IQFA has funded specific work of the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (called CPAU). CPAU is a network of Afghan organisations and individuals, with many kinds of projects, and Steve Williams and I have each worked with them on several occasions over the last seven or eight years. IQFA is specifically funding their efforts to strengthen local peace committees by enabling peace committees from different parts of Afghanistan to meet and exchange experiences and ideas.

In March, 2003, Mohammad Suleman from CPAU and I spent several weeks travelling in central Afghanistan in order to document[1] how one district resisted the pressure of the Taliban.

To set the scene.

The Case Study

The Taliban are Sunni Muslim and fundamentalist, largely rural, and ethnically mostly Pashtun. The people of Jaghori District are Shia Muslims, ethnically Hazara, so very different from the Taliban. Their area is remote, underdeveloped, and surrounded by Pashtun areas. They have strong traditions and structures of consultation among all the people, including the women, and a long tradition of support for education and employment for women. It was clear that they would clash very seriously with the Taliban on cultural and religious grounds.

By the end of 1997, Jaghori was one of the few districts which the Taliban had not yet conquered, and it was clear that it would soon be attacked. The people consulted together, as usual, and eventually decided that they would not resist the Taliban militarily. They had two reasons for this: (1) They were sure they could not win militarily, and did not want the consequences of war. (2) They did not want destructive relationships with other ethnic groups, particularly not the Pashtun, who were their neighbours on all sides. So, instead of fighting, they decided to send people to negotiate with the Taliban before any confrontations had occurred in their area. Typically, they analysed the Taliban structures in some detail, and sent three teams to negotiate simultaneously with three levels of Taliban command. They were to offer that Jaghori would not resist and would disarm and disband its militia, provided that the Taliban pledged:

1. not to exact reprisals,
2. not to interfere with their religious practices, and
3. to allow the district to continue to educate girls and employ women.

There were different results at different levels, but, on the whole, they got agreement to the first demand, incomplete acceptance of the second, and nowhere at all on the third. It seemed to be the best deal they could negotiate, so in the end they accepted it.

The impact of the Taliban was predictably grave. There were serious restrictions on religious practice, frequent humiliation of people in public, and a complete closure of schools. In addition, the Taliban imposed a complete boycott on the district, and for a full year, no food or supplies were allowed in or out. The people of Jaghori continued to negotiate with the Taliban and to resist them at every point. They continued to practice their religion as they always had, including sung prayers, which were expressly forbidden by the Taliban, as all music was forbidden.

The most knowledgeable imam in Jaghori went again and again to fight them with Koranic references, and always won these disputations, because he knew the Koran so well. They were allowed to open primary schools for boys, and they continued to educate girls, sometimes dressing them as boys, sometimes hiding the schools, always insisting that girls' education was their highest priority and that the Taliban would find them ungovernable if they refused it. In the end, the Taliban district commander offered a secret deal: they could keep girls' schools open except when delegations of high-ranking Taliban came to inspect the district. And, for the whole year of the boycott, their Pashtun neighbours came secretly at night to bring them food and medical supplies.

Eventually, of course, in 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed. The people of Jaghori escorted "their" Taliban safely home, because intercommunal relations were still important to them.

The people of Jaghori had had some successes. They had prevented battles and casualties. Their solidarity was strengthened, along with their traditions and structures of consultation. They had defended their principles and their priorities, and had kept girls in school and women in some forms of employment (and were the only district to manage to do so.)

Another district

Exchange project

The exchanges began earlier this year, and have been very successful so far, in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important is the opportunity to reflect together, to understand what happened, and to think about alternatives for the future. Here are quotations from two people involved in the process.

The first speaker, from Farza district near Kabul, is a leader of the local shura (religious decision-making body): "Until recently, we knew war, we knew fighting, we knew how to use guns to get what we wanted. After defeating the Taliban, we gave up our guns willingly [to the new government's disarmament programme.] Now, we understand the benefits of peace, the disadvantages of war. This kind of discussion has reminded us of the good things we had, the solidarity, our own good leadership. We must make the same kinds of sacrifices we made for the jihad, but now for peace."

The second speaker, from Jaghori, was actually one of the military commanders who persuaded his young fighters not to resist the Taliban. In speaking of the resistance to the Soviet invasion, he said: "At that time, we were trained in war, but no one offered to train us in peace. Perhaps we would not have listened; it might have been the wrong time. But we are glad that now we are learning to build peace."

It seems to me particularly appropriate that Irish Quaker Faith in Action should support Afghans in putting their faith into action in this way.

[1] The full case study is available at the website of the Collective for Development Action:
http://www.cdainc.com/steps/publications/Cases/STEPSAfghanistanCase.pdf