Introduction

Since we shall have a special session on Northern Ireland, I have been asked to concentrate on the other side of the Irish Sea. I shall say something about each of Scotland, Wales and England. Then I shall talk about how they, along with Northern Ireland, interact on a UK basis. After that, I shall touch upon the British-Irish Council and conclude with the challenges and opportunities.

Scotland

Expectations for Scottish devolution were high. As David Martin, Labour MEP for the Lothians, argued just before the inauguration of the new Parliament: Devolution could offer us Scots the best of all worlds: the flexibility of a Scottish Parliament; the strength of the UK's 10 votes in the [EU] Council of Ministers; and the benefits of being part of the largest trading bloc in the world – the European Single Market. Moreover, he also thought that Scotland's devolutionary settlement 'could give the Europe of the Regions a huge boost'. It would join Bavaria in its advocacy of 'three-level development' – the region, the member state and the European Union.

Labour's main rival, the Scottish National Party (SNP) sees the devolutionary settlement as a stage on the transition to 'independence in Europe'. You will hear more from our Shona. Let me simply note that advocates of both independence and devolution were inspired by the very large number of countries which became independent in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, all of which were much worse off than Scotland. If they could manage it, why not Scotland? (Archie Brown)

So how do things look after the first year? Newspaper assessments were qualified in their judgement and one poll revealed a large amount of ignorance. This was followed over the summer and autumn by headline-making news about the mess made by the Scottish Qualifications Authority over the handling of Higher examination results, the resignation of the SNP leader, Alex Salmond, and the death of the First Minister, Donald Dewar. Despite the ambivalence and distractions, there have been real successes which I shall leave for Shona to tell you about.

The ambivalence recorded in the newspapers partly stems from journalists' own irresponsibility. As usual, they consistently reported rows, etc; but, for example, a very impressive debate on domestic violence was not covered by a single newspaper. It is little to be wondered at, then, that an apparent 80% of people thought that devolution had made little difference to their lives. This is not to say that people want to return to the status quo ante. Indeed, if devolution were to fail, it is more likely to do so by being tipped-over into independence by insensitive handling of issues relating to the UK and to English reactions to devolution. I shall return to this.

Wales

The origins of Welsh devolution could not have been more different to those in Scotland. The much closer, indeed knife-edged, outcome in the Welsh referendum reflects the relative absence then of a coherent sense of Welsh identity – without such a strong sense of nation and a less developed sense of civil society. The three main sources of Welsh identity – language, non-conformism and radical politics – had eroded by the 1980s. And none of the contenders (Ieuan Wyn Jones, AM Anglesey and MP, Helen Mary Jones, AM Llanelli, and Jill Evans, MEP Rhondda) to fill the place of Dafydd Wigley as leader of Plaid Cymru use the word independence. The winner, Wyn Jones, refers to 'securing full national status within the European Union'.

However, there was a substantial rise in interest in having an Assembly between the referendum and the first elections to the new body and there is growing interest in its having stronger powers. The current powers are much weaker than those in Scotland and Northern Ireland (though it is ahead of the freedom of information game in being the first cabinet to publish minutes of its meetings on the Internet). The Welsh Assembly is responsible only for secondary legislation for putting into place laws passed at Westminster. Thus, it has been described as a 'glorified county council on stilts' (John Loughlin). However, concerns about infringements of the relationship between Cardiff and London and First Secretary Rhodri Morgan's announcement of a review of the workings of devolution have occasioned calls for change.

The very history of the London labour Party's determination that their own man and not Rhodri Morgan should be First Secretary was a bad start. There was widespread delight when, eventually – in February 2000 – Rhodri Morgan did become First Secretary. Such enthusiasm for the people's choice of the voice for Wales has a lot to contend with. Carelessness on the part of UK officials scuppered Wales' determination to be a GM-crop-free zone. Another major clash took place over performance related pay for teachers, which went to judicial review. According to Lord Gwilym Prys Davies, the 22 bills passed in Westminster in 1999-2000 that refer to Wales show no consistent pattern. Some clearly delineate areas of competence devolved to the Assembly, while others lack clear definitions or retain Whitehall control.

Even the Presiding Officer of the Assembly – a person supposed to be neutral – Lord Elis Thomas has been driven to ask: "To what extent is the body over which I have the duty of presiding really the National Assembly for Wales?" Either enthusiasm for Rhodri Morgan will turn to cynicism because he can do so little or the review will spark serious calls for more substantial devolution.

England

There are two dimensions to be looked at here; devolution to English regions and the impact of England's reaction to devolution elsewhere. I shall leave aside the election of a London Mayor and Authority as these have few powers.

English integrated regional offices, regional associations and regional development agencies are all seen as precursors of potential elected regional chambers. Whether or not this will happen is uncertain; there are conflicting opinions. A report for the government in the summer claimed that there is no demonstrated demand for regions throughout most of England. On the other hand, the leader of Charter 88 says there is a growing demand. It is probably the case that both devolution to neighbours and a determination to have regionally-defined, rather than Whitehall-defined, interests presented to the EU Council of Ministers may fuel keenness in those regions which do have a sense of commonality. This is especially so in the north-east and north-west, but perhaps also East Anglia and possibly the Midlands and south-west. One piece of research about to be undertaken is looking at the question of whether it is possible to define the south-east as a region and whether, if it is not, this puts an end to the whole project.

The Labour Government is committed to elected regional government 'where and when there is a clear demand for it', while at the same time, saying that 'the Party recognizes the legitimate aspirations of the English regions and believes that the creation of elected regional assemblies is the essential next step in our programme of renewing the constitution and empowering our citizens'.

In the meantime, it has 'beefed-up' the regional development agencies with a substantial injection of cash and has given them a stronger economic development role and more flexibility in their budgetary powers. At this autumn's party conferences, the Labour Party promised a Green or white Paper on regional governance. The Liberal Democrats promised referendums on regional assemblies on the basis of a minimum set of core powers, with the possibility of further devolution, and a Finance Commission to devise a new revenue distribution formula to the nations and regions. In contrast, the Conservatives pledge to scrap the recently strengthened regional development agencies.

In connection with England's reaction to devolution elsewhere, there is a growing restiveness about the problem that Westminster is both the 'English Parliament', as it were, and the UK Parliament. Since before the inauguration of the devolution settlements, questions were increasingly asked about the unfairness of the Barnett formula for the allocation of resources (Northern Ireland also thinks it is unfairly treated compared with Scotland).

Journalists suggested that the referendums should be all-British affairs since the upshot affected England – rather in contrast to what people thought proper in the Baltic States and the break-up of the USSR.

The Conservative MP for Billericay, Theresa Gormley, has called for a proper English Parliament – though whether this would be as attractive to a region far away from London as a regional assembly is not clear. Her party leader, William Hague's idea is to reform Westminster so that 'only English MPs should be able to take part in the decisive stages of legislation on questions that affect only England'.

In June this year, Labour MP, Frank Field, introduced a bill which would have barred MPs for Scottish and Northern Irish constituencies from speaking or voting on anything other than reserved matters. It would also have prevented such MPs from becoming ministers, except for reserved portfolios. It was defeated but, at 190:131, there was quite a degree of support for it.

Such demands for symmetry were anticipated by writers about devolution a couple of years ago. Most of them pointed out that symmetry had seemingly not been regarded as important in the past - when the more numerous MPs for English constituencies were, as a matter of course, able to legislate for the now devolved parts of the UK, even when the English majority was a different 'colour' to majorities elsewhere. Such writers have suggested that it is an insensitive handling – seemingly forgetful or arrogant – of these kind of issues, rather than the still minority demand for independence, that would be the real risk to the future of the UK.

A more measured start has been made to the institutional design of the centre. This is the Wakeham, Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords. The Commission proposed a Chamber of some 550 members, of which a portion (65, 87, 195) would be elected on a regional basis. The Labour Party accepts some version of this with a larger elected element, while the Liberal Democrats propose replacing the Lords with a fully elected Senate.

Co-ordinating Devolution in the UK

This is regulated by:

• a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK government and each of the devolved governments;
• four broad Concordats on the handling of EU matters, financial assistance to industry, international relations, and statistical work across the UK;
• various bilateral Concordats and agreements between UK departments and their counterparts.
  

The first plenary meeting of the JMC (following 6 sectoral meetings) was held on 1 September this year, largely at the behest of the devolved executives. It initiated the review, to which I referred previously, of the workings of devolution and recommendations are to be ready for the end of 2000. In commenting on their attendance at it, David Trimble and Mark Durkan said that the JMC has the potential to become an important forum for influencing government decision-making and policy planning for the devolved regions.

The MoU, upon which the JMC is founded, restates the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, even on devolved matters and its supremacy in EU and international affairs. Supremacy extends to the referral of disputes to he Privy Council, which is described as a UK, or central, right, rather than being a route for the devolved units to initiate. To enable UK law officers to know whether they ought to refer a matter, legislative proposals in the devolved Assemblies or Parliament must be seen by the centre in advance. These features may vindicate Tom Nairn's view that, whatever the signatories to the Claim of Right for Scotland believed about the restitution of an alleged popular sovereignty in Scotland, this has not happened. Sovereignty in the hands of Tony Blair is, according to Nairn, as it was in the hands of James 6th or 1st – sovereignty as the Crown-in-Parliament.

However, the MoU gives some undertakings; a willingness by the centre to exercise restraint and it makes numerous claims that it is not a legally binding contract. It claims only to provide a vehicle for mutual alertness to the each other's interests and for exploring the scope for joint action. The MoU promises to involve the devolved units as fully as possible in discussions of the UK's policy position on all EU matters (in the 'functional' JMC, chaired by the Foreign Secretary, or through correspondence).

The Concordats on the EU for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland specify that participation by the component parts is conditional upon the maintenance of confidentiality; it is for this reason that, not withstanding the immense scrutiny that the Scottish Parliament does of EU documents, it is still in the dark as to whether or not Scottish interests have been advanced in the Council of Ministers under what the MoU calls the UK position. The Concordats require the component units, following consultation, to adhere to the resultant 'UK line' which 'will reflect the interests of the UK as a whole'. The Concordat for Northern Ireland also applies to its participation in the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC), though arrangements are to be made to ensure that the NSMC's views are taken into account.

Another general issue, emphasizing the limits of devolution is that decisions about attendance at Council of Ministers are to be taken by the lead UK ministers on a case by case basis. Equally, on the issue of more general international relations, the lead is with the UK; the devolved units are to tell the centre about any contacts and discussion with foreign national or sub-national governments or counterparts in international organizations and to make arrangements through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). All these are inhibiting to any forces in the component parts which might have thought that devolution was a doorway to a more autonomous presence on the world stage. On the other hand, the MoU states that it is not its purpose to constrain discretion. It and the Concordats make exceptions in matters agreed upon in the Belfast Agreement – in particular the bi-lateral and multi-lateral action allowed for in the NSMC and the British Irish Council (BIC).

The British Irish Council (BIC)

In principle, the most important structure for Great Britain in the Belfast Agreement is the BIC. It contains the germs of two inconsistent consequences. One of these is that, as an expression of the 'human truth' (I borrow the words from Esmond Birnie) of the mosaic of relationships amongst the peoples of the islands, it might inaugurate a truly British-Irish relationship instead of an Anglo-Irish one. Indeed, on St Andrew's Day 1999, Berti Ahern told the people of Scotland that he welcomed it as a kind of loose confederation. As an expression of the complexity and overlapping of all our identities, the more popular name, Council of the Isles, would be more appropriate.

The other possibility is that the BIC could encourage the break-up of the UK through the secession of Scotland. Leaders in the Scottish polity increasingly look to the Republic as a model of an autonomous small state. The enthusiasm for the establishment of the Irish Consulate-General in Edinburgh and its fostering of business, academic and cultural exchanges is palpable. Equally, the Taoiseach's welcoming in 1999 of the scope of the BIC for bi-lateral relations and his 'keenness to exploit the potential of the new political dimension; fell on many willing ears.

My own view is that the BIC is less likely to be a force for the disintegration of the UK than of one for the coming together of the islands; through the cross fertilization of ideas about, for example, how to handle religious discrimination, human rights, etc. However, the inauspicious start of the BIC suggests that it may be neither the cause of disintegration or co-ordination.

First, it almost immediately deferred its potential to develop, like the NSMC, a cross-border role in EU matters. It has met only once in summit format, when a distribution of responsibilities for other policy areas was agreed (and this overlaps with what the British Irish Intergovernmental Conference has agreed to take on; i.e., drugs). Its second meeting was meant to have taken place in Dublin in October but was deferred as a mark of respect for the death of Donald Dewar (and will occur shortly).

A sectoral meeting was held on 2 October but, so little importance did this seem to have for Seamus Mallon, that when reporting on the second plenary of the NSMC, he could say only that he 'believed' that such a meeting was taking place. David Trimble and Mark Durkan, in their Statement on the first plenary of the JMC, were able to say no more than it was picking up momentum. The most important issue of Sellafield – a severe blot in an unprecedentedly good British-Irish intergovernmental relationship and which also involves the Nordic countries – is not yet seen as a proper BIC concern.

Conclusion: the Challenges and Opportunities

The Sellafield problem takes us to the heart of changes in governance everywhere for which the new institution, the BIC, could be a spearhead. Sellafield represents a failure, not only of British diplomacy, but also reflects a failure to realize, despite EU initiative, that traditional conceptions of the state being a key actor in environmental management are giving way to an acknowledgement that borders and sovereignty are not what they once were (Susan Baker). This is most obvious in the environmental field but is also more general. We can see this in the fact that, though the EU is a reserved matter and, since it is the UK that is the signatory to it, is international, most of its impact is on domestic policy, much of which falls to the devolved authorities.

In the classical conception of the state, territory was fundamental; in John Loughlin's words 'absolute sovereignty was exercised by national governments over clearly defined, solid borders protected by physical barriers, police, customs and armies. The new model of governance is based on networks; there are neither the hard territory nor impermeable borders. The new state is not de-territorialized but territory is conceived of as but one of the arenas in which networks operate. Borders are not lines of demarcation but meeting points between policy actors and citizens with different historical experiences of politics, administration, culture and society'. Indeed, Scottish traditions and current everyday policy concerns involve connections with Scandinavia as well as its links with Ireland.

John Loughlin is not saying one model has taken over from the other but that the two coexist. This is a challenge everywhere but especially in border regions – whether that border is one of land or sea. Border regions can, in his words, serve as laboratories for new democratic practice from which more central regions and states might learn.

Esmond Birnie's vision of the BIC puts it in a good position to lead the way in network governance within the islands while, by contrast the JMC, while entirely rational in the traditional conception of states, has the capacity to reinforce differentiation and segmentation between Ireland and the UK. At the moment, it looks as though the JMC and not the BIC is the motor of co-ordination. But it is already clear from the Scottish experience that the strictures of the MoU upon which it rests are not easily capable of being maintained. That is, the old distinction between domestic and foreign policy is already blurred in Parliamentary business in Edinburgh – with respect to the domestic impact of EU legislation and interests which imply co-ordination with Scandinavia. If it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain exclusive distinctions between devolved and reserved powers and exclusively central power over reserved matters, the BIC may yet have its day.

ends

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