Greens an the Nation (1994)

Century of Endeavour

A Green Paradigm for Nationality

(c) Roy Johnston 2002

(published in Issue 2 of Caorthann, the Green theoretical journal, issue 2, November 1994)

Abstract: Compares and contrasts 'ethnic' and 'geographic' concepts of nationality; analyses the emergence of the concept of Britain as a label for English hegemonism; suggests a possible relationship between Green and fringe-national objectives where these exist in Europe. Draws attention to the inter-State agreement which exists between Denmark and Germany as a pilot model for border minorities. Touches on Northern Ireland and relates it to India and Palestine as examples of British imperial procedures. Urges a geographic pluralist approach to nation-building, based on bottom-up democratic networking rather than top-down hegemonistic rule by a privileged ethnic group.

Note on the Author

The author has been active politically since his student days in the late 40s; he has evolved from an initial Marxist-democratic via a left-republican to his current left-Green position. He played an influential role in the attempt to develop a non-violent approach to the Northern Ireland question in the 1960s, encouraging Republicans to support the movement for civil rights. Recognising the failure of this, with the emergence of the Provisionals, he resigned in 1972.

Introduction

There are several models for the evolution of nation-states in the European context. There is the ethnic-nationalist model, adopted by the Germans in reaction to the ideological and linguistic imperialism of post-revolutionary France. This model, which is primarily language-based, is perhaps typified by the writings of Herder(1). There is the Marxist model, initially adumbrated by Engels, and partially developed by Stalin(2) under Lenin's influence. There are the Gellner(3) and Anderson(4) models, which borrow some Marxist concepts: while defining a nation (some would say 'idealistically' as an 'imagined community', with a broad-based cultural elite) the unification and realisation of the imagined concept (to the extent feasible with printed communication in a vernacular, and cemented by capitalist mass-production of standardised commodities within a unified market) is basically Marxist. Anderson is particularly critical of the Herder approach, instancing the total decoupling of language from national identity in the Americas.

Ethnic or Geographic?

Within these various approaches to understanding the national question, there are basically two opposing extremes, which may be broadly associated with the political right and left.

On the one hand there is the idea that the nation is an idealistic embodiment of some eternal principle enshrined in a pure ethnic tradition (excluding non-conforming minority groups), and on the other hand there is the idea that the nation is inclusive of all the people living in an economically-viable hinterland region, irrespective of their ethnic origins, and that their unification into a nation-state constitutes an opportunity to develop a mongrel or pluralistic culture, creatively with hybrid vigour.

The first principle is at the root of many of the negative aspects of European history, including those which led to the two World Wars. It certainly is the motivation behind the current Serbian aggression. Democrats, Socialists, Greens and other radicals have rightly been opposed to nationalism of this type.

The second principle seems to have been behind the attempt to establish a multi-ethnic Bosnia, as a microcosm of the failed multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. It certainly was behind the thinking of the American and French Revolutions, and of many of those who attempted to build the Irish nation from the 1790s onwards, though as time went on, increasing evidence can be found of the influence of the first principle.

England and Britain

The English nation is a successful multi-ethnic construct, based on a creole language (Anglo-Saxon and french), and cemented by an inclusive elite system which allowed considerable social mobility. The English went on to expand their national concept, taking on the label British (on the initiative of the upwardly-mobile Welsh aristocracy via the Tudors) and using it as a means of establishing a hegemonistic centralist system for preventing the emergence of Scotland and Ireland as rivals. We are currently living with the consequences of this process, which has been intensified by the needs of the capitalist system for an expanding market, and for capitalists to use the State to nip foreign competitors in the bud. Capitalism first began to thrive in England.

It has been suggested(5) that the relative friendliness of the British Government towards the Welsh language is a consequence of the need on the part of the English Establishment to promote Britain as a national concept, Welsh being descended from the language of pre-Roman Celtic Britain, and that there is a parallel with the role of the Gaeltacht in Ireland.

Greens in Britain have the problem of how they relate to other anti-centralist movements, like Scottish, Welsh and Cornish nationalism. There would appear to the basis for mutual understanding, if not alliance, especially in Wales and Cornwall, where there are relatively large populations of English immigrants. The need here is to promote the idea that the emergent national identity should be inclusive of all people who live and work within the identified national territory, and to discourage the idea that immigrants are hostile intruders bent on demolishing a traditional culture.

France, Spain, Germany, Denmark

There are several submerged national questions in France and Spain; the Basques and Catalans exist on both sides of the Pyrenees; while they have some autonomy in Spain they have no recognition in France.

On the whole the Spanish or German models which have relatively strong regional government favour the survival and development of regional or proto-national cultural identities, while the centralist French, British (and indeed Irish, which is modelled on the British) tend to be repressive.

(On this basis, the Protestants in Northern Ireland have as much a right to object to rule by a remote centralist system in Dublin as the Irish ever had to rule by a remote centralist system in London. Their acceptance of remote rule from London is based on the questionable premise that the Protestant religion requires State support.)

In France the case of Alsace, which is German-speaking, is somewhat special, in that it is rooted in the old-established Franco-German rivalry. German speaking in Alsace is not encouraged by the French.

Germany and Denmark have an inter-State agreement about the minorities living near their border; this safeguards their cultural rights. There is no analogous agreement between Germany and France regarding Alsace.

Britain and Ireland

The Irish nation ethnically is a pluralistic hybrid of Firbolgs, Celts, Vikings, Normans, English, Scottish etc. 'Racial purity' in the case of the Irish is blatant nonsense. Cultural diversity is expressed primarily in terms of religion. This diversity has tended to become exclusivist, in the aftermath of the defeat of the broad-based democratic movement of the 1790s, which was rooted in the European Enlightenment and the inclusivist democracy of the American and French revolutions. It was conscious British policy post 1800 to encourage religious divisions, and to prevent the emergence of an educated bourgeoisie with a unified cultural background.

This policy, despite appearances, never totally succeeded. There was substantial Protestant support for the 1914 Home Rule Bill introduced by the Liberals. This was however largely wiped out by the Tory conspiracy to arm the Orangemen against Home Rule, a process which must be identified as the 'introduction of the gun into Irish politics' in this century.

The writer's father, Joe Johnston, wrote in 1914 a pamphlet pointing out the disastrous consequences of the threat of civil war in Ulster(6) Connolly alone among those subsequently in the lead in 1916 identified the acutely menacing nature of the threat of Partition, and exposed it in his writings(7). Subsequent British post-colonial settlements in India and Palestine enshrined the partition principle, with political entities defined on a religious basis. The consequences have in both cases been disastrous, and remain a threat to world peace to this day, though in the case of Palestine there seem to be some small steps towards a pluralist secular democracy. Mandela has successfully resisted the proposal for a partitionist 'white homeland' in the new South Africa.

Partition, on the basis of ethnic or religious divisions, of a natural geographic entity has never been a good political solution. If there are to be national or regional political divisions, they should be on the basis of natural hinterlands, and there should be safeguards for rights of cultural, ethnic or religious minorities, supported by a higher-level authority.

Building from the Bottom Up

Instead of a leading hegemonistic group imposing its will on as wide a geographical area as it can, and keeping an 'inside track' for an 'in-group' in government, the Green vision is to build a political entity from the bottom up, beginning with strong government at local community level, with maximum participation by all citizens, and total equality of access.

Ideas like 'Home Rule is Rome Rule' or 'a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People' are totally alien to Green politics.

Bottom-up politics in a region where there is a patchwork of culturally distinct communities is a challenge to political creativity. An important aspect is law and order: the police must be accepted and be seen to be impartial. There needs to be a democratic control loop with influence on policy behaviour at a local community level. There needs to be proportional representation in all such democratic bodies.

For a local community to identify upwards with a wider national community, there needs to be a perception of common identity. This cannot be imposed from above. It must grow organically out of a complex of inter-community networks. The immediate task is to set up an environment in which this can happen it it wants to.

Any political settlement between Dublin and London respecting Northern Ireland must therefore avoid heavy-handed centralism, and encourage local inter-community networking, in culture, sport, enterprise development etc. Whatever proto-national identity emerges out of this process needs to have no barriers put in its way.

An important level in the development of inter-community networking is the recognition of a major town as having a hinterland, to which people naturally tend to go for specialist needs, like third-level education.

Any regional structure emerging in Northern Ireland needs to take into account the fact that partition when it took place cut through many such natural hinterlands. In the current peaceful environment these hinterland need to be encouraged to re-establish themselves. Economic, political, social and cultural activity needs to be focused on axes like Derry-Letterkenny, Dundalk-Newry, Sligo-Enniskillen. The re-opening of the border roads is top of the agenda, along with generation or wealth-creating employment based on local resources and local knowhow.

Regional government structures relevant to the dispersed populations in the border regions are likely to be different to the types of local structures needed for the concentrated populations of the Belfast conurbation. These will need to take into account the acutely defensive structures that have emerged in Belfast consequent on the troubles. It must be possible for the Falls and Shankill communities to co-operate through their democratic structures in the achievement of 'win-win' solutions to perceived problems.

The proposal for planting a campus of the University of Ulster on the boundary of these communities is to be welcomed.

The external unitary imposition of rule on Northern Ireland by a top-down process, whether by Westminster legislation or by the Irish Constitution, needs to be replaced by an 'opting in' process, with Dublin or London providing services of one kind or another to Northern Ireland on request.

If in the fullness of time it emerges that Dublin, being closer, is in a better position to supply relevant useful services, then Protestants no less than Catholics are likely to recognise this opportunity, and to evolve an increasing perception of Irish national identity.

Notes and Background Reading:

1. R R Ergang: Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism; New York, Columbia University Press; 1931.

2. J V Stalin; Marxism and the National and Colonial Question; Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR; Moscow 1935.

3. Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism; Blackwell 1983.

4. Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities; Verso 1991.

5. Janice Williams: private communication, 1994; work in progress.

6. Joseph Johnston: Civil War in Ulster: its Probable Consequences; Dublin, 1913; re-published UCD Press 1999.

7. James Connolly: Socialism and Nationalism; Dublin, Three Candles, 1948; pp 95-119 (series of articles in Forward and the Irish Worker written in 1914).

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