These notes are based on the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle (National Executive) Minutes, with some additional insights from the United Irishman. They are a continuing record of the third attempt to politicise the Movement in the context of the post-1921 situation. I have interspersed some Mick Ryan (MR) comments where appropriate, and again indicated his active agreement by an * at the start of a paragraph.

After the 1966 Ard Fheis in Moran's Hotel it was agreed that a Coiste Seasta (CS, Standing Committee) should be set up to operate between AC meetings. There are however no CS minutes on record until 13/06/68. There are 'reports from CS' on record in the AC minutes, but these are sketchy, and the AC meetings are infrequent.

[It will be necessary to try to fill this gap by reference to the writer's papers, the Wolfe Tone minutes, the United Irishman and other appropriate sources.]

The United Irishman in 1967

In the February issue the farmers are blocking the roads. There is a Vietnam feature. Tenants in Corporation estates are given voice. Public transport issues are treated. Tony Meade writes on Ballymun and the housing emergency. Noel Kavanagh is on Tory Island. The AGM of the WTS takes place in the West County Hotel: Daithi O'Connell comes from the Cork WTS, Fred Heatley from Belfast. Harry White is in the chair. Noel Kavanagh is secretary, assisted by John Tozer. Uinsean Mac Eoin is treasurer.

This is the peak of the WTS as an all-Ireland supportive intellectual structure. It is far from being an 'IRB' but it does fulfil a role of being a theoretical think-tank.

[There is perhaps need for more UI stuff in this context.]

[There is a gap here in my abstracts of the SF record which can be filled partially from the UI. The SF minutes were still being done by Sean O Bradaigh in Irish; I have scanned them but failed to pick up anything of note, though I may have missed some keywords.]

AC 14/10/67: there was a further reference to this chronic 'social and economic policy'; positions to be taken for the 1967 Ard Fheis motions were proposed.

[MR suggests a need to see de Rossa.]

The 1967 Ard Fheis (Liberty Hall, basement)

The idea was to get the motions into a logical order, so as to encourage a sensible discussion of the issues, and to do compounding where appropriate, in accordance with democratic conference practice. SC however took it as a 'licence to rig or railroad'; he issued voting instructions on bits of paper, to trusties who were in the 'other branch', thus trying to use what remained of the military command structure.

MR: Costello was court-marshaled and suspended for this. MR was O/C of Dublin at the time, and the Dublin Comhairle Ceanntar was actively political. The voting instructions it seems were Goulding and Costello plus about 10 straw men supporters of Costello. Eamonn Mac Tomais ran the (CM? This must have been some aspect of the army politicisation process; not clear what it was) in MR's house in Ranelagh. MR was not on Costello's list.

AC 18/11/67: the report of the steering committee was adopted, after a long an heated discussion, centred round Costello's motion on abandonment of 'abstentionism as a principle'.

The Ard Fheis took place, but unfortunately I do not have the agenda, though I do have two key composited motions, and a long amended version of one of them, proposed by the Ard Comhairle. Group 1 was a composite of motions 1, 4, 12, 15 and 36 and was an attempt to prevent abstention being discussed except every third year. Group 2 was a call for principled participation in assemblies, to be decided on tactical grounds by the Ard Comhairle.

The Ard Comhairle motion 1a is quite long and complex and I give it in full:

This Ard Fheis:

recognising that the Policy of seeking election on an abstentionist platform is a tactic applicable to the situation of a 32 county Dail becoming an immediately attainable and credible national body, derived from the 1918 election, which occurred before the British Government's 1920 Ireland Act partitioned the nation into two States with two Governments and Parliaments; and

recognising that the continuation of this policy in relation to the two partition parliaments up to the present has been reinforced by the experience of those political parties which have entered Leinster House and Stormont and which, in the case of Leinster House, are now proposing to surrender and abandon such partial powers as even this body possesses, either by entry to the Common Market or by economic integration with Britain under the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, to the detriment of the interests of the Irish People;

accepts that under appropriate conditions - which do not at present exist - a policy of revolutionary parliamentary action by disciplined deputies of high quality and purpose, under the control and leadership of a well-organised and politically conscious revolutionary republican movement, linked with outside agitational work and mass-organisation pressure, could be used as a means..

(a) of showing the inadequacy of the present partition parliaments to champion the interests of the people,

(b) of discrediting the claims of the Leinster House parliament to be the legitimate repository of political sovereignty over the Irish nation as a whole,

(c) of struggling to maintain and extend the rights and interests of the Irish People against the sell-out policies of the partitionist parties and of transferring real legitimacy, sovereignty and power to a 32 county assembly with the mass support of the organised people and the armed revolutionary movement;

(d) This 32 Co assembly would be set up simultaneously with the initiation of revolutionary parliamentary action and would act as a focus for the ensuing struggle for National Unity and Independence;

and accordingly instructs the incoming Ard Comhairle

1. to examine and analyse the most suitable basis for convening such a 32 county national assembly and of bringing about the appropriate conditions for revolutionary parliamentary action referred to,

2. to evaluate in so doing the experience of national revolutionary movements in other countries, and

3. to report back on this matter to the next annual Ard Fheis or to a special Ard Fheis, whichever is considered suitable.

This compromise motion did not attempt to amend the Constitution, but set up procedures for the incoming AC to take a hard look at the whole philosophical basis of abstentionism. It provided for a procedure which could have rendered the 1968 'Garland Commission' unnecessary; the objective of the latter was to continue this process, initiated in 1967, under which the politics of principled parliamentary participation could be discussed in depth throughout the Movement, in a series of local conferences. The Garland Commission later produced a report, of which copies exist. This tactic was adopted in 1967 and 1968 in an attempt to avoid a split.

If Costello had got his way, the Provisional split would have taken place at this 1967 Ard Fheis, or perhaps at the next one, in the O Liatháin Hall, when the Garland Commission was set up, in a further split-avoiding procrastination. It could be argued plausibly that the split, had it occurred in 1967 or in 1968, would not have given the Provisionals the initial momentum generated subsequently by the 1969 events in Belfast, and would have enabled the politicising movement successfully to contest and build on the mid-Ulster by-election, thus keeping at bay the Queens ultra-left which generated the Bernadette Devlin alternative. This is one of the crucial historical 'might have beens'.

It is evident, in retrospect, that this repeatedly postponed politicisation process had been initiated too late, and was too indecisive and uncertain, to enable a strong, principled and united movement to be developed, fit to face with political weapons the armed B-Special counter-attack of August 1969.

* MR is inclined to agree with the foregoing. Given that a split was imminent, whoever controls the timing of it has the advantage. This advantage was left to the Provisionals, who waited to vote at the 1969/70 Ard Fheis in Jury's Hotel, and then walked out, leaving the movement crippled politically for another year. Costello on this occasion wanted to force a walk-out before the vote, by suitably amending the standing orders, tactically a good move. The development of such a tactic in 1967 or 1968 however was prevented by mutual distrust between the key actors (Goulding, Garland, McGurran, Ryan and Costello).

Sean O Bradaigh's Publicity Report is on record; 18 statements were issued, on matters which included the Belfast shipyard dismissals, the EEC, the farmers agitation, the Potez closure, factory closures in the North, the Dundalk shoe factory, etc. The Defence of the Nation League was commended for its anti-EEC work. Support from Cumainn for the sale and distribution of printed material however had been minimal; notes on SF cumann activity fit to report in the United Irishman remained scanty.

On the whole we get the impression that a lethargic membership was reluctantly following, with heavy hearts, a basically modernising leadership. The 'socio-economic programme' mentioned in 1966 seems however to have sunk without trace.

MR around this time became organiser (IRA/SF) for Dublin and Leinster except Wicklow, the latter being left to Costello. In his memoir he recounted how he had to struggle to get CG to understand the extent to which the organisation was moribund.

The AC met on 9-10/12/67; present were the President TMacG*, VPs Larry Grogan and Joe Clarke; Tony Ruane, Mairin de Burca*, Walter Lynch, Tom Mitchell*, RJ*, Monica Ui Riain*, Mick Ryan*, Seamus Costello*, Eamonn Mac Tomáis; S O Bradaigh had sent apologies.

In this situation the VPs both were representatives of Laffan's SF3. I have marked the proto-SF4 CG-supporting politicising group with *s. It was somewhat uneasily divided at this point. Monica Ui Riain was Mick Ryan's mother; she lived in the East Wall area, and had good local standing.

There was discussion of a letter; Richard Behal was prevented from speaking at a public meeting. Behal was regarded as a promoter of somewhat adventurous direct action. He was active in the Waterford area.

Specialisations were agreed for AC members: Tony Ruane Finance, Sean O Bradaigh Publicity, RJ Education. On the proposal of SC seconded by RJ the post of Director of Industrial Activity was created, with a view to cultivating relations with the Trade Union movement. This was taken up by SC. Goulding proposed Sean Garland as National Organiser, with terms of reference to act '...on behalf of the Army and the UI...assist with the educational programme...and the director of industrial disputes... to sit in on CS meetings and be co-opted to the AC. This was proposed by CG, seconded by EMacT and passed unanimously.

There was clearly here differing perceptions. The old military / IRB tradition would have seen it in terms of 'infiltrating' trade unions and 'assisting' industrial disputes with various kinds of quasi-military direct action. The politicising people would have seen it in terms of participating in the democratic organisations of the working people, and giving a lead where appropriate. The divisions between these perceptions however were somewhat fuzzy.

* Sean Garland was then co-opted; also the regional representation was ensured by co-opting Eddie Williams from Cork and Paddy Kilcullen from Mayo, both of these being Goulding supporters.

It was also agreed from then on to record the minutes in English, recognising the de facto situation regarding the need for accurate and transparent record-keeping.

The Coiste Seasta (CS) was then elected: it consisted of WL, MdeB, TMacG, RJ, CG, TR, SG and SO'B.

The motions from the AF which had not been discussed there were dealt with. All those leading to actions in favour of working people and their organisations were adopted. They also adopted the aim of Sinn Fein as being a Socialist Workers Republic, with the intention of taking up appropriate international affiliations. This motion was from Bray, and originated with Costello. Motions to do with taking seats or otherwise were referred to the next Ard Fheis.

There was a discussion on the Mid-Ulster question and it was decided to hold meetings in the constituency with the Clubs as a matter of urgency, and the delegate this to the CS.

The voting for the AC in the 1967 Ard Fheis is on record. Goulding topped the poll at 95, Sean O Bradaigh came next at 71, and then the present writer, at 70, followed by Costello at 67, Eamonn Mac Tomais at 64, Tom Mitchell at 51, Frank McGlade 44, Mick Ryan 41 and so on.

* I feel the relatively high vote for the present writer needs explanation. I was not all that well known, and did not have any track-record of having 'gone to jail for Ireland', military service or other conventional popularity qualification. It could simply be that Goulding, as the leading politicising moderniser in the movement, ordered the Army people to vote for me, and they obeyed. On the other hand it could be that there was a genuine perceived need on the part of the rank and file to support the sort of approach I had been advocating via the United Irishman and via the various educational seminars which had taken place in the previous year or two. Or it could have been a bit of both. MR tends to agree with the latter; it was a combination of the two factors.

From here on the AC meetings became infrequent, as much of the business got done via the CS. There was thus somewhat of a hiatus in the record until CS minutes came on stream in June 68.

AC 18/12/67: The Republican Clubs in NI were to sell the United Irishman (UI). This was a step in their process of coming out from being underground branches of an illegal organisation, which SF was in NI at the time.

The AF motions are dealt with, referenced by numbers, but we will have to await archive access before we can decode this. The motions included the crucial Garland Commission one.

The possibility of a mid-Ulster by-election was noted.

AC 6/01/68: There was contact from one John Dore who wanted to promote an organised national citizens' campaign in favour of the retention of PR in the election process. Fianna Fail was promoting a referendum to amend the Constitution and get rid of it, thus ensuring its rule in perpetuity, using the British system of election. SG and TMacG were delegated to see him.

It was agreed to context the Wicklow by-election, with SC as candidate (still however on the abstentionist ticket, much to SC's disgust).

MR: Costello refused initially to sign the pledge, but MR and MMcG refused to work with him unless he did. In the end MR was his election agent, though 'on the run' as a result of some Housing Action episode. MR and MMcG spent every weekend in Wicklow, along with about 10 others, including the present writer. He discovered that there was no organisation in Wicklow outside Bray. Costello got 2200 votes.

AC 23/03/68: Frank McGlade was now included, co-opted to represent the NI Republican Clubs, which were the legalising SF Cumainn under a new politicising banner. It was noted that the CS had handled the correspondence, and there was a CS report, but we will have to await archive access for this, if it exists.

* Costello felt let down over the lack of support he got in the Wicklow by-election. Clearly the movement was voting with its feet on the matter of contesting elections under abstentionism.

* Malachi McGurran was appointed organiser for Ulster, and an educational conference was arranged for Belfast. On this matter I can interpolate my own memoir. The objective of this educational conference was to introduce the Belfast movement, which hitherto had been dominated by considerations of illegality, to the opportunities for working in open political mode, once the Civil Rights issues were addressed, and concessions won. It was therefore necessary to give total priority to open work under the CR banner. I was to attend it and make this case.

MR was appointed organiser for the whole of Leinster, including Wicklow, Costello's weakness having been exposed.

The NI authorities however acted first. They had their spies, and knew our movements, which in any case were quite open. In the context of a visit to the Belfast Wolfe Tone Society prior to the planned conference, I encountered a gentleman who subsequently turned out to have been a 'plant'. He said he wanted to join Sinn Fein, and proffered a membership application form, which I accepted, not smelling a rat, though with hindsight I should have done. I did not take seriously enough the actual illegal status of SF in NI.

Subsequently I was picked up by the RUC and held in the Falls Road police station. They went through every bit of paper I had on me, but by sheer good luck failed to pick up the SF application form. Betty Sinclair, the secretary of the Belfast Trades Council, and a leading member of the CP, got wind of my predicament, via Fred Heatley, of the Belfast Wolfe Tone Society, with whom I had been when picked up. She came with her NICRA and Trade Union auras, and argued forcefully that they had no reason to be using their Special Powers in my case. So in the end I was released, but the Belfast meeting was aborted, and the understanding of the opportunities presented by the opening up of Civil Rights, in the case of the Belfast Republican Clubs, was delayed.

Returning to the minutes of 23/03/68: I am on record as having proposed setting up a sub-committee to examine the Sinn Fein Constitution. This was referred to the CS.

There were some problems with Na Fianna and the Dublin Housing Action Committee. I seem to remember that Fianna tents were used for emergency housing.

There was a draft article on the 'Sinn Fein Definition of Socialism' which had been asked for by the Irish Democrat. Costello insisted that this be circulated to Cumainn rather than sent to the Democrat.

I have a copy of this draft document, which amounts to over two pages of foolscap, duplicated, impossible to scan in. I will try to summarise its essentials:

It begins by referring back to the 1967 Ard Fheis amendment which refers to a 'Democratic Socialist Republic in accordance with the 1916 proclamation', and the key concept is 'cherishing all the children equally', this being inconsistent with large-scale inheritable private property. Connolly's formulation is suggested: 'the application to the ownership of the means of production of the democratic principle of the Republican ideal'. What follows expands on this.

The 'democratic socialism' as defined in the context of the British Labour Party is rejected as a phony facade. We need to make our own definition, in terms of how to democratise the production process, seen as comprising 4 elements, supply, production, distribution and management, the latter being an essential part. There is a fifth element, ownership, which is in a different category. When this is under capitalist rules, ownership has over-riding rights, and sets management against the rest with orders to maximise profits, under criteria which ignore the social investment in the skills of the work-force.

Socialism rejects private ownership of the means of production, counter-posing social ownership. This can be municipal or co-operative in form, with decisions taken by elected management committees, from groups of those directly concerned. Examples are given. Large firms would function under policies decided by delegate conferences. Small family retail outlets would own collectively their wholesale distribution systems. Managers would implement policies defined by management committees, in the interests of the people co-operatively owning the firm: workers, consumers and suppliers, in due proportion, depending on the nature of the business and its environment.

The State as known today would no longer exist; it would be replaced by federations of peoples' organisation. Parties would exist, uniting common-interest groups; three such groupings were suggested, with an 'activist group' catalysing the interaction between the other two, but without a dominant role.

Some feedback came in during June on the 'definition of socialism', and this is on record with the present writer. People preferred co-operative rather than municipal ownership, and were uneasy about the potential for evolution into a 'one-party State'; a 'no-party state' was preferred, with elections to management committees of individual citizens known to electors. I have however no record of an integrated amended document having been prepared or agreed. I think we regarded it as an educational or consciousness-raising procedure, rather than a decision-making procedure.

The CS minutes for its first year or more are missing. Maybe they did not get around to keeping them, seeing the CS as a routine administrative operation. The next Ard Comhairle meeting took place on 18/05/68 No replies from Cumainn had been received regarding the 'definition of socialism' paper.

The question arose of finding a means for ensuring the legal existence of the Republican Clubs in NI, with SF banned, such as to enable them to participate in the Ard Fheis as affiliated Cumainn. I undertook to draft a Constitution which would serve this purpose.

It was reported that sales of the United Irishman were on the increase. This was a consequence of secret meeting of Army unit OCs, which had taken place earlier in a 'safe house' north of Nenagh, at which this task was accepted as part of the Army politicisation process. Increasingly it was the accepted duty of Army people to give priority to activating SF Cumainn, and making things happen at the political level. There were however those who accepted this role grudgingly, or simply withdrew, to come out of the woodwork later when the Provisionals emerged.

Mick Ryan has filled in that this meeting was in Andy McDonnell's house near Pallas; he agrees it was a turning point, being a recognition of the key role of the UI as an organiser and purveyor of ideas, on the Leninist principle. He expanded on this in his 1998 published memoir.

June 1968: Coiste Seasta Minutes Begin

CS 13/06/68 The Connolly Youth requested a representative to attend their annual convention. There was a call for protests relating to the contents of the proposed Criminal Justice Bill, which had been drafted in response to the situations created in the 'Housing Action' campaign, dealing with squatting etc.

CS 01/07/68 TMacG CG SG MdeB RJ were present; the political transformation is moving things in the direction of the CS basically being CG's 'HQ Staff', with the latter ceasing to meet as such. There were contacts with Melbourne and the Scottish Nationalists. Industrial issues existed at the de Beer diamond factory at Ennis, and with the proposed closure of the Potez aircraft factory. TMacG agreed to take RJ's draft Republican Club Constitution and filter it for issues that needed to be addressed via Ard Fheis resolutions. The Ard Fheis was fixed for November 31/Dec1.

CS 08/07/68 TMacG reported on the Scottish Nationalists' Convention. Copies of the Republican Clubs constitution were to be printed and distributed in the North.

CS 15/07/68 It was noted that the status of the Republican Clubs Constitution was that it was a facade for public consumption in the North, given the legal situation there; the real Constitution was that of Sinn Fein. A meeting was to be called of all SF Councillors to prepare resolutions for the General Council of County Councils (GCCC).

AC 20/07/68 Liberty Hall for the Ard Fheis; Sean O Cionnaith to be Organiser for Connaught. Support for Austin Currie and civil disobedience in the North. There was a report of an Educational Conference held in June. There was concern about local councillors; it was agreed to write to local Cumainn urging that they write to TDs about local issues. The question of how to commemorate the First Dail (1919-1969) was referred to the CS.

CS 29/07/68 Progress on the PR referendum was reported; also on the campaign on the Potez closure.

SG reported on a Belfast meeting at which it was stated that Betty Sinclair had disagreed with 'holding it under NICRA'. I suspect this was a reflection of a situation where Garland had planned to meet with BS as a contact between the Republican Movement and the Communist Party, but somehow the wires had got crossed, and it had ended up as an NICRA event. Such contacts were going on fairly regularly, with a view to trying to ensure that the NICRA was kept 'cross-community', in the sense of having a Protestant trade-unionist component. This was regarded as important, and the CP was a useful window into Protestant radical activism.

A committee for the 1919 First Dail commemoration was set up; this included Greta Ryan (Mick Ryan's sister, now Ni Murchu) and Eamonn Mac Tomais; it also brought in Cathal Mac Liam, who by then was Chairman of the Dublin Wolfe Tone Society, and Seamus Mac Riocaird. The latter was a 30s stalwart, who had become politicised post-Curragh via the co-operative movement; he ran the Howth Fishermens's Co-op, and had been an active supported of attempts to develop a new wave of co-operative organisation in the West, as part of the process of development of the social concerns of the Movement.

CS 12/08/68 The Proportional Representation campaign was in progress; there was mention of PR Society literature via May Hayes, who was their contact in Dublin. May Hayes had been a Connolly Association stalwart in London; she had retired on pension to live in Dublin (She had been secretary to Captain Harrison, who had been secretary to Parnell, a sort of apostolic succession on the constitutional side.) She was however not active and proved elusive.

The Dungannon NICRA March

I feel I should intersperse here a recollection, as I was there, and so was Anthony Coughlan. The latter, working via the Wolfe Tone Society, was much more actively committed than I was to the specific NI Civil Rights situation. He had produced a written statement for the occasion, and I remember him trying to get it 'read off the platform', or into a situation where it could be read, if there were to be a meeting, with a platform, and words said. His approach was via Fred Heatley, who was an NICRA activist, and a member of the Belfast Wolfe Tone Society. Fred objected strongly, as it had not been discussed in advance. He later claimed, and to the best of my recollection published, that the paper was a 'statement from the Army Council', and that he was right to block it for this reason. I feel I need to go further into this episode.

The paper was Coughlan's own, and he intended it as a genuine attempt to capture the sense of the occasion. It has turned up in my own papers, and I am certain that Fred Heatley was mistaken in his attribution. The Army Council at this time was politicising as hard as it could, and would have had no interest in issuing public statements in such an environment, realising full well their potential for damage.

CS 19/08/68 The Proportional Representation campaign is developing, without May Hayes. The Dublin Comhairle Ceanntair was seeking to build support via the Dublin Trades Council. There were moves to try to co-ordinate the Republican Clubs in the North; a meeting was arranged for Derry on Sept 14, followed by an all-NI meeting, to be held in Monaghan (due to difficulty in getting a place in the North). CG was to contact Anthony Coughlan.

Note that there is a continuing clear acceptance of Anthony Coughlan as the guru for advising the Northern Republicans about how they should relate to the developing Civil Rights campaign. There was an acceptance of him as being 'part of the movement' via the Wolfe Tone Society, with CG as the link.

Regarding 1919 it was noted that Maire Comerford was writing a history.

There was some contact with the Basques.

CS 26/08/68 No action on the Basques, due to splits. The PR referendum question continued. There was a report on the NICRA Dungannon meeting. This had ended with the march being blocked, where the Coalisland road came in, near the hospital; they had a token sit-down; there was some speechifying; it all ended peacefully.

CS 09/09/68 No word from the 1919 committee; Proportional Representation campaign still going on; the projected meeting on Sept 15 was taking shape (Maghera, not Monaghan); 80 delegates were expected; TMacG, CG, TM and Tony Coughlan were to go. This was for the purpose of ensuring that the Clubs understood their role in relation to the broad-based NICRA movement, and the need to keep to restricted CR objectives (no nationalist sloganising or flag-waving etc)

AC 21/09/68 Attention was on the Criminal Justice Bill, and on the 1919 project, for which the Mansion House had been booked for June 21 1969. It was agreed to hand it over to the National Commemoration Committee (the ad-hoc committee referenced earlier having apparently not delivered).

Cathal Goulding laid down an ordinance to the effect that Cumann na mBan was no longer part of the Movement. This had resulted from the development of feminist equality all round, and a sense that there was no need for a special group reflecting traditional female roles. The shell of the organisation at the time was occupied by a traditional apolitical group, regarded by CG as a source of right-wing intrigue.

MR adds some retrospective background to this. He had been chief marshal at Bodenstown. The CP had been there, and had wanted to carry a banner. This was a political decision, and MR referred it to CG, who was indecisive and referred it back to MR, who said OK carry it, whereupon Cumann na mBan refused to march.

CG then went on to give an account of the Maghera meeting. The activists had objected to the failure at Dungannon to break the police barrier; military-type thinking was still the norm. It was agreed that the Republican Club representatives on the NICRA Committee should put their views, but then accept and implement majority decision. A Regional Council was set up, chaired by Malachi McGurran.

CS 30/09/68 Proportional Representation campaign: Irish Congress of Trade Unions had produced a leaflet; this was to be distributed by the Cumainn. Attempts by the Pearse Cumann in Rathmines to contact local Fianna Fail, with a view to public debate, had been blocked by FF HQ. External Cumann contacts in this context were to be encouraged. There was a call be Seamus O Brogain the Cumann secretary for a more comprehensive registration, so as to identify hidden talents.

CS 14/10/68 The final rally of the Proportional Representation campaign was supported, though it was in effect run by Fine Gael. The verdict of the Irish electorate in this case was masterly: they elected de Valera to be President, but rejected his party's attempt to copper-fasten its rule on the Irish people, by retaining proportional representation for the electoral system.

On the Civil Rights question: it was noted that there was a new group in Derry....

[What was this?]

There had been a march in Dublin on the British Embassy and it was agreed that this had been a mistake. It was agreed to write to the 'other branch' to ask for an explanation, to see what thinking had motivated the idea. [Yet CG was on record as having been at this meeting. Why did he not explain there and then? It could have been that he was not actually C/S at this time, due to his having been jailed, though this was about 2 years earlier. This seems anomalous.] It was felt that the Wolfe Tone Society should be in a position to initiate the setting up of some sort of Civil Rights group relevant to the situation in the 26 Counties, which included the Criminal Justice Bill issue. It was agreed to combine meetings of Regional Executives with educational conferences on the same weekend.

CS 21/10/68 Tom Mitchell reported on the Derry events; some 3000 had participated. It was agreed to leave discussion of their significance until the next AC meeting scheduled for 26th. March on US embassy for Nov 2, organised by Irish Voice on Vietnam (this was an informal group involving Peadar O'Donnell and George Jeffares; the latter at this time was the Irish Workers Party foreign affairs expert, and he had successfully focused broad-based public opinion, including many religious groups, against the Vietnam war), Mick Ryan was to organise the stewarding of the march. A statement on the government defeat in the PR referendum was to be issued. The Republican Club in UCD had requested Goulding and Costello to speak. At this time both in TCD and UCD student republican clubs were flourishing, fruits of the politicisation process.

AC 26/10/68 Despite the decision of the previous CS, this was concerned mainly with consideration of the draft constitution which was to come before the coming Ard Fheis. It paid no attention to the opening up of the NI situation arising from the Derry Civil Rights events. Various amendments to the draft were considered, the key one being to make participation in Assemblies (ie Stormont or the Dail) an AC decision on tactical grounds, rather than a 'principle' enshrined in the constitution.

Representatives of the Connolly Youth, the Workers Party and Connradh na Gaeilge were to be invited to the AF.

I had been in Princeton at an AGIFORS meeting when the Derry events took place. I remember seeing the Derry events on TV in the US. The result was that I was not in on the 21/10/68 meeting. I get the impression from the record that the SF leadership was too obsessed with its internal reconstruction problem to appreciate the full significance of the developing Northern situation. I was at the 26/10/68 meeting, and had to go along with its priorities, as I had been in on the drafting process of the constitution.

CS 28/10/68 This was an extended meeting at which CG's regional organisers reported; it was part of the process of CG's 'HQ Staff' being subsumed into the political shell of the reforming Sinn Fein. The core-CS group was all there and consisted of Tomas MacGiolla, RJ, Tom Mitchell, Sean Garland, Sean O Bradaigh, Wally Lynch and Mairin de Burca. Mick Ryan, Bartley Madden and Malachi McGurran were brought in in their capacities as regional organisers for Leinster, Munster and NI (nominally 'Ulster' but NI de facto) respectively.

MR retrospectively regards the choice of Bartley Madden for Munster as having been a disaster; he was quite unsuitable for the job, leaving Munster full of Provisional raw material, though lack of political impact.

MMcG's report is recorded in most detail: a regional executive to be held in Maghera; TM or WL to attend. There were 5 clubs in Belfast, 6 in Armagh, 5 in Tyrone, 7 in Derry. The next NICRA march was fixed for November 16 in Armagh.

The need was noted for the Fianna to meet with the CS. There was Housing Action work in Dun Laoire.

MR suggests Martin Shannon and Liam McNulty as Fianna contacts. However I don't feel up to following these. RJ August 2001.

CS 04/11/68 TMacG CG WL TR SG RJ SO'B TM MdeB... There had been no contact with the Fianna; the latter had not been involved in the politicising process. TMacG and WL reported on the Maghera meeting; all areas had been represented; they wanted to push for a CR march in Derry on November 16 and Armagh November 23 or 30. There were 22 clubs and 4 regional executives. An educational conference was planned for Armagh on December 1. The commemoration at Edentubber on November 10 was to be used as a means of handing over Ard Fheis papers.

This sort of arrangement was still considered necessary, given the illegality of SF in NI; Edentubber was considered a convenient near-border location to which people came annually to commemorate a 50s tragedy. There is however an implied contradiction here. People attending an event linked to 50s militarism would tend not to be in tune with 60s politicisation.

There was a court-case involving one McEldowney in the North; this was innovative in that the movement up to now had not defended itself in court, refusing to recognise its legality. They decided to ask Geoffrey Byng QC to defend; this was a significant nod in the direction of linking with the Left in Britain, and cultivating pro-Irish elements with it. Byng had written extensively on Ireland, Partition and the Special powers.

It was agreed that MMcG would instruct the Clubs not to support in NICRA any move to dislodge Betty Sinclair from the chair. The link with the Belfast Trades Council, and Protestant radical activism, as expressed via the CP, was to be maintained. The NICRA must not be allowed to become simply a protest organisation of the Catholic ghettos.

MR comments retrospectively at this point that McGurran felt that the movement went too far into embedding itself in the NICRA and lost its own political identity.

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Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1999