Speech by Duncan Shipley Dalton to the Irish Association

(given at the Mansion House Dublin on 29th October 1999)

I belong to a party that has been, and as current events obviously demonstrate still is, obsessed with the subjects of majority rule and democracy. However, we would do well to take a closer look at our own roots. In 1920, the overwhelming majority of members returned to Westminster from Irish constituencies were in favour of ending the Union and creating an independent Irish state.

Northern Ireland exists in its present geographical form because the leaders of the Unionist electorate in the nine counties of Ulster made the cold, practical and tactical calculation to jettison three of the counties, along with their fellow Unionists, in order to secure an artificially high majority in the remaining six.

We secured our own Parliament in this new Northern Ireland by threatening armed rebellion and civil war if we didn't get our own way. Once we had that Parliament we almost immediately did away with the STV based electoral system (again by explicit threats to Westminster) in order to ensure that there would be no challenge to our position form either nationalists or from working class labourite political movements which could undermine Unionist solidarity. At much the same time we reorganised council electoral areas to our own advantage.

What we had created by the end of the 1920's was not a 'Unionism' in the sense of a political philosophy designed to promote the benefits of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland's position within it. Instead, we had a brand of 'Ulster Unionism', an exclusive, insular, Protestant, Loyalist creed which sets out its own terms and conditions for membership of the United Kingdom, and in so doing actually built in degrees of difference and separation which were to push us to the very edge of the Union rather than pulling us to the very heart of the United Kingdom.

'Ulster Unionism' did nothing to encourage Roman Catholics to play a part in the political processes of the mini-state. I don't believe that anti-Roman Catholic discrimination was as severe or as systematic as some modern propagandists would like to pretend it was, but it is clear that 'Ulster Unionism', in political, governmental and establishment circles, neither welcomed not trusted roman Catholics. There may have been a degree of justification for this paranoia in the early years of the new state, but it became unsustainable, self-defeating and extraordinarily stupid to pursue institutional sectarianism as an instrument of state policy.

The Ireland Act (1949) should have acted as the turning point. That Act, passed after the Republic had left the Commonwealth, copper-fastened our constitutional position by stating that Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom was a matter for the Stormont Parliament alone.

But yet again, we stood still. And bear in mind too that the two decades after the 2nd World War were not marked by riots and nationalist insurrection. The IRA campaign of 1956-1962 was never more than a whimper and ended with some republicans complaining that '…..Northern nationalists had abandoned the dream of a free, independent, united Ireland'.

Northern Ireland though had other problems in this period. Increasingly high unemployment rates (mostly due to the decline in the shipbuilding, linen and agricultural industries) were posing electoral difficulties for the 'Traditional Unionists'. In 1958 the Northern Ireland Labour Party took 16% of the vote and by 1962 this had risen to 26% --- representing a real threat to the Ulster Unionist's electoral base, especially in the Belfast urban area.

When Terence O'Neill became Prime Minister in 1963 he set himself the task of tackling that unemployment problem: he did so with a policy of regional planning, new-town development, infrastructural investments and a six year plan to disperse both industry and the labour force more widely around the province. He also pursued friendlier relationships with the Republic, to promote a better atmosphere for external investment.

Because he had spent much of his early life away from Northern Ireland, political comrades and Prime Ministerial predecessors. Even so, he was still able to argue that '… if you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness they will live like Protestants, in spite of the authoritarian nature of their church'. And this was the liberal face of Unionism !

Regardless of this, he was astute enough to realise that reconciliation was also an essential part of the modernising process, even if he wasn't brave enough to follow his positive instincts to their obvious conclusions. Things though were changing in the old order. Northern Ireland's financial dependence upon Westminster was growing. The Wilson government, elected in 1964, was taking a keener interest in the Province, thanks largely to the activities of a backbench committee known as 'the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster'. Relations between London and Dublin were improving because of their joint efforts to join the Common Market. The Republic's government had become more conciliatory and Sean Lemass had even encouraged the Nationalist Party in the North to abandon its abstentionist policy.

O'Neill did have some initial success with his modernising programme and in 1965 the NILP share of the vote fell significantly; while Lemass on his part felt able to visit Stormont, thereby recognising its status. But O'Neill made no genuine effort to win Roman Catholics to his vision of a new Northern Ireland. What he did do though was to raise their expectations by highlighting the differences between the two communities and then failing to do anything about it.

It was from this failure that the campaign for civil rights, as opposed to Nationalist rights, was to emerge. For years the Unionist governments had been able to keep the containment of Nationalism purely a local matter for the Stormont Parliament, but this new demand by Roman Catholics for equal rights within the United Kingdom was something which neither Westminster nor the media would or could ignore.

In many ways O'Neill's backhanded and dithering response to the Roman Catholic community in Northern Ireland placed him, and by extension Unionism, in a no-win position. Even though he sympathised with roman Catholics he was patronising in his approach and sidelining in effect. He had isolated himself from his own grassroots and party headquarters and then when the first of the Civil Rights protests emerged he was blamed for having fed, watered and encouraged this new manifestation of what was seen as simply militant republicanism.

In 1963, when O'Neill came to power, the N.I. state looked impregnable. Yet less than a decade later Unionism was in ruins and Stormont prorogued. Why ? Northern Ireland had become a citadel, walled in with Unionist opinion, Orange traditions and Protestant prejudice. Its walls cracked easily and crumbled quickly because the foundations were rotten and the defenders useless.

Unionists have their own version of history of course and blame a feckless Westminster and terrorist orientated republicans. My own opinion is that Westminster stepped in because Unionists had very clearly lost control. It is also my belief that the campaign for civil rights only turned into a political battle for a united Ireland when sections of nationalism and republicanism realised how easily Stormont had fallen and how unsympathetic Westminster was to the Unionist position.

It was quite clear as early as 1972, with the publication of the Green Paper on a future government of Northern Ireland, that whatever solution was agreed to it would only have Westminster's approval if it included and Irish Dimension and power-sharing. Westminster has never deviated form that position and I don't believe it ever will. What this did do was to give a newly inspired and refreshed nationalism a head start, both politically and psychologically: it meant that inter-party talks, rather than starting with a completely blank piece of paper, always began with the Irish Dimension and Power-Sharing already taken for granted. This has remained the position for the past three decades.

The period from the fall of the Sunningdale Executive in 1974 to the beginning of 1995 were the wasting and wasted years of Unionism. We gained nothing and we stopped nothing. Protests, rallies, stunts and strikes got us nowhere. We were wrong-footed, misled, ignored or lied to as a matter of course by both Prime Ministers and Secretaries of State. The tragedy was that we learned nothing from each new setback and continued to believe that the boom of the Lambeg Drum, the town crier of Pompeii histrionics of Dr. Paisley, and the 'quiet word in the right ear' and cup of tea with the Queen Mother tactics of Jim Molyneaux would somehow in the end save the day. Some Unionists still believe it even now !

But one thing was certain when the Framework Documents appeared in February 1995 and that was the fact that either we agreed to substantial talks with the pan-nationalist front or we sat back and waited for the juggernaut of joint sovereignty to park itself in the grounds of Castle Buildings. I am well aware that this sort of 'intellectual Lundyism' doesn't appeal to Ian Paisley, Bob McCartney and indeed many sections of my own party; but I also know that not one of them has been able to prevent a quarter of a century of political and constitutional erosion. They could noisily react to events, but they could not reverse them. Not exactly a long term strategy for Unionism !

I am not now going to go into the run-up to the Good Friday Agreement or the details of the deal itself. But what I will say is that, having endorsed it at every level of the party and carried it through both the referendum and Assembly elections, we should have sold it more competently, enthusiastically and thoroughly to our own grassroots and to the wider pro-Union electorate. In so many ways the difficulties in the implementation have stemmed from unsustainable promises made to people during these campaigns. In my opinion, taking into account the political, social and economic circumstances prevailing in Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Good Friday Agreement is, without a shadow of a doubt, the best deal that Unionism can get.

There is a faction within the 'NO' lobby which insists that even if somehow we secured a deal on decommissioning and established the Executive, that the structures of the Assembly itself would prove to be inherently unstable and unworkable. The rules under which it exists would, they argue, result in the institutionalisation of sectarianism and, rather than paving the way for a better future, would simply leave us with the same old parties and the same old problems. The Unionists would try and secure their position and the nationalists would work to their United Ireland Agenda.

And yes, if that were actually to happen, then the Assembly probably wouldn't be able to function. But it doesn't have to be like that. We don't have to live our lives according to the predictions of Mystic Meg and the professional pessimists of the woe-is-me, no-is-me, anti-Agreement Unionists. Never forget why they are called 'NO' Unionists; it's not just because they say 'no' to everything. It's because when you look at their record and then you ask them if they have helped the Union, stopped the betrayals, prevented the erosion and diverted the latest self-proclaimed crisis, their answer is always the same: NO we haven't. NO we haven't. NO we haven't.

Our real problem is that all of our political parties, with perhaps the possible exception of the N.I. Conservatives, are built around their response to the constitutional issue. However, when these parties, and particularly those of them who form the Executive, have to deal with the everyday bread and butter issues, the constitutional question does not need to be uppermost in their mind. Whether you are a Unionist or a Nationalist you still need jobs, education, welfare services and housing - all areas of responsibility for the new Executive.

My own belief is that in the right circumstances a consensus will develop among the parties on key social, economic and welfare issues. And unlike the previous Stormont regime the new devolved administration will be making its own decisions. It is usually forgotten that Stormont had a tendency to take social and welfare legislation, which had been passed for the rest of the UK and then adopt it unchanged for Northern Ireland. This had the advantage of saving Unionist governments the split risking problems associated with internal disputes over policy platforms. Maintaining the unity of the party was always deemed more important than a proper debate on left and right issues.

It is wrong to believe that the Belfast Agreement is incapable of adapting itself to meet changing circumstances and party political realignment. Strand One, paragraph 36 states: 'After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements and of the Assembly's procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustment necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness'.

Power sharing does not need to be sectarian based only, let alone dependent upon the continued existence of the present political parties. A minority does not have to mean nationalist or Roman Catholic. Many of the local parties actually have left-of-centre policies and beliefs and would probably agree on very much more than you might imagine at the moment.

Over a number of years co-operation it is not impossible that a natural political realignment would take place, which would see members of the UUP, SDLP, Alliance, DUP, and perhaps even Sinn Fein, discovering that they have so much in common on social and economic issues that it would make sense to create a new Social Democratic or Liberal Democratic party. There are elements within these same parties who would be more inclined to a right-of-centre platform, and they too might choose to form a new political party. That would be a very welcome development and if it did happen I could see no reason why the Assembly itself, with Westminster's blessing, couldn't make the necessary legislative changes.

I also believe that it would be under these changed and changing circumstances that Labour and the Liberal Democrats would be able to begin organising and campaigning in Northern Ireland, along with the Conservatives, either in their own right or else represented in the region by the UUP, as was the case between 1921 and 1972. It may seem odd to some to say this, but I happen to believe that devolution will strengthen the Union and the United Kingdom.

The truth is that most of the parties in Northern Ireland are little more than loose coalitions embracing everything from the far left to the far right. These differences would be exposed to the sunlight once the parties had to create policies rather than provide sound-bites on the constitutional question. It would be a tragedy if in these circumstances the rules governing the Assembly were so tight that they prevented the existing parties from fading away to be replaced by new parties based on a wide range of social and economic issues. Sectarianism will only become institutionalised if we choose to make it so.

Devolution is the new form of integration. Scotland and Wales have a greater measure of self-determination than they have had for centuries and it is likely that England too will experience greater levels of devolution and local control. It is essential therefore that Northern Ireland now grasp the present opportunity to pave the way for a new era of fairness, self-government and inclusiveness. We have to prove that we are capable of making decisions for ourselves.

The growth of regionalism has been one of the main consequences of our membership of the European Union and it isn't surprising that the Scots and Welsh want to ensure that their voice is heard at many different levels. It is equally vital that we in Northern Ireland are able to represent ourselves and make our case where it matters, rather than depending upon others to do it for us.

I believe in a Unionism which embraces the British and Irish Isles. There are many things which bind us together: we are not physically attached to continental Europe; we speak the same language; we share a cultural and geographical heritage and there is an enormous amount of to and fro between the constituent parts. We can work together to the advantage of all of us and I hope we can pursue a co-operative agenda within the British-Irish Council.

It may not look it at the moment, but the Belfast Agreement could provide the platform for an absolute sea-change in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, in the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic, in the relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and in the relationship between the Republic and the United Kingdom. The potential improvement in each and every one of those relationships will do far more to bring about a stable, decent and democratic society in Northern Ireland than a continuing and destructive obsession with the constitutional question.

This is what I mean when I have argued that there is no real alternative to the Belfast Agreement. Yes, there are alternatives: but the alternative the 'NO' lobby want is not the one they will get and the one they do get is not the one that they will want. And that is why I believe that it is important that the Ulster Unionist Party continues to fight wholeheartedly for the full implementation of the Agreement. It would be sheer madness to break away now, as so many in the NO lobby are urging us.

What happens if the Agreement collapses ? Well, for a start, it will be a generation before we can create the conditions under which a new round of inter-party talks will take place. In the meantime the British and Irish governments will continue with an Anglo-Irish process in which Unionists will have no input and over which they will exercise no veto. The voice of Unionism will be marginalized and even though Paisley may continue to roar in Ulster, Unionism itself will be diminished to a mere squeak everywhere else.

And let's be clear on one issue: Sinn Fein signed up to this Agreement only after they had been given the nod by the IRA. The IRA are involved in this Agreement and this Agreement does insist upon decommissioning. It is what was voted for in the referendum and it is what 95% of nationalists voted for. Sinn Fein and the IRA are being squeezed at every level on the decommissioning issue. They have run out of excuses long ago for keeping their guns and semtex.

Timing is not the crucial issue here, however much smoke Sinn Fein try to blow around the actual wording. Either the war is over or it remains unfinished business. Gerry Adams and the IRA must abandon their virtual reality world in which everything exists upon their terms alone and in which political progress is determined by veiled threat and the sound of rifles being cocked. Unionists have nothing left to prove. We have done everything which has been required of us by the Agreement, and we are ready and waiting to enter government with Sinn Fein.

Does Gerry Adams believe that we hate nationalists so much that we would willingly deprive ourselves of accountable devolved government ? Does he believe that we benefited so much from thirty years of Direct Rule that we welcome the prospect of London and Dublin continuing to determine our future ? Does he believe that David Trimble risked splitting the his party and facing electoral destruction by the DUP just for the sheer fun of it ? If Mr Adams would spend less time swanning around the world in search of praise, prizes and photo opportunities, he might have begun to realise that it is he, rather than the UUP, who has made implementation such a tortuous process.

The Ulster unionist party want this agreement to work and we have taken far more risks than any other party. Sinn Fein, for reasons of their own, seem to have enormous difficulty in accepting that democracy means the absence of armed and active terrorist organisations. Even the 'Irish News' has seen through the hypocritical hopelessness of Sin Fein's position on decommissioning and asked the IRA to do the decent thing.

But will they ? They blame us for insisting upon prior decommissioning, then issue statements that they won't decommission at all. They blame us for reneging on promises and yet they are recruiting the next generation of teenage martyrs. They blame us for belligerence and then take a baseball bat to some child who annoys a local godfather. What sort of crazy, convoluted, head-in-the-semtex logic do these people actually live by ? In the real world the Armalite and the ballot box do not cohabit. The sooner the IRA tells us that they understand that, the sooner we will have a permanent political settlement in Northern Ireland.

ends