Enquiries to RJ at rjtechne@iol.ie; Anthony Coughlan is contactable at his home address at 24 Crawford Avenue, Dublin 9, phone 00-353-1-8305792.

Volume 19

CDG arrives in Dublin on January 17 1968, encounters Cathal MacLiam who is in the process of moving house to Belgrave Road Rathmines, no 24, two doors east from the present writer. He meets Anthony Coughlan (AC) for lunch; Justin Keating has joined the Labour Party. He contacts Kader Asmal (KA). He meets Donal Foley and Cathal O'Shannon in the Pearl Bar. Finally AC brought him out to KA's house and they spent the evening. The next day he contacts Mrs Czira in the hopes of getting Mellows material but without success; she does not want to meet him, and anyway knows nothing about Mellows. After a few more Mellows contacts, more successful ones, he returns to Liverpool on January 22. He had a brief encounter with the present writer in which he suggests that Geoffrey Byng QC would be a good alternative to Austin Curry for Mid-Ulster.

Then there is a period in London working on the paper, followed by trips to Liverpool and Southampton; there is a mention of a contact with the present writer on February 10 1968; it seems I was trying to track down some Clann na hEireann contacts; I was in London for a weekend break. He then goes in for some gossip in an attempt to explain what he regards as my odd behaviour. It seems that '...after spending two years touring the country he decided to devote himself to theoretical work on a grand scale..'.

I recollect this weekend; the contacting of the Clann was peripheral; there was I believe something on, but if I had been there it would have been informally as an observer. I would have phoned CDG in the hopes of an encounter with him, to tease out the theoretical implications of the way things were evolving. But he was, I think, putting up the barriers; he had written me off as some sort of apostate.

In retrospect what must have been on my mind was the nature of the distinction between 'labour movement' and 'petty-bourgeois' modes of organisation, and whether the distinction was as black and white as he seemed to want to make out. Scratch a Dublin 'proletarian' and you find a 'petty-bourgeois' not very far below the surface. The Irish Workers' League in the early days had used Party funds to buy equipment for one of its EC members, to set him up in business, as an alternative to chronic unemployment. Most bricklayers were 'on the lump'. I was critical of Marxist orthodoxy, and anxious to explore how 'workers, working managers, working owner-managers and self-employed' could be brought into the developing movement for all-Ireland national democracy, and brought around to accept something approximating to a co-operative or democratic socialist vision as the follow-through.

There is a passing reference on February 21 1968 to an encounter with Maire Comerford in Joe Deighan's place: '...she said she did not think the Wolfe Tone Society would come to anything. They were "too innocent".... nobody in Dublin looked to the old people like herself now. Either they didn't bother at all, or they listened politely and took no notice..'.

There follows a period mostly in London, with trips to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen; in the latter place there is an entry devoted to an encounter with Brian and Olivia Farrington and Owen Dudley Edwards on February 27; then Liverpool, back to London March 21 for the paper followed by a break in Salop; then an entry on March 31 1968 where CDG comments on a Celtic Youth Congress in Bangor. It seems that the Irish contributor was good, but remarked with some surprise that some of the participants were monarchists, and that the 'Free Wales Army' had been there the previous day, in jackboots, but were dismissed by the company as 'cowboys'.

Back in Liverpool on April 3 CDG encounters Sean Redmond's letter of resignation, which prompts some comments illustrating the chronic problems of emigrant organisations. London, Birmingham, Liverpool; the usual round; then on April 10:

'...Telefis Eireann rang up about a Connolly programme. "It won't be what you'd like" said the producer Eoin something-or-other (could this have been Harris?) "it will be what the Irish Government likes." He asked me to go to Dublin for a day and appear on the programme, but I told him I am too busy to oblige. He wouldn't have Sean (Redmond). He said he knew AC..'.

I find it difficult to understand why he did not take this up, despite the producer's warning. He would have had the standing as the author of the definitive 'Life and Times'. He would however have had to interact publicly with people with whom he had little patience. He was I suppose primarily a 'back-room' person, though he regularly faced the public, at meetings of his own choosing, and often had to deal with public abuse. The injection of some Marxist scholarship into the RTE presentation on Connolly would have been, to my mind, positive.

From April 17 1968 there is a sequence of entries where CDG is trying to get a Republican spokesman for his Trafalgar Square meeting in commemoration of Connolly. Peadar O'Donnell is not fit to travel. Between Mairin Johnston and Cathal MacLiam more options are tried, including George Gilmore. In the end he gets options on Cathal Goulding, Seamus Costello, Tomas Mac Giolla and Ronnie Lindsay, the latter being active in the TCD Republican Club. CDG selects the latter.

It is interesting that CDG prefers to give a platform to the 'new blood' rather than to the old leadership in transition. This suggests he is increasingly sceptical about the integrity of the transition.

On April 30 there is a detailed entry relating to the question of whether there is Irish support in the East End for the Powellite anti-immigration campaign. CDG comes up against the theoretical weakness of the British left in understanding imperialism. This section deserves detailed analysis, which however is outside the current scope. Then the next day May 1 he has to deal with what amounts to an internal leadership crisis in the Connolly Association, a fall-out from the Sean Redmond resignation process.

Later on May 4 there are references to jobs in Dublin for Sean Redmond, and the role of MO'R as a source of advice. In this entry also is an indication that the 'old Dublin crowd' are planning on the assumption of the demise of the Connolly Association, and on initiating fund-raising in London among the emigrant Irish for the Irish Workers' Party. He gets this from Betty Sinclair, who had been drinking with Prendergast, a Russian emissary and others, at the expense of Telefis Eireann, presumably in the context of the Connolly programme in which CDG had declined to participate. Betty had written to CDG not knowing that he was supposed to have been kept in ignorance; he had however: '...a shrewd suspicion that holidays in Eastern Europe feature in the scheme..'.

On May 12 1968 there is a revealing passage which indicates that Micheal O'Riordan had been lobbying various East European embassies seeking to get goods for his fund-raising sales of work, with the support of Jim Prendergast, whom CDG labels '..something of an embassy-fly..'. CDG notes with disapproval that '...they still have the conception of a subsidised movement, with a low-priced paper and literature...'.

Prendergast and O'Riordan were of course both International Brigade veterans, and as such they had status of sanctity with the 'international movement' of post-Stalinist orthodoxy. It could credibly be argued that a military background is incompatible with good Marxist democratic politics in peacetime, and Greaves, and indeed the present writer, were up against this on the one hand with Prendergast and co, and on the other with Goulding and co. Prendergast, it seems according to Betty Sinclair, had been influential in getting an 'English-type' public house set up in Moscow, which he frequented when there.

There is on May 14 a reference by Greaves to a meeting in Nottingham, with its Fergus O'Connor connection, at which the question of a Joint Council between the IWP and the CPNI was discussed. Greaves attended in his capacity as the Irish expert on their international affairs committee. John Gollan, the CPGB chief, very sensibly did not want the CPGB represented. The question arose of CDG or J(oe) D(eighan) going in their individual capacities, as neutral observers.

There are complex issues here, arising from the delicacy of the relationship between the CPGB and the movement in Ireland. The CPGB would undoubtedly have wanted discreetly to catalyse the process of formation of an all-Ireland 'official' Marxist party as part of the 'international movement'. Greaves with his Connolly Association and Irish Democrat roles would have wanted to maximise support for Civil Rights in the North from the organised labour movement. The CPNI - IWP joint meeting could perhaps be helpful in this context. This was of course a distinct process from the present writer's aspiration to develop the republican movement into an all-Ireland democratic Marxist party having broad-based support from 'workers, working management, working owner-managers and self-employed'.

In Liverpool on May 26 1968 AC arrives for a Connolly commemoration event, in which Eric Heffer and Gerry Fitt are also involved. AC passes on the Dublin news: Kader Asmal had been asked to deliver a lecture to the ITUC but he declined and suggested Owen Dudley Edwards, much to AC's dissatisfaction. Edwards had however praised CDG's book on Connolly, and this had brought forth a press attack on CDG from Cathal O'Shannon. They go on then to a similar meeting in Manchester. CDG records conversations en route indicating some analysis of how Wilson saw the NI situation, and the role of O'Neill.

The foregoing passage needs further elaboration; it is rich in Westminster insights, and the Connolly Association role.

Then on June 9 1968 CDG gives an account of the Connolly commemoration meeting in Dublin, which took place in Moran's Hotel. It was due to start at 10.45 a.m. and to CDG's surprise the meeting was already crammed; 150 people at least. He notes some names: '...Peter O'Connor (from Waterford, another ex International Brigade man), Maire Comerford, RHJ ie the present writer, AC, Mrs Tom Johnson who is 93, Ina Connolly, Desmond Branningan, Donal Nevin, Barry Desmond, Seamus Costello, C(athal G(oulding), Seamus O'Toole, Vincent MacDowell, John Swift, Micheal O'Riordan, Sean Nolan, P(acky) E(arly), indeed the whole of the progressive movement of Dublin... Carmody took the chair - needless to say the IWP were cock-a-hoop. And they were well received what was more..'.

This was indeed one of the high points of the left-republican convergence. In the aftermath he had a meal with Maire Comerford, Sheila Humphries and Aileen McGrane. He clearly preferred the company of the old-timers who were his historical sources. Later he ended up in Belgrave Road; Cathal's place was still in a mess after his move in, and the group ended up in no 22, the present writer's place. There is a record of an encounter between CDG, CMacL, AC and the present writer, at which the membership status of people in the republican movement and the Irish Workers' Party was discussed. The question of the secretaryship of the Wolfe Tone Society came up; it seems I declared myself to be going for it, on the understanding that the republican education programme would be otherwise taken care of (perhaps with the WTS contributing to aspects. CDG however recorded, quite mistakenly, that I had asserted that AC was in the same position as myself as regards membership of the republican movement. The ensuing conversation, as recorded by CDG, indicates that he quite wrongly regarded both AC and myself as both being also actual members of the IWP, and this therefore suggested that we both had dual memberships.) He went on: '...we would get the republicans into a mess and then we'd get the blame..'.

Cathal was an active IWP member at the time, and was happily able to combine this with the Chair of the Wolfe Tone Society. AC however was never a member of the IWL or its successor the IWP, though he would have called himself a sympathiser, nor was he ever a member of the republican movement. I had ceased to be a member of the IWL/IWP since at the latest June 1964; more likely I had simply not re-registered on return from Britain in 1963, though I had remained on good terms with them. Both AC and I had been acting on our own initiatives, in our disparate ways of attempting to influence the republican movement in the direction of democratic politics, myself as a member, AC from outside, though informal contacts with myself, Cathal Goulding and others.

He goes on: '...Cathal, who is Chairman of the Society, heard of impending changes on his committee for the first time... (and then, to the present writer) your main defect is over-rapid passage from thought to action... Don't do it again. Don't take anybody else..'.

It is evident from the above that CDG was thinking in terms of the IWP as a disciplined Party organised on Leninist principles, and it came as a shock to him to find that AC and the present writer were maintaining their distance from this Irish embodiment of the Comintern aftermath, in the interests of the broader vision. It also came perhaps as a shock to Cathal the extent to which the Wolfe Tone Society was perceived as being the 'property' of the republican movement. Much of the web of contradictions which drove the then situation is embodied in this conversation.

Later on June 10 1968 CDG meets with Sean Nolan, told him about RJ and AC, and SN was as angry as he was: '..it's like having the IRB over again..'. I was said to have '..no more understanding of Marxism than a cat...'. He then went back to Liverpool.

CDG had not grasped the extent to which the IWP vision and mode of operation, rooted as it was in the by then totally corrupted and Moscow-dominated 'international movement', was a political cul-de-sac in the Irish context. They were like a religious cult, with Moscow instead of Rome. AC and I had, in our separate ways, understood this, and envisaged a much broader-based movement, with civil rights in the North the primary focus in AC's case, while in my case I tried to develop the Marxist core-idea of getting democratic control over the capital re-investment process. In my 'feline Marxism' I had the vision of building a national unity movement around the combined interests of working people, including small business and self-employed in the definition. The idea of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in the Irish context was a non-starter, whatever dubious value it may have had in more industrialised countries, and that indeed also was open to question. The ultra-left of course regarded this as heresy, and openly attacked us, as indeed they did with CDG when he tried to promote the Connolly Association as a broad-based national movement. AC and I were trying to do in Ireland something somewhat similar to what CDG was trying to do in Britain. I don't think he ever understood this.

CDG then returns to London, does various things including the paper, and returns to Liverpool where he gives some reflective thought to questions of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. Volume 19 of the Journal ends on June 30 1968.

Volume 20

There is a reference on July 6 to a conversation with Micheal O'Riordan (MO'R) regarding my alleged attempt to 'induct' Anthony Coughlan (AC) into the 'republican outfit'. I was guilty of '..failure to appreciate the role of the working class..' and of preferring the 'respectability' of the republican movement to the 'disreputability' of the communist element. Later in the day CDG records an encounter with me, in which I told him that AC had decided not to follow me after all; I went on unrepentantly however that I had 'never been integrated with the IWP'. He went on to note, of the present writer, that '..he draws our Marxist ideas without acknowledgement, and retails them to the republicans opportunistically tailored to suit their prejudices..'. In this context I can 'become the fountain-head... like Bulmer Hobson must have been like 50 years ago.. individualist... political impresario... we parted without a vestige of agreement..'.

CDG then went out to AC's place. AC '..understood that (CDG) had expressed concern at his proposal to take up the same position as RHJ. But he had seen the Constitution and did not agree with it. So he was not joining them. I don't know who told him I had tackled Roy. I did note however a few of those confused American New Left magazines about the place, and was relieved that he was so far so good. He claimed that his appearance on Sinn Fein platforms was in his capacity as secretary of the Wolfe Tone Society..'.

Thus we see that Anthony Coughlan rejected the constitution and did not join. I was prepared to accept the constitution, warts and all, on the assurance of the leadership that they wished to change it, and needed help in doing so. With hindsight, I am inclined to be unrepentant, and to come down on the side of the philosophy of broad-based Marx-inspired political entrepreneurship.

CDG goes back to Liverpool on July 12, and on July 13 1968 he records an encounter with Tom Redmond, who at the time was close to Brian Farrington. TR was telling CDG about Fanon, whose book Constance Farrington, Brian's ex-wife, had translated: '..and this is where RHJ got his nonsense from... BF is RHJ's closest friend..'.

Then in London on July 25 CDG records evidence of what he sees as a '..political change in S(ean) R(edmond). He said he thought the USSR was "playing a dirty game" in Nigeria, and that it was impossible under any circumstances whatever to intervene in Czechoslovakia, even it it were to join the Nazis. Now if I can help it he will not break on this...'.

The Czechoslovak situation then becomes acute on August 21 when the USSR invades; Des Logan phones CDG early to get a reaction. Pat Devine submits his Irish Democrat copy, in support of the Russians. CDG has to edit it down. Questions come in; what did the CA think? CDG took the line, we don't know, we have not yet discussed it. Des Logan was indignant, '..this will split the Party..'.

In the August 29 entry we have an account of the CPGB meeting at which the Czechoslovak crisis is discussed. It is beyond our scope to analyse this. It seems that he prefers the Irish to the narrow parochialism of the English. He remarks that apart from Des Logan all the Irish tend to be pro-Russian. The overall impression is that CDG takes up a position of defence of Soviet intervention.

Then on September 5 1968 in London it seems I phoned and then looked in. While I was there MO'R phoned, congratulating CDG on his stand on the issue; there had however been complications in Dublin, and a statement critical of Russia had gone out, despite MO'R, who now wants to get CDG to '..knock sense into people's heads..'.

A leading group of IWP activists, including George Jeffares, Sam Nolan, Joe Deasy, Paddy Carmody and a few others, later broke with the IWP on this issue, mostly ending up in the Labour Party. The attention of the IWP leadership was concentrated on this issue for many months, extending to years, while the Northern situation developed its positive potential. My evaluation of their minimal utility in the developing Irish situation, as outlined above, was on the whole confirmed.

In the same entry CDG goes on to record a long conversation with the present writer, whom he regarded as being '..largely at sea... wondering if he had been wasting his time with SF... he had opposed the burning of the ship at Galway... he was not.. persuaded that the Russians might have a case in Czechoslovakia.. AC had drawn the conclusion that the Russians must be mad... Cathal thought that they could do no wrong... others filled into other parts of the spectrum...'. Joe Deighan turned up, he also was seen as '..very confused..'. Returning to the Irish situation, when I claimed not to be a physical force man, his response was, 'then why masquerade?' He went on: '...he told me the republican clubs were about to launch a grand civil disobedience campaign in the North. Now that in itself would not worry one. But I asked him if they had consulted the Trade Unions or the Labour Movement. Of course they had not. So they learn nothing and forget nothing, and are liable to go off on any tangent..'.

There is an entry on September 11 which fills in some detail on the IWP meeting which decided about Czechoslovakia, O'Riordan being voted down 18 to 13, Nolan being away. There is also a second-hand description of the present writer's behaviour on the day of the invasion, indicating the extent of my upset.

CDG goes to Dublin on October 9 1968, straight to Cathal, then to lunch with AC, where he discovered that AC had been drenched by water-cannon in Derry at the October 5th civil rights demonstration, which brought the situation there to world attention. He asked AC '..if they stood for socialism why didn't they join the working-class movement? AC: The unions and Labour party would never do anything. CDG: So you have a short cut? They said they had. It is to be hoped it proves shorter than their cut to the United Irish Republic...'. Cathal Goulding it seems had been on the way to Derry but his car broke down. CDG: '..I said I thought they should all keep away. But you might as well talk to the table. CG then yanked AC off to an editorial meeting of the United Irishman(!).

He goes on: '...I was at Cathal's and AC and O'Toole came in. Then RHJ came in looking very jaded. I gave him a further talking-to - but he is entrapped in a web of his own weaving. At midday I had seen O'Riordan who told me he had trouble with Nolan over Czechoslovakia. This was indirectly confessed when Nolan came in. Smilingly he said "I hope you're not here to make trouble." I said I doubted if I could add much to what was here already.

The disastrous nature of the USSR's action was indeed showing up across the board. What chance was there of getting any sensible approach to developing a broad-based politicised left-republican convergence in this situation? At least the republicans were not allowing themselves to be diverted by it, but the Left, such as it was, was effectively neutered.

The next day October 10 CDG went to Belfast, failed to find Betty Sinclair, and went on to Derry, where he met with Ivan Cooper, picking up the impression that they were all under the influence of McCann and the Trotskyite element, though Cooper told him of the new committee from which McCann had walked out. He had no contact addresses in Derry and was depending on contacts made via the Derry Journal.

CDG must by now have been regretting his inability to influence the follow through from the May 6 1965 event, which had been the seed-bed for the alternative approach to Civil Rights, rooted in the Labour Movement. He must have been regretting his having been relatively immobilised by his sister's illness at this crucial time. Most of his Irish contacting had been in the context of historical research; those with the hands-on experience, such as AC and myself, he must have seen as taking initiatives which in some cases he would have regarded as ill-advised.

He returns to Dublin, and stays until October 14, when he returns to London. Later on October 19 1968 he encounters Betty Sinclair, who regales him with the '..sharp internal differences within the Civil Rights Committee.. the anti-communism of (Fred) Heatley. What is bad is the refusal of the CP to participate effectively. At the Political Committee when she raised the question the Chairman Andy Barr looked at his watch. She says that both he and Graham wanted TU jobs, and Barr particularly will fight strenuously any line of policy that would lose him ground in the trade union. This Party policy is made subordinate to the Sheet Metal Union - the old old story, the unholy alliance I have been battering my head against for twenty and more years... Of McCann she says if he was on the platform she would walk off... she has high praise for McAteer who... stood by her side through the meeting. We discussed the republicans who she says are very difficult to work with. They invited her to one of their committee meetings, secret no doubt, but she did not go. I said I thought she was right..'.

A proposal had arisen, initiated by Heatley, to the effect that those who had participated in the 'illegal march' at Derry should sign a paper saying they had done so. Betty agreed initially to this at the meeting, then went home and had second thoughts, conveying these to McAnerny the secretary, who also began to have doubts. Together they went to a third, who felt the same. Heatley was indignant. Some compromise formula was agreed.

Betty, whose heart was in the right place, was thus being left out on a limb by the Party. Her wavering on the signing issue must have been influenced by her relative exposure. The inability of the Labour Movement to take up the issues in the manner that CDG had hoped for must have been increasingly obvious.

In London on November 9 1968 CDG records receiving a letter from the present writer indicating that I am '..mending some of my ways..'. He also receives one from MO'R to the effect that I had been to see him. He thinks it may be to renew my membership. He also records that C(harlie) C(unningham) has noticed '...an improvement in morale; since 1962 we have not had a victory; now at last..'.

I recollect this episode. I was indeed uneasy about the way the republican movement was going, and had made an informal approach to O'Riordan to seek his views. But no way could I at that stage have re-joined. I felt that the politicisation process among the republicans had been started, had momentum, and needed to be completed as far as possible. I had no inkling of the impending Provisional threat. Mac Stiofain was playing his cards close. Although critical of Greaves, especially his hard-line Czech attitude, in line with that of O'Riordan, I felt I needed to keep up the contact. There were signs of internal reform within the 'international movement'; I had not totally written it off. Maybe if the politicised left-republican project succeeded, there would be a place for it in a reconstructed international movement, without the heavy centralist hand of Moscow, then dominated by the so-called 'Brezhnev doctrine' which justified intervention.

The Connolly Association conference took place on November 23-24 1968 in the MCF Hall. CDG has little to say about the conference itself, except to mention the presence of '..quite a few young people..'. There was an observer from Clann na hEireann, and representatives from the Campaign for Democracy n Ulster (CDU). '..There was a general feeling that the Unionist "reforms" meant nothing but window dressing, but we deferred our campaign for a Bill of Rights until a campaign of pressure had been undertaken to press for their enlargement.. next Sunday efforts will be made at Belfast to "soft-pedal" the campaign, McAteer leading the way. This may well happen, and I can imagine that people like Andy Barr, who has been getting Paisley resolutions in their unions, might also prefer things to go that way. It will be very interesting to see the outcome..'.

On November 27 CDG went to a meeting in Coventry at which he encountered '..John Hewitt the poet.. an orange-socialist who disguises his unionism as trotskyism. He spoke of the olden days. He knew Captain White well. He concluded that the Casement diaries must be forged because Captain White, who knew Casement and couldn't stand him, never once used them to discredit him in conversation..'. Later in discussions it emerged predictably that people were unhappy about the Czech scene.

We may have on December 10 the beginnings of doubts about the integrity of the USSR-dominated 'international movement'; he records a conversation in CPGB circles about a 'spontaneous' meeting in Moscow in support of some proposal, with the result appearing in print within a few hours: obviously a 'put-up job'. He goes on to note the opinion of a Hungarian, to the effect that differences between 'socialist' countries arose from competition for the West German market. The Czechs with their reforms would have been well positioned to improve their market share. CDG concludes '..I did not feel that this was an adequate explanation for the gigantic sledgehammer taken to this nut..'.

In Dublin on December 13 1968 CDG records seeing SN and lunching with AC, without comment. The next day he shows up at the IWP Christmas bazaar, where he encounters, trivially, the dreaded G..., mentioned earlier. He discusses the Czech situation with Carmody: '..there is nothing for us in an anti-Soviet campaign..'. Carmody agreed. CDG also encountered the remains of the IWL group who had been so destructive of the CA a decade previously. Carmody wanted to talk with them, expressing sympathy with Pat O'Neill who had been 'crucified' while in the Electrical Trades Union. CDG: '..the "crucifixion" consisted of touring England in a motor-car posting bogus election papers for Haxell. It would be impossible to have the slightest sympathy for anybody involved in that discreditable operation..'.

The evidence of the deep-rooted corruption of the USSR-dominated 'international movement', extending right down to the membership and practice of its component member-parties, as observed at first hand by CDG, was visibly accumulating. Thus Carmody was prepared to defend O'Neill even in 1968.

There is an interesting record of a meeting on December 16: '..some kind of Wolfe Tone Society caucus.. which had not been properly convened... this was the plot, revealed by O Loinsigh after complaints that the IRA took every major policy decision themselves without consulting the Wolfe Tone. Mac Eoin added that he did not think anything of Sinn Fein either. The decision in question related to Mid-Ulster..'. It emerges that Mitchell resigning to take his seat, and Conor Cruise O'Brien, are considered as options preferable to Austin Currie. CDG disapproves of both.

In the end we were usurped by Bernadette Devlin, who fuelled the anarchist fringe. The incubus was of course abstentionism. We were still stuck with this, though we were working on it via the 'Garland Commission'. The frustration was palpable.

1969

There are however no further echoes in the journal of the rest of the PD's disastrous march on Derry, leading to the Burntollet episode. There is however a reference on January 14 to an encounter with MO'R who has been over for a CPGB meeting at which the Czech situation was discussed; they were going for R Palme Dutt and questioning the ownership of the Labour Monthly. There is also a reference to a meeting in Liverpool where there was a '..sprinkling of Trotskies and Potskies and Maos and Bow-wows, all calling for militant action to be taken by other people..'.

CDG spends most of the next few days on the book, interrupted by the paper; then on February 13, he receives a letter from the present writer wanting him to '...address a school for the republicans. They are on to prepare the way for taking seats in the Dail. He said MOR was in favour of my going. But I told him that I thought it unwise to nibble in that particular garden, and anyway I was not free at the proposed time..'.

This would have been one of the series of educational conferences which were organised in the context of the Garland Commission. It might even have been the famous 'Sheelin Shamrock' occasion. Regrettably I don't have a record of these in detail, though references crop up peripherally in various sources.

In Belfast on February 26 1969 he tried to contact Betty Sinclair and Hughie Moore; both were out. In the end he tracked down McAnerny who filled CDG in on how the students movement was being taken over by 'manipulators' who are no longer students themselves. '...A carefully packed meeting, poorly attended by the ordinary members, was called, and the candidates went up... The "manipulators" will not allow properly constituted committees of officers. The world and his wife can come in... these "scuts" as McAnerny calls them are trying to oust Betty Sinclair from the chairmanship of the NICRA. The Derry pair, Hume and Cooper, disaffiliated from the NICRA so as to be able to pursue their political ambitions..'. He then goes into the origins of Hume and his role in ousting McAteer. CDG goes on: '..McAnerny is not a republican. He is not even anti-partitionist. He wants to remain with the UK and continue to receive British subsidies. But he is a level-headed rational small businessman, very solid, sociable and broad-minded. He has no objection to the students preaching "Trotskyist communism" but objects to its being done under his banner...'. Later he saw Hughie Moore who predicted Betty was in for a tough time. He then went to Dublin on the Enterprise, and was met by AC, in whose house he stayed.

Abolition of Stormont?

After some historical contacting on March 4 CDG arrives back at Cathal's to find '...C(athal) G(oulding), S(eamus) C(ostello) and another republican drinking with Tony... there was a great argument. I find them personally very modest but politically very arrogant. I was trying to head them off this move that is being planned for creating a breakdown of law and order that will compel England to abolish Stormont. "But that would be no harm" says CG "it would show it is Britain's responsibility". I had great difficulty in persuading him that this was now admitted (and) we must move on to the next stage - working out a policy. I don't know whether much was agreed, but they will think over what has been said, and, what I forgot to say at the start, they had come up so as to find out my views on matters in general..'.

It is interesting to compare Greaves's view of the Republicans with that of my father in 1923, as expressed in his Manchester Guardian articles.

Then on March 6 CDG records AC's opinion that CG is no longer Chief, and that younger men in their thirties, SC and Mick Ryan '...are prepared to depart even further from traditional practices..'. Later he sees Asmal and Ron Lindsay; the latter had been writing for the United Irishman, opposing the 'breakdown of law and order to invoke British intervention' theory, and AC had been composing draft editorials to this effect, but O Tuathail had cut it. '...This is just what annoys me about the position where AC and RHJ work for the UI instead of the Irish Socialist, providing the republicans with a socialist screen which they discard when it suits them... one never gets thanks for helping people like this..'.

In New Books later on March 8 CDG picks up from Sean Nolan that '...the development in Belfast is about as bad as could be.. Betty Sinclair had gone up for the chairmanship of NICRA and received only two votes. One of the PD people got it (Frank Gogarty) and the vice-chairman is Vincent McDowell, who doesn't even live in the six counties, but in Dublin! The republicans voted against Betty. I was talking to MOR about this....' It seems that MOR had been on to CG and had been reassured that the republicans would support Betty; in fact it had the status of an "order", but they disobeyed...'.

This was the crunch issue; Betty would have helped keep the NICRA on a constitutional path avoiding adventurism; the new leadership represented a move towards the adventurist 'abolition of Stormont via breakdown of law and order' policy. The republican vote was crucial, and perhaps indicated that the Republican Clubs were increasingly in some confusion, some members perhaps following the policies being promoted by Mac Stiofain, with armed insurrection in mind; influence from the CP was minimal. The chain of command emanating from the Dublin politicisers no longer worked.

Back in London on March 19 1969 CDG has a phone-call from Noel Harris, over on union business; he gives him the Dublin news, which includes the discovery of a Special Branch notebook, received with much hilarity; everyone who was anyone was in it, including CDG; the UI is to publish extracts. He adds however that the Belfast situation is due to the failure of Andy Barr and the others in the Party to back up Betty Sinclair, with which CDG agrees.

On March 23 the CA conference takes place; it seems I attended it, in the company of Pat O Suilleabhain from the Clann. I was on record as giving out that I was coming as the latter's guest, but according to CDG he picked up from other sources that I had sought out POS and brought him along. There was a 'dissident UIA' presence. Afterwards Joe Deighan who had been to Belfast filled in CDG about the NICRA scene: Gogarty on amphetamines, and various 'Peoples Democracy' lunacies. Also '...this woman the republicans are trying to push instead of Currie is somewhat unstable to put it mildly...'. This is a reference to Bernadette Devlin.

CDG confines his comments to local and CA matters until May 8 1969 when he notes a meeting of the NICRA at the Irish Club, with the '...embassy-controlled United Ireland Association very much in evidence... the republicans are completely untrustworthy and cannot keep out of intrigue. Their connection with the Embassy is quite noticeable over a period...'.

This merits further investigation. I suspect this may have been an early indication of what later became a concerted Fianna Fail intrigue to take over the NICRA, rather than actually a republican initiative. I am surprised that CDG does not pick this up. A republican initiative involving the embassy in London is somewhat incredible.

He has the following comments on May 14: '...what is clear is that the petite-bourgeoisie, always plentiful in Irish circles in London, are moving in to make the Civil Rights issues their own. We decided we would make the Bill of Rights case. Miss Devlin is squatting with gypsies in Middlesex now. It seems likely to me that NICRA will end as a farce. The Trafalgar Square rally they had planned for June 22 (selecting the date Clann na hEireann are at Bodenstown, and the day we usually have the square) has got the Devlin woman, Hume and Cooper speaking. They are all left-wing opportunists. It will be a mad meeting. But after a time there may be no bandwagon to jump on. Eamonn McCann says that in order to win the Protestants the Civil Rights movement needs to "split horizontally". He thinks if they kick out the middle-class Catholics they will win the working-class Protestants. So all that may be left are the three Labour movement organisations, CA, CDU, MCF. What is useful is that there is a certain measure of agreement...'.

CDG visits Belfast on June 5 1969, and then goes on down to Dublin, where he stays with AC. In Belfast he meets Betty Sinclair, who had been near a nervous breakdown: '...she felt naturally displeased with Moore and Barr who showed no interest in her work, and then listened to Mrs McGlade's chatter passed through CG and MOR back to Belfast. She was surprised to have annoyed some of the republicans... she was also upset that MOR had not come to her first, and rightly so. She says she has kept a full diary of all the events in the past few months and it should be an interesting record. She criticises HM and Stewart. They cut out of one of her articles a derogatory reference to Chinese policy because it might offend the young people who are pro-Chinese. They are boosting Peoples Democracy in their paper because it has certain support..'.

Talking to O'Riordan on June 7 1969 CDG picks up the Dublin version of the Betty Sinclair story; it seems she got drunk at a CPNI party and insulted some republicans who blew in. The Party dismissed her from the executive, and banned her from the paper. MOR disagreed with this. CDG: '...time we all grew up..'. After some days, mostly in the national library, he encountered the present writer on June 14, it seems I told him of my 'impossible position'; I was in disagreement with burning down foreign landlords houses; I was however optimistic about changing electoral policy.

On June 18 1969, travelling to make contacts on the historical trail, CDG encounters one EC (Ned Connolly), who it seems is on the Limerick Comhairle Ceanntar of Sinn Fein, and is currently engaged in discussing '..RHJ's long document on revolution without the working class. Their whole conception is that of "taking over" the labour movement. No doubt it is with that in mind that CG and others consulted the CPNI on how to "work in the Trade Unions"..'. CDG goes on with what I suspect could be an admission of his own doubts: '..In these days when masses of people fear the irrevocability of communism, there are strange phenomena of attraction and recoil..'.

CDG's idea that somehow the vision which we projected excluded the working class is difficult to explain, unless he was going on indications from the republican political culture seen in practice, in which case he undoubtedly had a point. The 'Commission Report' embodied the vision, but the implementation of the vision would have had to pass through the filter of the republican political culture, which I had set out to change, but had grossly underestimated the size of the problem.

At Bodenstown on June 22 1969 CDG encounters all the leading elements of the 'republican-left convergence', but can't refrain from commenting: '..Tom Gill made the "oration". It was full of socialism, but nowhere did the workers emancipate themselves. This is the capitulation of RHJ - socialism through the petite-bourgeoisie, and of course it is not socialism, at all..'. Later he encounters Tom Redmond who is then in the process of setting up a branch of the IWP in Bray; Costello was trying to persuade them to "stand for physical force". This would imply acceptance of IRA hegemony.

Costello I had counted among the leaders of the politicisation process, yet according to this, of which I was unaware at the time, he was even then still steeped in the 'physical force as principle' culture, so derided by Connolly. I had hoped in the 'Garland Commission' process to replace this pathology with some sort of democratic political culture, based on class alliances and common interests. CDG went back to Liverpool on June 24.

The August 1969 Crisis

This supports the hypothesis that the Northern IRA units had been re-organised as such, and were under the influence of Mac Stiofain, who wanted to provoke a military response, and that the trend into politicising via the Clubs had gone into reverse. On the other hand, JB could have been absorbing disinformation spread by those planning the pogrom. The lack of arms in Belfast supports the latter hypothesis.

There was a meeting on August 16 1969 in King St, the CPGB HQ, between representatives of the 3 CPs; Micheal O Riordan for the IWP, Hughie Moore and Jimmy Stewart for the CPNI, John Gollan, George Matthews, Palme Dutt and others for the CPGB; CDG and SR were there as from the Irish Committee of the CPGB; they sat with MOR. JG opened by introducing a Soviet statement which had come on the teleprinter, said to be 'erroneous'. CDG was worried in case they would concentrate on setting the USSR to rights, but his fears were groundless; Gollan led off with '...a serious and understanding statement which showed he was a man of considerable imagination. Naturally the Russians deserved an answer, but after some discussion they decided not to give it priority, but to concentrate on bringing out a tripartite statement, which they did, CDG doing the drafting. The IRA statement was mentioned in passing; MOR had studied it and concluded it was Goulding's; CDG had thought it might have been mine. It was indeed Goulding's.

Without having the text of the statement to hand, it is possible to infer from CDG's notes that they wanted reform imposed on Stormont by legislation at Westminster under Article 75 of the GIA, rather than to support Taoiseach Jack Lynch's call for UN intervention. Simply to withdraw the troops would be a recipe for extended pogroms.

On August 22 1969 CDG arrives in Belfast, and rings JB, who '...had his bellyful of "breaking the deadlock"..', but was helpful; they went to see Andy Barr: '..he was quite shaken. He is an extremely pleasant person, and was pleased when I told him we intended to pursue the encouragement of reconciliation between the two religions. He said that perhaps he had gone too far in trying to keep open relations of co-operation with Protestants. The trouble was now that men he had known all his life would no longer talk politics with him. The events of the past few weeks had converted the moderates into bigots..'.

Later he sees Gerry Fitt, who described the desperation on the Falls Road and the demand for arms. He had rung Callaghan and got a secretary; finally he got through to the man himself, and soon afterwards the troops came in. Presumably Callaghan had consulted Wilson. Subsequently Callaghan promised to disarm the B-men, and assured Fitt that the reason he was not doing it at one blow was that the arms would then mysteriously disappear. Fitt was on top of the world, and quite convinced that what had happened was a result of a 'plan' that CDG and he had hatched in the car on the road between Liverpool and Manchester. The next step was to get the B-Specials to fire on the British troops. '...Between you and me that's being fixed up now..'.

I have looked back at this entry, which was on May 26 1968, and I can see no evidence of a 'plan' as such, but some evidence that Fitt was in a position to influence Wilson to be critical of the RUC and B-Special situation.

The same day he toured the Falls area with Jimmy Stewart, observing the barricades, and how they had defended themselves against the pogrom. There were 75,000 people behind the barricades. CDG concluded that '..this was no spontaneous pogrom, but a highly organised and well prepared attempt to drive the Catholics out of the city and set up a Paisleyite dictatorship to forestall the introduction of democratic rights..'.

Coming down to Dublin he observed the 'solidarity' meeting on O'Connell St, encountering CMacL, AC, RHWJ, Derry Kelleher, John de Courcy Ireland, Micheal O Loingsigh, Con Lehane, MOR '...indeed everybody..'. He mentioned to AC that he had missed his Democrat deadline. AC went off to a meeting in the UI office. The reason AC let CDG down over his deadline was that AC was helping to produce a special issue of the UI. Noel Harris remarked to him that AC seemed to be following in RJ's footsteps. MOR remarked that "Tony thinks he's following Desmond, but he's not". It seems I tried to defend AC on grounds of the urgency of the situation. According to Cathal AC had produced a document for the WTS which they had had to throw out. CDG noted that Andy Barr had produced a document for a Belfast CPNI meeting which they had to reject; he got this from Jimmy Stewart.

CDG then goes on to record a hearsay version of the state of my marriage to Mairin, which was then somewhat acute, but what he recorded was Mairin's version at second hand, which was subject to considerable embroidery. CDG's knowledge of relationships between the sexes was limited and rarely insightful. Indeed, from here on it is evident that CDG's assessment of the present writer's character and situation is increasingly biased by embroidered and sensationalised hearsay via the feminine grapevine, in a marital breakdown situation. He never thought to check out my side of the story, or to explore the hypothesis that there might be rational explanations behind apparently odd behaviour.

Back in London from August 23 CDG works on the paper, and Volume 20 of the journal ends on August 31 1969.

Volume 21

In London on September 20 1969 Sean Redmond picks up that one (Brendan) McGill was setting up a branch of 'Solidarity' in London, with the effect of undermining NICRA. CDG: '..it would place the fund-raising functions in the hands of the IRNVE ('Irish Republic Now Virtually Established'). There is plenty of method and no madness. Having stolen the CA methods in the only way it could be stolen by intervention from Belfast with the foolish help of Edwina Menzies and the rest of them, they now propose to switch control to Dublin. This will reduce the movement to a money-making racket. The main consideration of Sinn Fein has always been to prevent or forestall any independent working-class initiative wherever it is. And of course RHWJ with his Fanonist 'socialism without the workers' was the very thing they wanted..'.

He keeps on unfairly blaming Fanon for my valid observation that the Irish working people, being mostly with petty-bourgeois aspirations, are seldom paragons of Marxist working-class culture. It is therefore a somewhat disillusioned CDG who goes off cycling in Wales, filling his journal with interesting observations on everything but Ireland. He does not return to Liverpool until October 16, and then to London on October 20, when he records what he interprets as a snub from Gerry Fitt:

I am indebted to Anthony Coughlan for adding the next two entries, in response to an enquiry about the above 'snub' from a Fitt biographer:

OCTOBER 20 Monday: CC(Charlie Cunningham) told me that when they all went to lobby at the House of Commons GF(Gerry Fitt) was there and, seeing SR(Sean Redmond/ CA General Secretary), said 'Hallo,Tom,' - This, says Charlie Cunningham, was a calculated snub, but Sean Redmond replied cooly, 'Tom's in Dublin.'

OCTOBER 21, Tuesday: I asked SR(Sean Redmond) about Gerry Fitt. He did not think there was anything wrong with him but absorption in himself and a somewhat naive faith in the Labour Party for doing what they have. He had travelled back from Brighton with Fitt, Paul Rose and Frank Pakenham. One could detect the inner awe when he said 'Lord Longford'. All the world loves a Lord!

The above suggests that the 'snub' related to the Connolly Association, of which SR was then in the lead, rather than to Greaves himself; Fitt (intentionally?) mis-identified Sean as Tom his brother. RJ 08/12/06.

Then on October 22 1969:

CDG finds out about a court-case in Huddersfield, involving Eamonn Smullen and others, in an attempt to get arms. It is not clear what is involved; is the IRA re-organising as such? In fact it seems to have been a 'sting', a police trap, which some people fell for, in the then emotionally heated atmosphere. The republicans in Dublin got diverted into a 'release the prisoners campaign' as a result, to the detriment of the politicisation process, already strained by the NI events.

The next day October 23 CDG notes an attempt to recruit Peter Mulligan, a CA stalwart, into the IRA. It is indicated that there apparently is an intention to resume military action in 1971. This must be an indication that Mac Stiofain's followers are already active, prior to the split. It is basically confirmed in Mac Stiofain's memoirs, in principle, though not in detail. He was engaged in active military planning from 1967, either under the false impression that this was what Goulding actually wanted, or, alternatively, with the intention of actively restoring the military agenda, despite the then Army Council policy.

It seems I had been over in London on business, and had been staying with Sean Redmond. CDG records an encounter in the Lucas Arms on October 24. It seems I was somewhat self-critical, but was inclined to be dismissive of the proposed 1971 resumption of hostilities, though aware of the possibility that I might be kept in the dark. The Kerry republicans had broken with Dublin, and now there was a meeting in Belfast; Jimmy Steele was involved. I was in two minds about going forward for the Ard Comhairle. The question of 'petite-bourgeois organisational pre-suppositions' came up; I had earlier been aware of this as a problem and had wanted to discuss it with CDG, but he had been dismissive. We concluded, good-humouredly, that I was, like JJ, before my time, too impulsive, too talkative, and too keen on print.

The Connolly Association conference met on November 30 1969; CDG characterises it as a 'recall of the one wrecked by NICRA'. There were delegates from Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, Oxford and London; the MCF was there, and a few LP and TU people. Hume it seems is in favour of people joining the Ulster Defence Regiment. CDG regards the formation of latter as an 'astute move' on the part of the British, going on to make the remark that '..the absence of theoretical clarity in Belfast Left circles seems to prevent their extending influences on the nationalists, who are heavily divided... the IRA members of London NICRA were at the NICRA conference in Belfast..'.

On December 6 CDG receives a letter from Micheal O'Riordan, who wants to meet with him urgently, to discuss the question of the republican/IWP school, which had been off, but is now on again. He mentioned that he had finished his life of Frank Ryan. This was the 'Sheelin Shamrock' school, which occurred subsequent to the split, and represented another high point in the left-republican convergence process. More on this later.

In Belfast on December 17 1969 CDG encountered Betty Sinclair, now 'rehabilitated'. She had heard of this 'National Liberation Front' between the republicans and communists; what did it mean? '...She thought the republicans complete amateurs and was hesitant about entering into formal arrangements with them, the more so since it would seem that they would take things their way...'. The Belfast Trades Council was losing affiliations due to amalgamations. When CDG told her Sean Redmond was leaving she said she would not mind the job herself. She would never have returned to Belfast had not McCullough persuaded her. Jimmy Stewart was taking on a full-time position in the Party, but Betty thought the position was not healthy, as a number of Protestant members were falling out. JS was now caught up like JB in the excitement of republicanism, and was now talking like the IRA.

Later in the Engineers Club with Betty and John McClelland he picks up that '..the Protestant community is sour and suspicious. Arms are coming in all the time. Everybody confidently predicts civil war and regards it as inevitable. Of NICRA he says they are all at sea. The McCluskeys helped "Peoples Democracy" oust Betty. Now they want to remove those who did the former service for them; above all they cannot grasp British responsibility. As for Edwina Menzies who was to replace Betty and set things straight again, she is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Not that I would have any sympathy for her, after the way she came over to London reporting that she had accepted the bogus London "NICRA" (another name for the IRA) because they could gather people "who would not work with the Connolly Association"..'.

Down to Dublin on December 18 1969 where CDG meets with Micheal O'Riordan. The joint school is to be in a hotel in Cavan. There is a proposal to amalgamate the IWP and the CPNI into the CPI. CDG was uneasy about the name, and would have preferred if they had agreed on a joint programme and action first. He goes on: '..I think that recent events have toppled them too far. They do not see that the anti-imperialist forces went into action ideologically unprepared and without their allies, or the allies they could have had later. The two qualities which so often go with Irish courage are precipitancy and intellectual arrogance. And these are about in plenty now. MOR thinks that if they combine forces they would have to think of a national policy. So he is set on speedy reunification and showed me a document. I said nothing, but I had it in my pocket. Betty Sinclair had given me it. It has its points. But it smacks of the "National Liberation Front", which they say is RHJ's invention.... Incidentally they tell me that the IRA has had schools and that they use the group system favoured by the British CP, and who introduced it to them? The same man, I do not doubt without acknowledgement...'.

I did indeed introduce the group system, with discussion of issues introduced in plenary session, and subsequent feedback to the plenary, and I probably did credit the CPGB with having pioneered it in the 1940s, though it had by then become quite general, and could hardly have been regarded as 'CPGB property'! Is this perhaps a slightly 'petit-bourgeois' attitude on the part of CDG?!

There is a record on December 20 1969 of an encounter with the present writer, on his home ground. It seems I assured him that Brendan McGill, who had been behind various London events, was not acting for the IRA, but was linked with the Blaney group who were influencing the Derry movement from Donegal, in the Fianna Fail interest. CDG found this incredible, as he did my assertion that the Dublin leadership was not behind the Smullen episode in Huddersfield. I told him I had pulled out from all leading bodies, and that the recent Convention had voted 31/8 in favour of political participation. The SF Ard Fheis of course was still to come, as indeed was the verdict of the electorate.

On January 12 1970 CDG notes the result of the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis; the present writer has after all gone on the new Ard Comhairle, with CG and TMacG; Ruane, who had been a CDG contact, having gone with the breakaway group. He indicates that he is 'glad RHJ has stuck it out. After all he got them into the mess as I told him he would, and to pull out would be impossible..'.

In Dublin on January 17 in discussion with CMacL CDG opines that the split arises from the outmanoeuvring of the civil rights movement in the north, and the consequent discredit of the republican policy of political action. He attributes the failure in part to what he calls my 'Fanonist nonsense, socialism without the working class', but also to '..failure to tackle the Northern thing on sensible lines..'.

In London on January 21 1970 CDG notes that London Clann are pro Stephenson and Birmingham pro-Goulding. He urges the CA people to do nothing to make things worse in SF, and remarks that '..the influence of republicanism will be minimal for a number of years..'. The next day CDG notes that '..RHWJ's follies had contributed to the position..' and that he will continue to receive both papers, but will support neither faction. The Huddersfield episode, it seems, was 'official' and Goulding was standing by Smullen and co. The Dagenham arms raid was 'unofficial'.

In other words despite the best politicising efforts of RJ and others, the movement on both sides of the split was reverting to traditional mode, under the pressure of the Northern events.

On January 24 1970 CDG has a reflective entry on his '..next moves after RHJ's nonsense has probably put republicanism out of operation for some years if not permanently. He has infected AC who has been showing a new and typical blind arrogance in policy matters, though it was left to RHJ to find out the reason. I wrote to Barry Desmond and dropped the hint that if Labour now made a strong national stand, they might become the leading opposition party now that Fianna Fail... is treating Labour as the enemy - as a rival for the fleshpots of course, now that go-getters Justin Keating and Conor Cruise O'Brien are in it..'.

Back in Dublin on January 29 1970, initially on the historical trail, CDG picks up from CMacL that Tony Meade had called, was happy about the split, glad that Stephenson had gone; Brady had denounced CG and RHJ. The next day he talks to Sean Nolan, who agreed the split was madness, taking place in a situation of extreme weakness; there would be much bitterness; the breakaways would look for martyrs; there would be many disillusioned people. RHJ and AC should be in the IWP.

Then on January 31 1970 he called on the present writer, who seemed '..perfectly sanguine.. there was no-one of any ability among the breakaways..'. I was under the impression that the 'official' politicising structures were holding, and that the Northern Executive of the Republican Clubs had replaced the 'Northern Command' structure. CDG however picked up the impression that I was not told everything; I was not aware, for example, that Costello had been in London. I was it seems unable to give a satisfactory account of Belfast, and was under the impression that Jimmy Steele had no influence. Kevin McCorry was taking over the NICRA as a full-time operation. CDG sums up the situation as one of '...complacent sectishness..'.

He was of course quite right. We had totally underestimated the extent to which Mac Stiofain had been actively building the Northern Command structure, outside of the political process. CDG then went back to Liverpool via Belfast, where he picked up some angles on the scene from an Orange taxi-driver.

Back in Britain CDG deals with CA business, mostly in London, with some travelling around; then on March 7 1970 he receives a letter from the Belfast NICRA relating to their Covenant campaign, which includes a reference to the Bill of Rights, which entity CDG regards them has having stolen from the CA without acknowledgement, and tends to blame AC, whom he accuses of wanting to keep himself free from the 'taint of communism' by suppressing its CA origins.

In Belfast again on March 15 1970 CDG attends the conference which marks the unification of the CPNI and the IWP into the CPI. He was on the IWP invitation list but not on that of the CPNI. There were over 100 people there; the proceedings was opened by Andy Barr, who reminded people that there never was an actual decision to divide the two parties, it was 'brought about by objective circumstances'. It took place during the war, on the entry of the USSR. Jimmy Stewart and Micheal O'Riordan spoke, followed by Edwina (nee Menzies) Stewart who called for a 'Civil Rights Charter' to be added to the Constitution of NI by the Westminster Government. There were greetings from some 20 CPs in various countries. When it was over Sean Nolan asked him if he had any misgivings. He said he had: '..but it is done. The problems you haven't solved before reunification you will have to solve after it..'. Sean Nolan put this in his final speech, and also another thing CDG told him, that they would have to make the working class republican.

Then he goes down to Dublin, in the company of AC, who it seems had been present as an observer, presumably in his capacity as the Dublin correspondent of the Irish Democrat. The next day March 16 1970 he spent some time with Cathal Goulding, who called in to MacLiam's house. '..Some of the bounce had gone out of him. He was more inclined to be self-critical... too busy in his business to get around to see people..'. The Belfast events did them terrible harm, specifically '..having no guns..'. CG tended to blame the lack of guns on the Belfast people themselves: '...the test of a man when the movement is broke is how deep he'll dig into his own pocket..'.

Note the apparent assumption that lack of Falls Road guns was the problem, rather than the existence of the armed Protestant B-Specials as a component of the Crown forces. Thus the pogrom succeeded in its objective, of making everyone thing in terms of guns for 'defence'.

CDG went on to remark that the difference between the (official) UI and the (provisional) Poblacht did not warrant a major split. Goulding responded: '..Stephenson wanted the abstention issue discussed so as to kill it quickly. When we proposed delay as there was no election in sight, Costello challenged him "are you afraid to fight it out?" So it was discussed, and the result was the split..'.

CG goes on to discuss Costello, the North, British policy, Federation. There is a mention of RHJ in this context. CG '..thought the British policy was to weaken and confuse the Unionists in the hopes of imposing a federal settlement..'. As regards NICRA, whereas Betty Sinclair said she would have striven to keep the McCluskeys, CG thought they were better out of the way. They either had to be rid of them, or have NICRA dominated by Fianna Fail. He claims that FF leaders are always wining and dining at Dungannon Castle. He says Curry .... mixes socially with the Unionists, despite his political opposition to them. They are quite convinced he would fall for federation.

CDG concluded '..one gets the impression of a very imperfectly centralised organisations..'. CG had been invited as a 'fraternal delegate' to the CPNI conference. He asked CDG had he misgivings about this CP reunification; he said he had, but asked CG for his: '..I saw the CPNI as a door to the Protestant workers, if they become anti-Partition they may close it..'. CDG replied that he thought that in that case they would have to make the trade union movement the door.

Then, on the question of the 'Irish Republic Now Virtually Established' CG was dismissive: '..revolutionaries must work from things as they are. For my part I cannot see any broad basis of politics being evolved from anybody but dedicated Marxists. They will show the way to the future...'. CDG goes on: '..it struck me that CG is now in a transitional phase. Joe O'Connor in London expressed the opinion that the Goulding IRA will go CPI and the other become the recognised IRA. It would be a pity in ways. But I think this might be true of Goulding. That he has enormously matured is certain...'.

Later: '..I saw RHJ again for a few minutes. It struck me that he was conscious of having lost influence. CG goes to MOR now not to him. As I left the house he said "I want to talk with you - about philosophy". It was because I had accused him of following Fanon...'. The next day he records that I pointed him in the direction of Ned Byrne, Kevin O'Byrne's father, who knew Mellows. Then he went back to London to work on the paper.

There is a lengthy entry on April 12 1970 which goes into the question of 'abolition of Stormont', the London NICRA, and 'Stephenson's IRA' which '..has come out for it..'. There is a move on foot to get 'direct rule' into the MCF. '..The "provisional IRA" of course think that any sacrifice is worth getting a direct line-up of Ireland versus England. They cannot see the projected sequel of a federal union, or indeed how they could pursue the struggle from the south..'. This could be important and needs further elaboration.

There is a reference to the Connolly Association conference on April 18 1970; some people nominated for the EC did not show up; CDG had to draft the main resolution himself. AC was there. Volume 21 of the Journal continues up to the end of May, with long entries, but little or nothing which is germane to developments in Ireland.

Volume 22

The next day June 6 1970 he has the following to say: '..they never succeed in anything. They belong to a class that cannot win. And yet the glamour surrounds them. For all the talk of "socialism" they are clearly opposed to it. They make blunder after blunder... talking about a "National Liberation Front". That is RHJ's invention. I am inclined to think the IWP are foolish to change their name to CPI and have this non-organic amalgamation, or shall we say, incompletely organic. Clearly the masses are miles away from them. And though CG also doubted its wisdom, it is to co-operate with the republicans (I suspect) that he did it..'.

The 'NLF' canard has assumed, to my mind, an undue importance in people's minds. It was never intended as a slogan or a name of a confederating body, or a real movement involving any formal amalgamation. It was used by Mac Stiofain and others to imply the existence of a 'communist threat'. Insofar as I ever used it, it was to connote a process of expansion of the movement to soak up a broader range of progressive forces than Sinn Fein itself, and the embedded politicising IRA who were activating Sinn Fein. The 'Freedom Manifesto' as published in the February 1970 United Irishman is an outline of what we then had in mind for a broader movement.

We were never very specific about this process, but the feeling I had was that the IWP-CPNI amalgamating into the CPI was politically a non-starter, and would be moribund due to the dead hand of Stalinism. People disillusioned with this might be able to think their way into joining an expanded, integrated and politicised republican movement which, as well as the primary objective of national unity through democratic reform in the North, had the core democratic Marxist objective of attaining democratic control over the capital investment process, and creating a friendly environment for co-operative enterprise. The 'NLF' was, for a time, a convenient in-house label for this concept, which we used during internal discussions. We never managed to think of a good name for the concept, although viewed retrospectively it was perfectly valid, taking on board as it did a recognition of the developing crisis in post-Stalinist Marxist orthodoxy, which came to a head subsequently in 1989.

CDG went to Belfast on July 15 1970 and observed the militarisation of the scene. Betty Sinclair thought it would be better to have the 26 counties united with the six and federated with Britain than to have this go on. He encountered Madge Davidson and Dalton Kelly in the NICRA rooms, along with a Connolly Youth lad from Dublin; the latter became his '..guide around the ruins..'. The CY were meeting with the British YCL at the weekend; they were critical of the CPGB. CDG tried to explain some of the problems. They observed lads playing football, and soldiers looking on.

Back in the NICRA offices Jimmy Stewart arrived and took CDG up to the '...Defence Committee rooms. There were moves on foot to transform it into a Catholic Defence Committee. The priests were coming in, and NICRA is being denounced as "communist". I felt uneasy about the whole position...'. There was discussion about the Ardoyne proposal to re-route Orange processions; CDG's demand would have been to ban them.

In Liverpool on August 4 1970 CDG has a visit from AC, who attributes the bombs in Belfast to the work of the Provisionals, encouraged by Blaney. They both went down to London the next day. There is talk of Con Lehane paying out on a legacy. The next day CDG spoke on the Irish situation at a CP branch, and recruited a CA member. Then on August 8 he notes a letter '..from RHJ about Belgian factories (!)..'. I have no idea what this was, but it must have related to the increasing concern in Dublin about the EEC implications, with attention diverting from the North, regarded increasingly as a disaster area.

On August 14 1970 CDG notes a letter from CMacL who had been raising money for the Irish Democrat at a private party; Micheal O'Riordan had objected. He also had the news that the present writer was considering standing for the Seanad, to take over Owen Sheehy-Skeffington's seat: '...he certainly couldn't be worse than that individualistic crank and mischief-maker... But Cathal says "what about the republican mantle" and that I should advise RHJ against it for his own sake..'. The next day CDG '...wrote to Cathal and said perhaps going into the Senate would be the best thing for Roy. He could take up issues like pollution, excessive tourist development and so on. It would be no use talking to him as he was incapable of following a consistent course of action, and he might get in, because surely both the IRA and the Government would be glad to have him kicked upstairs..'.

Skeffington had had a heart attack; I had been to see him, and there was some rapprochement; I might even have had his 'blessing', which would have picked up a few votes. I must have been seriously considering it. But I did not in the end take it up; I was too concerned with the problem of how to make a living as an applied-scientific consultant, and this would have been a diversion. The seat went to Mary Robinson.

In Dublin on August 26 1970 CDG took up with O'Riordan the question of ID fund-raising; the latter was apologetic. The background to this was the IWL in the late 50s who used to collect for the Dublin movement masquerading as the CA, in 'Connolly socials' in London. It was an ongoing bone of contention. The next day after visiting the National Library he phones Dr Roy Geary in the Statistics Office, seeking data on prices in Ireland during the Union; he found that no-one had researched this; it was assumed they were at the English level. What about transport and industrial costs? According to Geary he was proposing an entirely new major research, so he decides to '...make a holiday of it..'. This was, I understand, probably in the context of the historical background to CDG's Mellows book. It might however also however have been with the coming EEC situation in mind.

The same evening there was a 'gathering of the clans': Anthony Coughlan, Des Logan, the present writer ('..as confident and incorrigible as ever, no more talk of senates..'.), Micheal O Loingsigh, later Noel Harris, who explained that Sam Nolan was the driving force against Cathal's ID fund-raising party. It emerges from NH that the CPI is '..carried away by the Republican alliance, and that people who were as good as orangemen three years ago are now bright sea-green Republican incorruptibles. I think that they have had so little to do with the Republicans that they cannot criticise them, only follow blindly..'.

There is an entry on October 2 1970 in which CDG records a visit from AC who '..told me that he had been enquiring about the genesis of the contingency plans for the abolition of Stormont which is being plugged in fine style at the Labour Party conference. Every day brings a new convert. Now of all people AC learned about it from RHJ which means that there were quite a few people involved in discussions in Belfast. All those who considered themselves to be high-contracting parties....

This entry goes on at length; maybe it is significant, but I have absolutely no recollection of this situation; maybe other papers will emerge to clarify it. My impression was that we were consistently against abolition of Stormont and for imposed reforms under Article 75 of the GIA, which was basically the Greaves position.

After a trip to Belfast on October 29, where he picks up an impression of NICRA disarray from Betty Sinclair and Kevin McCorry, CDG goes on the Dublin where he encounters talk of the Common Market Study Group in CMacL's place, which was '..doing great work..' including the publication of AC's pamphlet. There is talk of anti-Mansholt demonstrations in Tralee. The CMSG meets in Cathal's on November 2; there is a poor attendance, and unless they get TU support it is as good as lost. The present writer was said to be there '..as ever putting forward speculative nonsense..'. There was talk of an attempt on Cathal Goulding's life in Dundalk, and Micheal O Loingsigh warns AC and RJ that they need to be careful, being the '..two most hated men..'. Later on November 3 it emerges that AC has given up being secretary of the Wolfe Tone Society, and it seems there was an attack on RJ by 'provisionals' (within the society) which I was said to be '..too flustered to repel properly..'. After some disparaging comments on Justin Keating ('..reverting to type..') and on the European Union as a Fascist concept, CDG goes back to Liverpool on November 5.

There is a lengthy entry on November 7 dealing with lobbying Westminster on the Bill of Rights; this probably deserves further analysis. The MPs were it seems introduced first-hand to CS gas on the occasion. There is recorded a phone-call with McCorry in Belfast, and a letter from AC who '..castigates the six-county republicans and the Stewarts who are tailing after them..'. The Stewarts are said to be '..captivated by the romance of republicanism and simply follow the Goulding element blindly..'

On November 22 1970 CDG notes that the Belfast NICRA has endorsed the McRory report, of which he does not approve, writing so to McCorry. Effective local government is gone. The next day he notes that the WTS and the CCL in Dublin have endorsed the draft Bill of Rights. Then on December 1 he learns from Sean Nolan in Dublin that AC is coming to London to attend an EEC meeting; it turns out the next day that AC is to speak at the meeting, filling in for Justin Keating, who has cried off. AC is increasingly putting his efforts into the anti-EEC campaign, the Northern question having become intractable due to the developing Provisional campaign.

On December 11 1970 he gets a letter from one Roland Kennedy, addressing him as 'Dear Sir', and announcing the planning of a massive demonstration for July 11. He goes on '..I was angry and decided not to take it lying down. These people are parasites. They call themselves NICRA, though NICRA Belfast has no branches and its constitution does not provide for it. This enables them to parade in NICRA's cloak..'.

We continue with the Greaves Journal into the 1970s, starting with 1971; the intensity of relevant entries declines, but it remains of interest as background to the evolving RJ context.

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