I have not done a systematic trawl of the accessible material; perhaps I will do this eventually. I have however managed to identify some highlights from the Cabinet and Taoiseach papers.

Callaghan Meeting February 5 1971

Callaghan was the leader of the Labour Party, in a situation where British policy on Northern Ireland was bi-partisan. He had earlier been Prime Minister.

The main meeting was with Dr Hillery, then Minister for External Affairs. Hillery's position I found impeccable; he attacked the way the B-Specials were being re-constituted as 'gun clubs'. Support by Britain for the NILP was a non-starter. Extension of the British LP to NI would be a step backwards. He called for total support for the SDLP declaration on co-operation, friendship and understanding with a view to eventual unification by consent. After the meeting Hillery phoned the Taoiseach Jack Lynch to urge that he stress the SDLP position. There was no mention of the EEC.

In the subsequent meeting with the Taoiseach the implication of the EEC was discussed for both States; Callaghan held that this had no relevance to Partition. Replacement of Chichester-Clarke by Craig was regarded as 'dire'. Callaghan wondered if helping the NILP would attract Unionist voters to Labour. Common economic problems such as inflation were mentioned; this was attributed to trade union intransigence fuelled by their 'crazy economics'. Heath was said to be an EEC enthusiast but the Tories were split and his main motivation was to remain Prime Minister. Callaghan was for the EEC but would 'lose no sleep' over it.

Lynch at the FF Ard Fheis February 20 1971

Response to Internment

On June 4 1971 there is on record an Irish Times report of Tomas Mac Giolla speaking at a Birmingham meeting of Clann na hEireann, attended by 1000 people. He shared the platform with Bowes Egan, Bernadette Devlin and Padraig Yeats. There was a threat to assassinate Bernadette, and this was the reason given for Special Branch mingling with the audience. TMacG was suggesting that the 'Federal solution' had been accepted by Stormont and the NI Nationalists; this was said to involve governments for Scotland and Wales, with in effect Ireland coming back into the Union.

There is no sign of any explicit reaction to this speech, not have I yet found any evidence of inter-government thinking along these lines. Ongoing concern was primarily with the Ulster Defence Regiment.

There is however an extensive 'secret' internal memo dated 21/06/71 which suggests that the then current Government position on NI has wide acceptance in Britain, in NI, and internationally.

It went on to suggest that Catholic ghetto opinion was swinging in favour of an all-out attack on the regime; it would be necessary to get London to understand this. Unionists were incapable of considering a unitary solution, or even of breaking the link with the Orange Order. Minority leadership had been in touch and saw no sign of any Unionist acceptance of the need for power-sharing.

It was necessary to persuade the British that '...it is in their interest to change the North radically and quickly before extremist forces on either side make Governments react to them..'. It was suggested that there was a '...threat to the applications by Britain and Ireland for membership of the EEC if the situation in the North should break down completely..'. Also that '...British policy of attempting to implement the Downing St Declaration through the Unionist Establishment is in danger of breaking down...'.

The preferred option for replacing Stormont was a Commission with equal representation from the two communities chaired by a third party; all discussions should be quadripartite.

Alternative Assembly

There is a letter from the Ambassador Donal O'Sullivan dated August 23 where he mentions having had dinner with William Deedes MP in Kent, who was said to be an influential Tory. Heath looked at NI with impatience.. a local irritation.. unfavourable publicity on the Continent... Maudling said to be influential on the PM... The opposition will not return to Stormont on the basis of the status quo... Direct Rule is '..too dreadful to contemplate..'.

On the same day the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society's memorandum was received and placed on record. Also on the same day, a delegation of Northern elected representatives was received by Lynch and Hillery. There was talk of internment and torture. Civil disobedience was widespread and effective, being promoted by the NICRA and the 'official' republicans. There was a demand for an 'alternative assembly'.

On August 26 there is a note of the responses from many Governments world-wide to a request to make representation to the British in the Irish interest; this was met in most cases with sympathy but refusal to act, except in the case of the French, who agreed to contact the British Ambassador.

On August 31 it is noted that the Taoiseach should not meet Heath except on the basis of an agreed agenda. Given the continued deterioration, it '..may be necessary to force London to deal much more deeply and seriously..'. There is mention of an 'all-Ireland economic and social council'.

There is an (undated) draft constitution for such an Assembly, composed of the elected non-Unionist Stormont MPs and Senators, supplemented by local-government co-options. Its objectives were non-violent political. It occurs at the top of the file sot it presumably is at the end of August and is a result of earlier inputs.

Lynch, Heath, Wilson in December 1971

In the Lynch-Heath talks on December 6 the agenda was primarily Northern Ireland. They covered human rights, cratering of roads, extradition, the Compton Report. The Wilson proposal was being promoted by Heath, but it was not acceptable in Dublin. The coming EEC accession was mentioned peripherally in passing.

On the same day Lynch addressed the Parliamentary Press Gallery Group, and linked the North with the EEC. He referred to a previous meeting in Dublin in September. He regarded the Wilson speech as a turning-point in British policy: the British saw Irish unity as a policy objective, and would no longer obstruct the wishes of the NI people. But Lynch insisted that we would not re-enter the Commonwealth. He also referred to his speech on the occasion of the Truce Commemoration on July 11. The Irish vote in favour of the EEC was not in doubt.

The Wilson Commons Speech

The essentials of the Wilson proposals, as announced in his speech in the Commons some days earlier, and accepted by Heath, were:

1. Violence must cease.

2. Inter-party and inter-government talks.

3. Internment must cease.

4. Rights of Unionists to be protected in a federal constitution.

5. An international binding convention to be signed.

6. Ireland to seek re-entry to the Commonwealth.

7. Oath to the Constitution and to the Queen as head of Commonwealth.

8. Extradition of terrorists by the Irish Government.

9. The Army to remain for up to 15 years.

10. Westminster to handle security.

11. Stormont Government to include minority representatives.

12. Human Rights provision of Downing St Declaration to be implemented.

13. Irish Constitution to be changed on matters relating to family planning etc (ie divorce, contraception, abortion).

14. Dual and equal education on the English and Scottish model.

15. Social services to be upgraded to the British level.

There is evidence in the Wilson file that the real sticking-point for the Government on the Wilson proposals was item 13: they regarded the role of the Catholic Church in dictating the legal environment as being of key importance. There is included a copy of a printed pamphlet by one Hamish Fraser, entitled 'A Nation Betrayed'. This occurs in both duplicated draft and printed form, suggesting prior consultation. The Wilson speech, and a current pamphlet 'Civil Rights Yes, Civil War No' (which is not filed), were attacked as 'Masonry', a 'British Humanist plot', calling for the secularisation of the State. Wilson was regarded as a 'super-O'Neill'. One can perhaps see the hand of John Charles McQuaid. The public reason for rejection, however, were items 6 and 7.

Wilson was entertained to dinner by the Taoiseach on November 18 1971, at which the items 6 and 7 reasons were given. It was noted that Wilson '..dismissed with acerbity the suggestion that entry of the two islands into the EEC would have any bearing on the partition question..'.

Some navigational notes:

Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 2002