M de B and SR being available. Eddie Williams was appointed full-time organiser for Munster. Anthony Coughlan was to be invited to attend a CS meeting, in the context of the emergent 'Federation' proposal and its perceived relationship to the Common Market.

The northern crisis was turning peoples' attention away from local political work all over. There was a civil administration emerging behind the barricades in Derry; this was real and effective; I had occasion to observe it in Derry the following weekend. I also met with Bernadette Devlin, and she had agreed to come to Dublin in the 13th.

CS 1/09/69: TMcG, RJ, JC, SRR, MdeB, Tony Ruane present. Federation statement had been issued by the Republican Clubs. The Coughlan meeting was long-fingered. The weekly newsletter was initiated. Sean O Cionnaith reported from Connaught that the effect of the Northern crisis had been to cause all local work to be abandoned. Local meetings to explain the political position were needed. TMcG reported from Derry; civil administration existed; RJ was to go there the following weekend; feasibility of worker-co-op initiatives against unemployment would be examined.

During the next period the SF minutes become unreliable; most of what happened was as a result of ad-hoc decisions made in a confused situation. The Ard-Fheis date was repeatedly postponed.

CS 8/09/69: TMcG, JC, MdeB, SR, RJ present. There had been a statement issued on Article 44 of the Constitution; one was in preparation on the Federation proposals. RJ complained that Nuacht Naisiunta(2) had no number, date or address on it. This would be remedied from now on. RJ and SR were to attend the Connolly Youth conference as observers. A Clann na h-Eireann recruiting leaflet was rejected as unsuitable.

CS 15/09/69: attendance as above. Note the continuing presence of Joe Clarke and the absence of leading 'heavies' apart from Mac Giolla. This suggests that such action as there was took place via the reviving network of the 'other branch', and the people concerned were avoiding CS meetings because of Joe Clarke. RJ reported on a further Derry meeting; Liam Cummins was to attend the next meeting.

AC Sept 20 1969: present were TMcG, C *Campbell, Tony *Ruane, RJ, Larry *Grogan, Joe *Clarke, Sean Mac *Stiofain, Eamonn Mac *Tomais, Denis Cassin, Des *Long, Seamus Rattigan, Liam Cummins, Paddy Callaghan, Sean O Gormaile, Derry Kelleher, Marcus Fogarty, Gabriel Mac Lochlainn, Mairin de Burca.

The *proto-Provisionals were all there, making no contribution, but observing the scene and preparing behind the scenes for the walk-out, no doubt noting our total rejection of any military option.

It was noted that the citizens defence committee was no longer under republican control; this was due to co-options (by its proto-Provisional and Blaneyite leadership, Sean Keenan, Paddy Doherty etc); the barricades were coming down; the NICRA however was again emerging; Dalton Kelly was PRO; the AGM was planned for January. A meeting was planned for the 26th at which the Republican Clubs would organise activities relating to the CR issue, including a civil disobedience campaign.

Paddy Callaghan reported that the Federation of Co-ops had met the Minister and the possibility existed that the Federation if developed could control the sea fishing industry.

The Ard Fheis was again postponed sine die, due to the 'unsettled state' and a perceived threat of violence; it had been arranged for October 19. This was proposed by Sean mac Stiofain.

No doubt because he needed time to organise and schedule his walk-out for maximum impact and harm to the politicisation process.

CS 29/09/69: TMcG, TR, SmacS, SR, RJ, JC, MdeB; Dalton Kelly attended from the NICRA. Sean O Bradaigh's letter of resignation was accepted with regret. TMcG reported on the Galway salmon fishing issue. The existence of the Dun Laoire Cumann was accepted. (This was a proto-Provisional group which had not been paying its dues; Joe Nolan was involved.) The meeting of Republican Clubs had been poorly supported; the plan to get active clubs in every county, with a 6-county executive to handle publicity remained unfulfilled. Dalton Kelly reported on the Citizens Press; it was hoped to get the Defence Committees to adopt it, while keeping policy under control of the movement.

The relationship between the Defence Committees, the Republican Clubs, the NICRA and the Citizens Press during this period needs to be analysed, with the NICRA records as additional source. What I suspect is that the first were increasingly under Blaneyite / proto-Provisional control, and were subverting the membership of the second, and keeping the third and fourth at bay. This SF minute is ambiguous. RJ June 2001.)

CS 6/10/69: Mac Stiofain present, along with TMcG, SR, MdeB and JC. Also RJ. More trouble with Joe Nolan and Dun Laoire. Correspondence with S Tipp CC re cumainn, referred to organiser. RJ reported on Housing Action Movement feedback from the Left: it was rumoured that SF was withdrawing from active participation due to a secret agreement with the FF government, relating to the Northern question. Mairin de Burca diverted the discussion into the question of payment of fines.

This would appear to be an echo of proto-Provisional intrigue, supporting the Justin O'Brien thesis in his Arms Trial. This also suggests that MdeB was at this time, consciously or unconsciously, supportive of the proto-Provisional position.

During this period the content of Nuacht Naisiunta would appear to be directly related to SC meetings, the link being MdeB.

CS 13/10/69: TMacG, SMacS, SR, RJ, JC, MdeB. Joe Nolan and the Dun Laoire Cumann. DHAC fines to be paid. Election of regional AC representatives: clarification needed. Republican Clubs to meet again to form an Executive on Oct 19. Sale of the UI to be promoted.

AC 18/10/69: TMacG, CC, SC, EMacT, TR, LG, JC, SMacS, GMacL, DC, RJ, DK, SR, DL, KA, OMacC. Republican Clubs to support Kevin McCorry or Dalton Kelly for the NICRA full-time organiser. Citizen Press to remain under republican control, but with Belfast CCDC represented on the management committee. Regional executive of RCs had been set up, and clubs re-activated. The Clubs legality case had been defeated in the Lords; people had been therefore convicted, but given conditional discharges. A Campaign to release Malachi McGurran and Frank Card was initiated. CS reported list of current active regional organisers. Ard Fheis date fixed for January 10-11. Mac Stiofain proposed that the 2 main resolutions be circulated in advance with information as to their timing on the agenda. This was accepted.

Mac Stiofain obviously had in mind the need to drum up maximal attendance at the crucial times. If his military plan was to be developed, the political plan needed to be stymied with maximal disruption.

CS 27/10/69: TMacG, JC, TR, RJ, GMacL, MdeB. Note that the CS meetings during this period were basically being carried by RJ and TMacG on behalf of the leading politicisers. The role of Joe Clarke was to put a glowering negative presence on the process, backed by Tony Ruane, and fortified by SMacS from time to time. TMacG reported on the 6-Co Regional Executive: five areas were represented; people had in most cases been absorbed into CRA work and club work had been dropped. Billy McMillan was elected Chair, Liam Cummins secretary, Kevin McCorry press officer and Oliver Frawley treasurer. The first meeting was fixed for Belfast on November 2 and there was to be a motion proposed by J White and seconded by R MacKnight 'that a revolutionary front of all radical groups be set up for the purpose of organising the youth into a revolutionary movement and to press the social objectives of the movement now'.

It is far from clear what the philosophy of, or strategic thinking behind, this motion was; it seems to have come bottom-up from the people concerned and to have reflected ultra-left PD-type influence; it certainly was not a reflection of leadership thinking.

Thirteen regions were defined for elections to the incoming Ard Comhairle; these were realistically based on the known distribution of Cumainn and Clubs, and defined in terms of ease of access to a regional centre. It is not clear who drew up the list; it could have been from Goulding, who would have had a feel for the main foci of politicisation. They were 'all-Ireland' in structure, eg we had 'Donegal/Derry' and 'Fermanagh / West Cavan / Leitrim'.

CS 3/11/69: TMacG, SR, TR, Mick Ryan, Seamus Costello; Sean Dunne and Andy Smith attended as from the Dublin CC, and Joe Nolan from Dun Laoire. It seems I was not present at this one, unusually. This was to resolve the Dun Laoire question. The Dublin CC position was that the Tracey Cumann promoted by Joe Nolan was 'paper', and a new active Cumann had been set up in Sallynoggin; Joe Nolan could join this if he liked. Joe Nolan was challenged to produce the minute book.

Mick Ryan reported complaints that CS business had been discussed outside the CS; this was aimed at Joe Clarke but no names were mentioned.

There was then a session with the regional organisers, and some of the regions were re-defined on the basis of their local knowledge.

CS 10/11/69: TMacG, SMacS, TR, JC, Seamus Costello and MdeB. It was considered that the report of the Republican Clubs meeting on Oct 27 was inadequate, and it was agreed to expand it. This report as noted above was an addendum. Joe Nolan and Dun Laoire still simmering. National collection was coming in slowly and so far was £326. Dublin cumainn called to action on the housing issue; statement to be issued on the Labour Party call for a housing emergency. Suspension to Special Powers to be tested by an indoor meeting in Newry to call for the release of the prisoners. SC proposed and RJ seconded a motion to the effect that leaks from the CS if source identified be punished by suspension. This was on foot of a letter from the 'other branch' to the effect that CS and AC business was being openly circulated. This was getting at Joe Clarke, who had obviously been feeding the proto-Provisional rumour and disinformation machine.

CS 17/11/69: TMacG, SC, JC, SMacS, RJ, SR, MdeB, Mick Ryan. Joe Nolan referenced Sean O Bradaigh. Bernadette Devlin had approached the Movement to organise meetings for her in the 26 Cos. It was agreed to seek a meeting in advance to agree policy positions: UDR, British interference, sectarian strife etc. Points for the 'special Bodenstown' were agreed, and Liam O Comain from Derry was to speak. TMacG reported on the Limerick regional meeting which had elected Des Long.

There are indications that 'heavies' were beginning to consider it important to come to CS meetings, to counterbalance SMacS and JC; we have Mick Ryan and Seamus Costello.

CS 24/11/69: TMacG, SMacS, MR, RJ, CHG, JC, MdeB. It was considered important to meet with BD before the projected Limerick meetings. Mac Stiofain to meet with a new Cumann in Ring. Regional meetings had taken place in Dublin, Waterford and Wicklow, electing respectively Sylvester Doolan, WJ Dunphy and Frank Wogan. RJ reported on the Waterford meeting; 8 cumainn had been represented. The 6-co executive was now meeting regularly and club members were being encouraged to affiliate with the NICRA.

This last point is ambiguous; it is not clear whether Clubs were being affiliated to the NICRA as 'affiliated organisations' or whether club members were simply being encouraged to join as individuals. There is perhaps a hint here of what could be regarded as an 'infiltration' process.

CS 1/12/69: TMacG, RJ, CG, JC, MR, SMacS, MdeB. RJ reported on Limerick meetings with Bernadette Devlin. She had avoided a prior meeting by the expedient of flying to Shannon. She had however spoken well and been co-operative. Collections went for the Northern relief fund.

In retrospect, I must say I never fully understood how these meetings had come about, by whom or how they were initiated, what their objective was. I was inclined at the time to attribute them to the initiative of the Limerick politicisers, but from the CS record it seems the initiative came from Bernadette. Were they perhaps a diversion? Who was taking whom for a ride? It seems I did not voice my unease at the CS, though I remember distinctly being uneasy, and critical of their lack of political focus.

AC 6/12/69: TMacG, SR, MR, EMacT, JC, LG, DL, TR, SC, RJ, CC, SMacS, DK, LC, DC, OMacC, MdeB. Voting record for July 18 was placed on record. Ard Fheis motions were adopted re Cumann affiliation procedures, a steering committee procedure for handling Ard Fheis agenda at the subsequent Ard Fheis, cumainn to meet at least 12 times per annum, duties of Cumann members, issue of membership cards; there was a call for more native-speaking Irish teachers in Gaeltacht schools. An integrated policy motion to be drafted and put to the AC before the AF. Statements re Frank Card to be issued by 6 Co Executive; McGurran had been released. Regional structure was ratified; attendance records of regional representatives to be on record at subsequent election-time.

CS 15/12/69: TMacG, SC, MR, JC, TR, SR, MdeB. Queries about delegate status from Kildare and Tralee. Dun Laoire Cumann issue resolved by Sean O Bradaigh producing a minute book; its existence was accepted.

CS 22/12/69: two Limerick cumainn rejected on grounds on non-payment. Regional AC members from the North were Ivan Barr and Frank Patterson. Ard Fheis booked for the Intercontinental.

CS 29/12/69: TMacG, CG, SR, JC, TR, RJ, MdeB. SMacS's letter of resignation from CS was read; there was no comment. There had been a campaign of bogus press coverage relating to the coming Ard Fheis; it was agreed to issue a statement to the effect that policy would be decided, as always, at the Ard Fheis and not in the media. Regional delegates were noted: Peter Duffy and Ruairi O Bradaigh. Stewarding of the anti-apartheid event on Jan 10 had to be refused because of the Ard Fheis.

CS 5/01/70: TMacG, RJ, MR, JC, TR, CG, MdeB, SR. Leitrim delegate applications were accepted. RJ to draft some motions for the public session.

There is no record to hand of the final AC meeting which was supposed to take place prior to the AF, and which would have considered the key policy motions with a view to deciding on an AC position recommending them or not. Nor have I to hand the AF agenda. If I get hold of it I will have more to say here. It can however be said that the walk-out left SF in an anomalous position, because those who walked out had already voted, leaving blocked the key constitutional amendment on abstention. It was clear that the walk-put had been planned so as to maximise the difficulties in the way of the politicisation process. It is ironical that the militarists have now, in 2001, after 30 years of mayhem, come around to something like the position to which the politicisers aspired from 1965 onwards, and nearly achieved in 1968-9.

Notes and References

2. It had been decided to produce a weekly newsletter for the Cumainn, to give an up-to-date leadership view of the crisis as it was evolving nationally. This is on record, and I have abstracted it from here on, for as long as it is relevant to the writer's narrative. The record is conserved in the Workers' Party archive.

Some navigational notes:

Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999